Judges: Casey
Filed Date: 2/16/1989
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/31/2024
Petitioners, Broome County and its Director of Real Property Tax Services (hereinafter Director), seek to annul a determination of respondent which ordered them to bring the county’s tax maps into compliance with the requirements of 9 NYCRR part 189. The Real Property Tax Law requires that the county "prepare and maintain in current condition for each city and town therein a tax map approved by [respondent]” (RPTL 503 [1] [a]). Respondent is authorized to "promulgate rules which establish standards, specifications and procedures for the preparation and maintenance of tax maps and shall approve tax maps which satisfy such requirements” (RPTL 503 [1] [b]), and 9 NYCRR part 189 contains the standards, specifications and procedures established by respondent pursuant to this statutory authority. In December 1985, respondent notified the county that its tax maps were not in compliance with the required standards and specifications, and respondent construed the county’s response as a refusal to bring its tax maps into compliance. Relying upon the powers conferred upon it by RPTL former 216 (2),
Petitioners contend that respondent lacks the authority to direct either the county or its Director to comply with the requirements of 9 NYCRR part 189, since the enforcement provisions of RPTL former 216 (2) apply only to assessors or other public officers or employees whose duties relate to assessments. According to petitioners, since the Director does not participate in the actual assessment of property or the preparation of assessment rolls, he is not a public officer whose duties relate to assessments. We reject this argument. The statutory provision is clear and unambiguous; it applies to assessors and any other public officer whose duties relate to assessments (RPTL former 216 [2]); it is not limited to those who actually participate in the assessment of real property. Even a cursory reading of the statute which prescribes the powers and duties of a county director of real property tax
Having concluded that the Director is subject to the enforcement provisions of RPTL former 216 (2), we see no relevance in petitioners’ contention that the county was improperly named in respondent’s compliance order. The county can act only through its officers and employees, and since the Director is the county officer responsible for the preparation and maintenance of tax maps (RPTL 1532 [1] [a]), an order to the Director, in his official capacity, is sufficient. The fact that the order also named the county itself is a matter of form, rather than substance, and has no bearing on the validity of the order. We also note that since RPTL former 216 (2) expressly authorizes the enforcement mechanism pursued by respondent herein, the cases of Boreali v Axelrod (71 NY2d 1) and Matter of State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment v Kerwick (52 NY2d 557), cited by petitioners, are inapplicable.
Next, we also reject petitioners’ contention that, in the absence of proof that the county’s current tax maps are inaccurate, the order directing that the tax maps be redrawn is arbitrary and capricious. As noted above, the Legislature has authorized respondent to promulgate rules and regulations establishing standards, specifications and procedures for tax maps (RPTL 503 [1] [b]), which respondent has done. Respondent herein directed the public officer responsible for preparing and maintaining the county’s tax maps to bring those maps into compliance with certain of the rules and regulations containing specifications and standards for tax maps. We see nothing irrational in respondent’s directive, which is authorized by RPTL former 216 (2). The accuracy or inaccuracy of the county’s tax maps is irrelevant; the issue is
Petitioners’ final argument, premised on the savings clause contained in 9 NYCRR 189.20, has some merit. The savings clause reads: "Nothing contained in this Part shall affect the validity of a tax map approved by [respondent] pursuant to the said rules and regulations adopted by [respondent] on March 22, 1956 or prior thereto and the parcel identification numbers on such maps used to describe real property on assessment and tax rolls completed prior to January 1, 1984” (9 NYCRR 189.20). Petitioners contend that any prior approval of the tax maps by either respondent or its predecessor, the State Tax Commission, triggers the savings clause. Respondent, on the other hand, contends that the savings clause was only intended to preserve the validity of parcel identification numbers used on assessment and tax rolls completed prior to January 1, 1984. Based upon the clear and unambiguous language of the savings clause, we find petitioners’ interpretation to be too expansive, while respondent’s construction is too restrictive. The clause refers only to the tax maps approved by respondent, and in light of the provisions of 9 NYCRR 189.19 concerning the effective date of part 189, repeal of prior rules and regulations, and substantial compliance, the scope of the savings clause should not be expanded by interpreting an approval by respondent to include an approval by its predecessor. As to respondent’s interpretation of the savings clause, an administrative agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is entitled to great weight (e.g., Matter of Nisnewitz v Board of Regents, 95 AD2d 950, 951), but the agency is bound by the clear wording of
Mikoll, Yesawich, Jr., Mercure and Harvey, JJ., concur.
Determination annulled, without costs, and matter remitted to respondent for further proceedings not inconsistent with this court’s decision.
A new version of RPTL 216 was enacted in 1988 (L 1988, ch 490), with RPTL 216 (1) containing substantially the same language as RPTL former 216 (2).