Judges: Kane, Mahoney
Filed Date: 8/4/1983
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/1/2024
(dissenting). We recognize the validity of the principle of judicial restraint which insulates the court from involvement with the management, operation or administration of an executive enterprise (Jones v Beame, 45 NY2d 402, 408). However, in our view, the issue presented in this case transcends that broad policy concept with a much narrower question; the interpretation of particular laws and regulations designated to protect the individual rights of a mentally disabled patient.
We start with an analysis of the statutory provisions establishing the Mental Health Information Service (MHIS) and defining its powers and duties (Mental Hygiene Law, § 29.09). Since its inception, these powers and
Certainly an inquiry into the “suitability” of a patient to remain in an institution should include an examination of the appropriateness of the care and treatment provided one who cannot care for himself or herself. Such an inquiry would not involve the court in the exercise of a professional judgment, but, significantly, a pursuit for the answer to the ultimate question raised in the proceeding; namely, was professional expertise available and was it exercised. This is the duty imposed upon the State (Youngberg v Romeo, 457 US 307, 321-323) and MHIS is the vehicle established to monitor the performance of that duty. Parenthetically, it should be noted that a careful examination of this record and the history of the patients contained therein renders any attempt to classify these patients “voluntary”, rather than “involuntary”, incredulous. Finally, and as we conclude is demonstrated by this record, there is a need for overview of the operation of this vast enterprise that directly affects the health, safety and welfare of unfortunate members of society, lest they become lost in the vast confines of a particular facility. MHIS and the procedure sought to be employed herein provide a quick, certain and economical way to fulfill an obligation that the courts owe to every citizen.
We would modify the order appealed from by deleting that provision which denied respondent’s motion “without prejudice to renew” and otherwise affirm.
Order reversed, on the law, motion granted, and petition dismissed, without costs.