Citation Numbers: 82 A.D.3d 838, 918 N.Y.2d 552
Filed Date: 3/8/2011
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/1/2024
The appeal from the intermediate order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action (see Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, 248 [1976]). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment (see CELR 5501 [a] [1]).
“The essential elements of medical malpractice are (1) a deviation or departure from accepted medical practice, and (2) evidence that such departure was a proximate cause of injury” (DiMitri v Monsouri, 302 AD2d 420, 421 [2003]; see Wexelbaum v Jean, 80 AD3d 756, 757 [2011]; Roca v Perel, 51 AD3d 757, 758 [2008]). Where a defendant in a medical malpractice action, in moving for summary judgment, makes only a prima facie showing that he or she did not deviate or depart from accepted medical practice, the plaintiff, in order to defeat summary judgment, need only raise a triable issue of fact as to the alleged deviation or departure, and need not address the issue of proximate cause (see Stukas v Streiter, 83 AD3d 18 [2d Dept 2011]). [decided herewith]).
Therefore, the Supreme Court erred in granting Gewirtz’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against her. Covello, J.E, Florio, Eng and Chambers, JJ., concur.