Citation Numbers: 69 A.D.3d 566, 892 N.Y.2d 191
Filed Date: 1/5/2010
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/1/2024
Under the common-law doctrine of spoliation, when a party negligently loses or intentionally destroys key evidence, thereby depriving the nonresponsible party of the ability to prove its claim, the responsible party may be sanctioned by the striking of its pleading (see Denoyelles v Gallagher, 40 AD3d 1027 [2007]; Barahona v Trustees of Columbia Univ. in City of N.Y., 16 AD3d 445, 445-446 [2005]; Baglio v St. John’s Queens Hosp., 303 AD2d 341, 342-343 [2003]). However, a less severe sanction is appropriate where the absence of the missing evidence does not deprive the moving party of the ability to establish his or her
On this record, the plaintiff did not clearly establish that the Hospital negligently lost or intentionally destroyed the fetal heart monitoring data for July 19, 1997, the date of Ryan’s birth. The record fails to rule out the possibility that the central monitoring computer system utilized by the Hospital in its labor and delivery unit to electronically store fetal heart data onto an optical disk was properly operating, or the possibility that it malfunctioned on July 19, 1997, due to no fault of any of the parties involved in this action, and resulting in no fetal heart data being recorded or stored for that date. Nor did the plaintiff establish that the unavailability of the fetal heart monitoring data “fatally compromised [her] ability” to prosecute this action (Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v Berkoski Oil Co., 58 AD3d 717, 718 [2009]).
Accordingly, since the plaintiff failed to clearly establish that the Hospital negligently lost or intentionally destroyed the material, the plaintiff was entitled only to the sanction of an adverse inference charge at trial with respect to the fetal heart monitoring data for July 19, 1997, as against the Hospital (see Barone v City of New York, 52 AD3d 630, 631 [2008]). Moreover, the plaintiff failed to show that the alleged spoliation left her “prejudicially bereft” of the means to prosecute the action against the Hospital (Weber v Harley-Davidson Motor Co., Inc., 58 AD3d 719, 722 [2009]; see Jenkins v Proto Prop. Seros., LLC, 54 AD3d 726, 727 [2008]). Accordingly, the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in striking the Hospital’s answer and, instead, should have imposed the lesser sanction of an adverse inference charge at trial with respect to the fetal heart monitoring data for July 19, 1997, as against the Hospital (see Tapia v Royal Tours Seru., Inc., 67 AD3d 894 [2009]; Barone v City of New York, 52 AD3d at 631). Fisher, J.E, Balkin, Hall and Austin, JJ, concur.