Filed Date: 6/17/1996
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/31/2024
The Supreme Court reasoned, inter alia, that there could be no claim based upon negligent misrepresentation under the facts of this case because the parties were not in privity and they did not enjoy any kind of special relationship necessary for the imposition of liability. However, there may be liability for negligent misrepresentation where there is a relationship between the parties such that there is an awareness that the information provided is to be relied upon for a particular purpose by a known party in furtherance of that purpose, and some conduct by the declarant linking it to the relying party and evincing the declarant’s understanding of their reliance (Ossining Union Free School Dist. v Anderson LaRocca Anderson, 73 NY2d 417, 425; Credit Alliance Corp. v Andersen & Co., 65 NY2d 536, 551). To state it somewhat more succinctly, the relying party "must have been a person for whose use the representation was intended” or "he must at least have been a member of some very small group of persons for whose guidance the representation was made” (Prosser and Keeton, Torts § 107, at 747 [5th ed], citing Restatement [Second] of Torts § 552 [2] [a]). The predominant concern is that the potential liability of the allegedly negligent party should not be unlimited (Credit Alliance Corp. v Andersen & Co., supra).
Applying the foregoing rules to this case, we find that the
We further find, as did the Supreme Court, that the appellant has failed to demonstrate that the representations made were false. Indeed, the appellant’s complaint is that when he tried to resell the estate, he could not prove its authenticity to the satisfaction of his buyer because the plaintiff failed to produce alleged authenticating documents. However, the record suggests that the appellant made no attempts to otherwise verify Stanford White’s status as the architect beyond asking the plaintiff to produce documents it was never shown to possess. Moreover, he eschewed the plaintiffs offer to "put [him] in touch” with the prior owners, who might have been able to produce the requested proof. On this record it cannot be concluded that the house was not designed by Stanford White, only that the plaintiff failed to provide the appellant with proof that would be satisfactory to his buyer. Therefore, we agree that the counterclaim was properly dismissed as the appellant failed to establish that the representations were in fact false (see, Andres v LeRoy Adventures, 201 AD2d 262; Bower v Atlis Sys., 182 AD2d 951; Hausler v Spectra Realty, 188 AD2d 722). Miller, J. P., Ritter, Krausman and McGinity, JJ., concur.