Filed Date: 1/12/2004
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/1/2024
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The defendants, as the parties moving for summary judgment, had the burden of establishing, prima facie, their entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr., 64 NY2d 851, 853 [1985]). This burden is not met merely by citing gaps in the plaintiffs case (see Saryian v Ramana, 305 AD2d 400 [2003]; Kucera v Waldbaums Supermarkets, 304 AD2d 531, 532 [2003]; Dalton v Educational Testing Serv., 294 AD2d 462, 463 [2002]). Assuming that the defendants made a prima facie case concerning the identity of the manufacturer and the lack of a specific product defect that caused the plaintiffs injury, the plaintiff carried her burden of raising a triable issue of fact (cf. Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562 [1980]). She established a reasonable probability that the defendants manufactured the exercise bicycle on which she allegedly was injured (see Healey v Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 87 NY2d 596, 601 [1996]; cf. Brown v Elm Plumbing Supply, 271 AD2d 469 [2000]; Escarria v American Gage & Mfg. Co., 261 AD2d 434 [1999]). Moreover, the particular defect, if any, that caused the injury can be established by circumstantial evidence (see Otis v Bausch & Bomb, 143 AD2d 649, 650 [1988]; cf. Klein v Ford Motor Co., 303 AD2d 376, 378 [2003]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court correctly denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
The defendants’ remaining contentions are without merit. Florio, J.P., S. Miller, Crane and Rivera, JJ., concur.