Citation Numbers: 14 A.D.3d 319, 787 N.Y.S.2d 44, 2005 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13
Filed Date: 1/4/2005
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/1/2024
Appeal from orders, Family Court, New York County (Sara E Schechter, J.), entered on or about May 13, 2003, which, inter alia, found that the mother had permanently neglected the children and that respondent-appellant had been given notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard at the dispositional hearing, and which terminated the mother’s parental rights and freed the children for adoption, held in abeyance, and the matter remanded for a hearing as to appellant’s parental status.
Appellant is the putative father of the children who entered foster care in June 1999. Petitioner agency commenced these proceedings in December 2001, pleading permanent neglect in the first cause of action, against both the mother and appellant, pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b (4) (d) and (7). In the second, petitioner alleged that no person other than appellant was entitled to notice. The third cause of action alleged, alternatively, that appellant’s consent was not required for the adoptions pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 111 (1), and that his rights were limited to notice of the proceeding and an opportunity to be heard concerning the children’s best interests.
Prior to the fact-finding hearing, the court adopted petitioner’s position that appellant was a “notice father” and not a “consent father,” and that appellant knew whether he had done the things that a consent father has to do. Petitioner withdrew its parental neglect claim against appellant, electing to proceed against the mother alone on that ground. After the dispositional hearing, the court found that the children’s best interests would be promoted by the plan of adoption, and granted the petitions.
While it is true that the issue of appellant’s status would have been irrelevant had the agency proceeded solely on its permanent neglect cause of action against him, petitioner was not precluded from seeking a determination that appellant was only a “notice” father and not a “consent” father, once it withdrew