Judges: Dejoseph, Peradotto, Smith, Valentino, Whalen
Filed Date: 11/14/2014
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Joseph E. Fahey, J.), rendered May 23, 2011. The judgment convicted defendant, upon his plea of guilty, of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree.
It is hereby ordered that the case is held, the decision is reserved and the matter is remitted to Onondaga County Court for further proceedings in accordance with the following memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment that convicted him upon a guilty plea of attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 265.02 [5] [ii]). Defendant contends that County Court erred in refusing to suppress the evidence seized as the result of the allegedly unlawful stop of the vehicle that he was driving. We conclude that the court applied the wrong standard in denying defendant’s suppression motion. We therefore hold the case, reserve decision, and remit the matter to County Court to determine the motion in accordance with the correct legal standard.
At the suppression hearing, the People presented evidence
In denying defendant’s suppression motion, the court concluded that the traffic stop was lawful based upon “a founded suspicion that criminal activity [was] afoot” (People v De Bour, 40 NY2d 210, 223 [1976]). That was error. It is well established that “ ‘police stops of automobiles in this State are legal only pursuant to routine, nonpretextual traffic checks to enforce traffic regulations or when there exists at least a reasonable suspicion that the driver or occupants of the vehicle have committed, are committing, or are about to commit a crime’ ” (People v Washburn, 309 AL)2d 1270, 1271 [2003], quoting People v Spencer, 84 NY2d 749, 753 [1995], cert denied 516 US 905 [1995]), or “where the police have ‘probable cause to believe that the driver . . . has committed a traffic violation’ ” (id., quoting People v Robinson, 97 NY2d 341, 349 [2001]). Here, the People do not contend that this was a routine check to enforce traffic regulations, and instead rely on defendant’s commission of a traffic infraction under Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1227 (1), prohibiting the consumption or possession of an open container containing an alcoholic beverage in a motor vehicle on a public highway, to justify the stop of defendant’s vehicle. Here, the court did not apply the correct standard in denying defendant’s suppression motion, i.e., it did not determine whether the police had probable cause to believe that defendant had committed a traffic infraction (see Robinson, 97 NY2d at 349; People v East, 119 AD3d 1370, 1371 [2014]; see generally People v Concepcion, 17 NY3d 192, 195 [2011]). Inasmuch as