Citation Numbers: 7 A.D.3d 268, 775 N.Y.S.2d 530, 2004 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 6464
Filed Date: 5/4/2004
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/1/2024
Defendant failed to rebut the presumption in Local Law No. 1 (1982) of the City of New York “that, in any building erected prior to 1960, peeling paint in a dwelling unit occupied by a child six years of age or under comprises a hazardous lead condition” (Juarez v Wavecrest Mgt. Team, 88 NY2d 628, 647 [1996]). Given the presumption, it was defendant’s burden to show the absence of hazard, not plaintiff’s to show its existence (cf. Woolfalk v New York City Hous. Auth., 263 AD2d 355 [1999]). Thus, it does not avail defendant to argue that plaintiff’s expert’s tests failed to show the existence of a dangerous level of lead in the apartment. In any event, defendant’s evidence to that effect at best raised only issues of expert credibility as to whether the tests were properly performed and interpreted, which issues were properly submitted to the jury (see Mejia v JMM Audubon, 1 AD3d 261 [2003]). A fair interpretation of the evidence, including, in particular, the testimony of plaintiff’s expert neurologist, also supports a finding that even if the assertedly unreliable fingerstiek test were disregarded, the level of lead in plaintiffs blood was high enough to cause the injuries she suffered (see Seay v Greenidge, 292 AD2d 173 [2002]). The damage awards are not against the weight of the evidence and do not deviate materially from what is reasonable compensation (cf id.; Sampson v New York City Hous. Auth., 256 AD2d 19 [1998]). We have considered defendant’s other arguments and find them unavailing. Concur—Nardelli, J.P., Andrias, Sullivan and Ellerin, JJ.