Citation Numbers: 69 A.D.3d 426, 893 N.Y.2d 28
Filed Date: 1/7/2010
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/1/2024
Defendants satisfied their initial burden on summary judgment by establishing, prima facie, with the submission of the medical reports of their expert neurologist, orthopedist and radiologist, that plaintiff did not suffer a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d). Defendants set forth objective tests supporting their claim that plaintiff suffered no limitation in range of motion.
Plaintiff, in response, raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he suffered a significant or permanent consequential limitation of use of his spine. His chiropractor “identified measurements of loss of range of motion in plaintiffs cervical and lumbar spine, and on that predicate opined that plaintiff suffered severe and permanent injuries as a result of the accident” (Pommells v Perez, 4 NY3d 566, 577 [2005]). The chiropractor adequately related plaintiffs spinal injuries to the accident.
However, plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether his knee injury constituted a serious injury pursuant to Insurance Law § 5102 (d) {see Antonio v Gear Trans Corp., 65 AD3d 869, 870 [2009]; see also Dejesus v Paulino, 61 AD3d 605, 608 [2009]).
Plaintiff also failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to his. 90/ 180-day claim. The fact that he missed more than 90 days of work is not determinative (see e.g. Ortiz v Ash Leasing, Inc., 63 AD3d 556, 557 [2009]); the statute requires plaintiff to be prevented “from performing substantially all of the material acts which constitute [his] usual and customary daily activities” (Insurance Law § 5102 [d] [emphasis added]). Plaintiff’s chiropractor’s affidavit, which said that plaintiff was “totally