Judges: Mercure
Filed Date: 7/23/1992
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/31/2024
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Travers, J.), entered April 9, 1991 in Rensselaer County, which, inter alia, granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
The facts are not in dispute. In November 1989, defendant
We reverse. Clearly, the salary of a county executive may be increased during his or her term of office only by a local law subject to referendum on petition (see, County Law § 201; Municipal Home Rule Law § 24 [2] [h]). We reject the contention that Rensselaer County, which has adopted an alternative form of government in accordance with NY Constitution, article IX, §§ 1 and 2, is exempt from the operation of County Law § 201 by virtue of the provisions of County Law § 2 (b). Even accepting for the sake of argument that County Law § 2 (b) applies in this case because of the powers granted to the County Legislature pursuant to section 2.07 (8) of the Rensselaer County Charter,
Mikoll, J. P., Yesawich Jr. and Crew III, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, motion denied, cross motion granted and summary judgment awarded to plaintiff.
Section 2.07 (8) of the Rensselaer County Charter empowers the County Legislature to "fix the compensation of all officers and employees paid from County Funds, except that the compensation of any official whose salary is governed by State Law for the term of his office, shall not be increased or decreased during the term of office except as permitted by State Law”.