Snow v. Taylor

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1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
2 DAN W. SNOW,
3 Plaintiff-Appellant,
4 v. No. 35,081
5 KEVIN TAYLOR,
6 Defendant-Appellee.
7 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF LEA COUNTY
8 Lee Ann Kirksey, District Judge
9 Sanders, Bruin, Coll & Worley, P.A.
10 Clayton S. Hightower
11 Roswell, NM
12 for Appellant
13 Max Houston Proctor
14 Hobbs, NM
15 for Appellee
16 MEMORANDUM OPINION
17 SUTIN, Judge.
1 {1} Plaintiff Dan W. Snow appeals from the district court’s order dismissing his
2 claims with prejudice. [RP 60] In this Court’s notice of proposed disposition, we
3 proposed to summarily affirm. [CN 1, 6] Plaintiff filed a memorandum in response to
4 our proposed disposition (MIO), which we have duly considered. Remaining
5 unpersuaded, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s claims with
6 prejudice.
7 {2} In his memorandum in opposition, Plaintiff does not raise new arguments and
8 does not cite any relevant law in support of his position on appeal. Rather, Plaintiff
9 continues to argue that, because the initial judgment was criminal in nature, we should
10 not apply a civil remedy for the restitution and that we should apply a “liberal public
11 policy” to allow Plaintiff to collect restitution because he should be made whole and
12 because Defendant was absent from Texas during the “relevant time period.” [MIO
13 2-3] The only authorities cited by Plaintiff are in support of uncontested, general legal
14 propositions: the various reasons for restitution in Texas [MIO 1-2]; the definition of
15 victim [MIO 2]; the terms for restitution in the Texas criminal rules [MIO 2]; the fact
16 that a liberal public policy should generally be applied to restitution statutes [MIO 2];
17 and the fact that the statute of limitations should generally be tolled when a defendant
18 is absent from the state. [MIO 3] None of the authority cited by Plaintiff refutes the
19 law or analysis in our notice of proposition disposition, and we are unpersuaded by
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1 Plaintiff’s reasoning. See Hennessy v. Duryea, 1998-NMCA-036, ¶ 24, 124 N.M. 754,
2 955 P.2d 683 (“Our courts have repeatedly held that, in summary calendar cases, the
3 burden is on the party opposing the proposed disposition to clearly point out errors in
4 fact or law.”).
5 {3} Accordingly, for the reasons stated in our notice of proposed disposition and
6 herein, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.
7 {4} IT IS SO ORDERED.
8 __________________________________
9 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
10 WE CONCUR:
11 _______________________________
12 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge
13 _______________________________
14 LINDA M. VANZI, Judge
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