Filed Date: 1/30/2014
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
A preponderance of the evidence supports the determination that respondent abused the child by committing offenses against her defined in Penal Law article 130 (see Family Ct Act §§ 1012 [e] [iii]; [f] [i] [B]; 1046 [b] [i]). The court found the child’s testimony at the hearing credible, notwithstanding any alleged inconsistencies, and we see no basis for disturbing that finding (see Matter of Irene O., 38 NY2d 776 [1975]). The child’s testimony is competent evidence of abuse, and need not be corroborated by evidence of serious physical injury or other evidence (Matter of Christina G. [Vladimir G.], 100 AD3d 454 [1st Dept 2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 859 [2013]). In any event, it was corroborated by the caseworker’s testimony as to the out-of-court statements by the child’s stepsister and stepbrother (see Matter of Tiara G. [Cheryl R.], 102 AD3d 611 [1st Dept 2013], lv denied 21 NY3d 855 [2013]; see also Matter of Ashley M.V. [Victor V.], 106 AD3d 659 [1st Dept 2013]).
The determination that respondent neglected the child by inflicting excessive corporal punishment on her (see Family Ct Act § 1012 [f] [i] [B]) is also supported by a preponderance of
The court properly drew a negative inference against respondent since, after petitioner established its prima facie case, respondent failed to meet his burden of explaining his conduct and rebutting the evidence against him (see Matter of Ashley M.V., 106 AD3d at 660). Concur — Gonzalez, P.J., Friedman, Renwick, Freedman and Richter, JJ.