Filed Date: 9/30/1997
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/1/2024
Judgment unanimously modified on the law and as modified affirmed and matter remitted to Onondaga County Court for further proceedings in accordance with the following Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him after a jury trial of murder in the second degree (Penal Law § 125.25 [1]) and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree (Penal Law
The prosecutor did not engage in misconduct by questioning prospective jurors about their potential reactions to variations in the testimony of eyewitnesses and whether they would categorically reject the testimony of a witness who had a prior conviction and who testified concerning the use of cocaine. The prosecutor merely engaged in “the standard trial tactic of giving the panel [of prospective jurors] a preview of the weaknesses in [his] case and gauging the reaction” (People v Porter, 226 AD2d 275, 277).
We reject the contention that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct when, during his opening statement, he referred to certain conduct of defendant committed prior to the shooting but failed to present evidence of that conduct during the trial. Absent bad faith or undue prejudice, reversal is not required because the prosecutor fails to prove every statement or representation made during an opening statement (see, People v De Tore, 34 NY2d 199, 207, cert denied sub nom. Wedra v New York, 419 US 1025; People v Mariani, 203 AD2d 717, 720, lv denied 84 NY2d 869). Although the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by his overzealous cross-examination of defendant in the nature of character assassination and by his repeated extraneous sarcastic remarks during summation (see, People v Hicks, 102 AD2d 173, 182-183; see also, People v McCann, 90 AD2d 554), County Court sustained prompt objections to the improper questioning, and defense counsel did not request curative instructions, move for a mistrial or object to any of the summation comments. Further, proof of defendant’s guilt is overwhelming, and we cannot conclude that the misconduct was so egregious that defendant was denied a fair trial (see, People v Curley, 159 AD2d 969, 970, lv denied 76 NY2d 733; cf., People v Mott, 94 AD2d 415, 419).