Filed Date: 2/1/2011
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/1/2024
Ordered that the appeal by the defendant Hudson Valley Regional Diagnostic Medical Center, Inc., also known as Monsey Family Medical Center, from the judgment is dismissed, as it is not aggrieved by the judgment (see CPLR 5511); and it is further,
Ordered that the appeal by the defendant Mendel Hoffman from the judgment is dismissed, as no appeal lies from a judgment insofar as it is entered upon the default of the appealing party (see CPLR 5511); and it is further,
Ordered that on the Court’s own motion, the notices of appeal and cross appeal from the order dated October 2, 2009, are treated as applications for leave to appeal and cross-appeal respectively, and leave to appeal and cross-appeal is granted (see CPLR 5701 [c]); and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated October 2, 2009, is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law and in the exercise of discretion, and the matter is remitted to the Supreme Court, Rockland County, for a determination of the motion on the merits; and it is further,
Ordered that the order dated October 2, 2009, is affirmed insofar as cross-appealed from; and it is further,
Ordered that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendant Mendel Hoffman.
The defendant Mendel Hoffman moved pursuant to CPLR
The Supreme Court erred in holding Hoffman’s motion in abeyance pending the appeal from the judgment, since the issue of whether Hoffman was properly found to be in default cannot be reached on the appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5511; Morales v Perfect Dental, P.C., 73 AD3d 877, 878 [2010]). Under these circumstances, we remit the matter to the Supreme Court, Rockland County, for an immediate determination of Hoffman’s motion on the merits.
Upon remittitur, in determining whether to grant that branch of Hoffman’s motion which was pursuant to CPLR 5015 (a) (3) to vacate the amended order dated August 8, 2008, and the resulting judgment, the Supreme Court “must determine whether the motion [for leave to enter a default judgment] was supported with enough facts to enable [the] court to determine that a viable cause of action exists,” as “[t]here is no mandatory ministerial duty to enter a default judgment against a defaulting party” (McGee v Dunn, 75 AD3d 624, 624 [2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, the representations of the plaintiffs’ attorney made to the Supreme Court regarding Hoffman’s failure to appear in the action and his personal liability in the instant matter influenced the court in finding Hoffman in default and to thereupon enter a judgment against him. Contrary to the plaintiffs’ representations, Hoffman answered the complaint and appeared in the action. Moreover, he was not a party to the stipulation of settlement that the
The parties’ remaining contentions are without merit or have been rendered academic. Rivera, J.P., Angiolillo, Roman and Sgroi, JJ., concur.