Citation Numbers: 38 A.D.2d 256
Judges: Gulotta
Filed Date: 2/14/1972
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/12/2022
This is an appeal by the petitioners from a declaratory judgment which held four contracts made by two water districts and two sewer districts with the respondent village for the furnishing of water and sewer services to the inhabitants of these districts to be void and unenforceable. The term of each of the contracts is for ‘ ‘ so long as the said district exists ”.
The trial court held that, since these contracts might be operative for more than 40 years and sections 118-a and 119-a of the General Municipal Law, which deal with water supply and sewage disposal, respectively, limit such contracts to a period not in excess of 40 years, they were void ab initio and unenforceable, although only about 10 years have elapsed since the contracts were made in 1961 and 1962.
No New York case in point is cited by the Special Term. The indication in both Corpus Juris Secundum (63 C. J. S., Municipal Corporations, § 979) and McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (3d ed., vol. 10, § 29.100, p. 490) is that in other jurisdictions the problem has been handled in a variety of ways, but the following cases squarely hold such contracts valid for the permissible statutory period: State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Ironton Gas Co. (37 Ohio St. 45), Cartersville Improvement, Gas and Water Co. v. Mayor (89 Ga. 683). An early New Jersey case, Board of Finance of Jersey City v. Mayor (55 N. J. L. 230), held a contract to be void because it might exceed the allowed statutory period, but on appeal (57 N. J. L. 452) the basis for the ultimate decision was on a different ground. Contrariwise, an old Federal court case, Manhattan Trust Co. v. City of Dayton (59 F. 327), held that a contract for an indefinite term would not be valid even for the permissible 10-year period. No persuasive reason was advanced for this approach.
Additionally, it should be noted that the New York statutory provisions and how they apply to our fact situation are not free from doubt. Section 234 of the Village Law, which deals with contracts by a village with other districts for the purchase and sale of water, limits such contracts for the sale of water to 10 years, but permits the village to contract for the purchase of water for 40 years. Section 276 of the same law, relating to contracts between villages and sewer districts for operation and maintenance of sewer systems, in contrast to section 119-a of the General Municipal Law, has no time limit.
Furthermore, section 120 of the General Municipal Law authorizes contracts for the purification of a water supply and sewerage between villages and improvement districts without prescribing any time limit; and section 120-a of that law specifically authorizes a contract between municipalities and sewer districts for sewerage disposal “ upon such terms and for such consideration and length of time as may be mutually agreed upon between all the contracting municipalities ” (emphasis added).
It is our opinion, therefore, that the ordinance of April 20, 1971 of the respondent village, purporting to abrogate the contracts in question, is void and of no effect.
Were this the only issue, we might well finally dispose of this case now as a matter of law. However, there are two factual questiqns which can be determined only after a plenary trial, namely, (1) whether any binding contract exists obligating the respondent village to supply sewerage services to the appellant Satterlee Grove Sewer District and (2) whether there existed a conflict of interest sufficient to vitiate the contracts, by reason of the simultaneous representation of all the parties to the contracts by the same firm of attorneys and by further reason of an undisclosed financial interest of said attorneys in the land developers who were the beneficiaries of these water and sewer agreements.
The judgment should be reversed, on the law, and the case remanded to the Special Term for trial of the factual issues, with costs to abide the event. No questions of fact have been considered.
Hopkins, Acting P. J., Shapiro, Christ and Benjamin, JJ., concur.
Judgment of the Supreme Court, Orange County, entered August 24,1971, reversed, on the law, and case remanded to the Special Term for trial of the factual issues, with costs to abide the event. No questions of fact have been considered.