Judges: Malone
Filed Date: 5/26/2011
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/1/2024
Appeals (1) from an order of the Family Court of Rensselaer County (E. Walsh, J.), entered February 16, 2010, which, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct Act article 4, granted respondent’s motion to dismiss the petition, and (2) from an order of said court, entered April 22, 2010, which granted respondent’s motion for an award of counsel fees.
Petitioner and respondent were divorced in September 2009. The judgment of divorce issued by Supreme Court incorporated, but did not merge, the parties’ April 2006 written separation and settlement agreement and a subsequent agreement modifying the separation agreement that was entered into by the parties in January 2009. These agreements resolved issues regarding custody of the parties’ three children as well as child support payments and maintenance. Less than one month after the judgment of divorce was entered, petitioner moved, by order to show cause in Family Court, for a “de novo recalculation of [respondent’s] [c]hild [s]upport obligation” or, in the alternative, an upward modification thereof. Respondent moved to dismiss the application. The parties appeared before a Support Magistrate, who granted respondent’s motion. Family Court affirmed the Support Magistrate’s decision, over petitioner’s objections. Thereafter, respondent successfully applied for counsel fees. Petitioner appeals from both orders.
Initially, as is relevant here, Family Court is authorized to modify an agreement pertaining to child support, which has been incorporated but not merged into a judgment of divorce issued by Supreme Court, only upon a showing that a change in circumstances warrants such modification (see Family Ct Act § 451 [2] [a]; § 461 [b] [ii]; Matter of Brescia v Fitts, 56 NY2d 132, 139-140 [1982]; see also Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [9] [b]). Accordingly, petitioner’s contentions regarding the validity of certain of the provisions in the separation agreement and the modified agreement were not properly raised in Family Court (see Matter of Huddleston v Huddleston, 14 AD3d 511, 512 [2005]).
To the extent that petitioner requested an upward modification of respondent’s child support obligation, it was incumbent upon her to establish “ ‘that the [settlement] agreement was
Finally, under the circumstances of this case, we are not persuaded that Family Court abused its discretion by awarding counsel fees to respondent (see Family Ct Act § 438 [a]; Matter of Kemenash v McIntyre, 205 AD2d 898, 899 [1994]). However, respondent’s current request for appellate counsel fees should be directed to Family Court (see Matter of Urbach v Krouner, 213 AD2d 833, 836 [1995]).
Peters, J.E, Rose, Lahtinen and Garry, JJ., concur. Ordered that the orders are affirmed, without costs.