Citation Numbers: 115 A.D.2d 919, 496 N.Y.S.2d 816, 1985 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 55279
Judges: Yesawich
Filed Date: 12/26/1985
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/28/2024
Appeal from an order of the Family Court of St. Lawrence County (Nelson, J.), entered January 4, 1985, which, inter alia, granted petitioner’s application for custody of Tammi Aiken, and which directed him to pay $40 per week for the support of Kara Aiken.
Petitioner (father) and respondent (mother) were divorced in 1978; custody of the two daughters of the marriage was awarded to the mother. On January 20, 1984, Tammi, the older daughter, left her mother’s home to live with her father. This change in circumstances prompted the parties to file petitions for modification of the prior custody and support orders, and hearings were had on those applications.
Family Court ordered SCU to disburse to the mother any support money collected before the filing of the father’s petition, transferred custody of Tammi to him, canceled his support obligation for her, increased the amount of support payable for the other child, Kara, from $30 per week to $40 per week, and denied the father’s request that the mother contribute to Tammi’s tuition expense. This appeal followed.
Initially, the father contends that the aspect of the order which directs SCU to pay over to the mother funds it had collected for Tammi from January 20, 1984 to February 24, 1984 was unfair because her entire support had been his responsibility after January 20, 1984. The court, however, was only empowered to make its modification of the prior support order retroactive to the date of the filing of the father’s petition (see, Family Ct Act § 449)—and not earlier (see, Matter of Hackett v Haynes, 70 AD2d 1051; see also, Besharov, Practice Commentary, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 29A, Family Ct Act § 449, p 333).
The father’s disagreement with Family Court’s decision to increase his child support obligation for the child who remained with the mother is similarly ill advised. His argument incorrectly presupposes that prior support decrees continued to bind the court absolutely. In fact, the material change in circumstances occasioned by Tammi’s move permitted modification directed at enhancing the best interests of the child (see, Matter of Brescia v Fitts, 56 NY2d 132). Here, the court thoroughly evaluated the circumstances and, after noting the
Furthermore, since the father unilaterally made the decision to incur Tammi’s tuition expense and failed to establish his allegation that the mother "instigated and caused” Tammi’s decession, Family Court correctly concluded that there is no merit to the contention that the mother should share that expense.
Order affirmed, without costs. Kane, J. P., Main, Weiss, Mikoll and Yesawich, Jr., JJ., concur.