Filed Date: 5/5/2011
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/1/2024
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Gregory Carro, J., at suppression hearing; Robert H. Straus, J., at jury trial and sentencing), rendered October 10, 2006, as amended October 24, 2006, convicting defendant of robbery in the first degree, assault in the second degree, criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree and two counts of criminal possession of stolen property in the fifth degree, and sentencing him, as a second violent felony offender, to an aggregate term of 29 years, unanimously affirmed.
The hearing court properly denied defendant’s motion to suppress identification testimony, and properly exercised its discretion in denying defendant’s request to call the victim as a witness. The evidence adduced at the hearing did not raise any substantial issue as to the constitutionality of the lineup that could only be resolved through the victim’s testimony (see People v Abrew, 95 NY2d 806, 808 [2000]; People v Chipp, 75 NY2d 327, 337-338 [1990], cert denied 498 US 833 [1990]).
Initially, we note that the hearing court credited the testimony of the officer who conducted the lineup that he was unaware that a chain had been stolen during the robbery. During the lineup, defendant was wearing a chain that the victim later identified as the one that had been taken from him. None of the other lineup participants were wearing chains. Defendant argues that the identification could have been influenced by that fact, and that the victim’s testimony was necessary to determine whether he noticed the chain.
When a defendant, even unbeknownst to the police, is the only lineup participant wearing an article that a witness associ
The court properly imposed consecutive sentences for the robbery and assault convictions (see generally Penal Law § 70.25 [2]; People v Frazier, 16 NY3d 36, 40-41 [2010]). Defendant threatened to cut the victim with a knife in order to compel him to hand over his property. The crime of first-degree robbery was completed when the victim complied with that demand. Defendant then walked away, but moments later turned back and slashed the victim with the knife. This constituted the distinct crime of second-degree assault, committed with a new criminal intent unrelated to the robbery (see People v Murray, 299 AD2d 225 [2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 631 [2003]).
We perceive no basis for reducing the sentence. Concur— Andrias, J.P., Sweeny, Catterson, Renwick and ManzanetDaniels, JJ.