Judges: Harris
Filed Date: 10/3/1947
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
The plaintiff, The New York Central Railroad Company, brought this proceeding to condemn certain real property in the city of Syracuse for the purpose of carrying out a direction of the Public Service Commission to elevate its railroad lines running through the city of Syracuse. (Syracuse Grade Crossing Elimination Act, L. 1Ó28, ch. 825, § 8, subd. 1.) Title to the property in question to be taken, known as Parcel No. 316 and being a small portion of a large lot, was, at the time of the bringing of the proceeding, in the defendant Richard F.
At the time of the commencement of this proceeding, the premises of the defendant Bichard F. Harrison, including Parcel No. 316 (which parcel consisted of a triangular piece of land being the northerly corner of the entire property of Harrison and containing about 25 square feet) was itself practically triangular and had a frontage of approximately 29.74 feet on James Street and another frontage of 28.3 feet on North State Street. On the land was a building containing stores and apartments and known as “ Stratford Apartments ”. The building consisted of a basement and six stories above ground; the ground floor was, arranged for six stores (one on James Street, one on North State Street, and four facing the railroad) and the other floors were divided into living apartments which were sixty-five in number. With the exception of the frontage on North State Street and James Street, the outside boundary of Harrison’s property, approximately 110 feet, was the prdperty of the plaintiff. There were fire escapes on the northeasterly side of the building which faced the railroad property, and also on that side there was a sidewalk used as a means of ingress and egress to the stores on the northeasterly side of the building and to the basements in the building. The inside or southeasterly side of the property, except for recessions used as airshafts, adjoined the wall of an adjoining building and in part it was bounded by a vacant lot ownéd by some other person. The heating plant and boiler room of the building were located under James Street at a place adjoining Parcel No. 316. There were two entrances to the upper floors of the building from the street, one on James Street and one on North State Street.
The issue raised by the answer of the defendants was whether or not the defendants owner and lienors were to be compensated by the railroad plaintiff for certain easements of light, air and access; this question depended on who was the owner of the land which lay between the railroad tracks and the northeast face of the building, and whether the defendants owner and lienors had title to the portion of the street occupied by the heating plant and boiler room, the use of which would be destroyed by the elevation of the railroad. In order to dispose ' of such questions and by agreement between the parties, there was brought in the Supreme Court an action for judgment declaring the rights of the parties to this proceeding in and to the premises and easements in dispute. Such proceeding was tried at Special Term, certain facts were determined and certain conclusions of law were made adversely to the plaintiff, but on appeal the judgment of the Special Term ivas modified on the law and on the facts. (See Harrison v. New York Central R. R. Co., 255 App. Div. 183, affd. without opinion, 281 N. Y. 653.) In brief, the judgment rendered on such appeal held that beginning with the northeasterly line of the building itself the premises northeasterly thereof, insofar as this proceeding is concerned, belong to the plaintiff herein, The New York Central Eailroad Company, and that the defendant owner had and has no rights in such property. The judgment further held that the plaintiff there (defendant owner here) had no right to maintain the heating plant and boiler room in James Street and was not entitled to compensation for the destruction
Following judgment in the action for declaration of the rights of the parties and pursuant to stipulation therein, on application of the plaintiff, Special Term ordered amendment of the petition for condemnation and of the judgment rendered on such petition December 4,1933, so as to provide in the amended judgment for the condemnation of Parcel No. 316: “ Also such
The commissioners designated by the Special Term judgment of December, 1933, then proceeded with their duties, viewed the premises and took testimony on behalf of all of the parties appearing as to the value of the premises taken by reason of the judgment in this proceeding as amended. Testimony of value was given by expert witnesses and included assessed valuations. Such commissioners (to which reference will be made hereinafter as the first commission) made a report to Special Term under date of March 21, 1942. This report placed the value of the property of the defendant Richard F. Harrison, before the taking in this proceeding, including the building thereon, at $145,000, and the value of the remaining property, “ after taking Parcel No. 316 and the easements of light, air and access over and across James Street and North State Street * * * [at $21,000, and contained the conclusion] that the compensation which ought justly to be paid to the owner of the property * * * and to the lienors * * * is the sum of $124,000, with interest on said sum from December 20th, 1933, at the legal rate or rates.” On the coming in of the report at Special Term, the defendants owner and lienors moved for the confirmation of the report. The plaintiff opposed such confirmation, and after submission of that motion to confirm the Special Term denied the motion and ordered that the matter be sent back to the same commissioners for further consideration and directing the commissioners to file a further revised report showing what evidence had been disregarded by the commissioners, what
The second commission, saying that it did so, after taking into consideration the question of title involved in the ownership of the adjoining railroad property and involved in the lack of ownership by the defendant Harrison of the property where the heating plant and boiler room were located, and considering the rental value of the property and the other proof before them, found the fair value of the Harrison property, before the taking on December 20, 1933, was $162,000; and that its value, after the taking, was $19,000, and concluded that the
Testimony before both commissions as to the 1933 assessed value of the premises, was land $59,100, building $95,000. One expert witness called on behalf of the defendant placed the sound value of the building on December 20, 1933, at $187,397, and another expert called by the defendant placed the value of defendant’s land as of the same date, December 20, 1933, at $77,200, and the value of the entire property on that date at $257,000. One of the plaintiff’s experts placed the reproduction value .of the building at $172,829.73, and the sound value of the building at $51,848.92; another of plaintiff’s expert witnesses placed the reproduction value of the building at $175,371, and the sound value at $49,980. Other experts sworn by the plaintiff placed the fair market value of the entire property, before the taking on December 20, 1933, at $46,000.
So far as the finding of both commissions as to the value of the property is concerned, both plaintiff and defendants are in substantial accord that, if the building were razed (as it subsequently was) the value of the property left (usable only for parking purposes) was from $19,000 to $21,000. The first commission place this after value at $21,000; the second commission place it at $19,000.
The report of the second commission was filed with the Special Term. Subsequently a motion was made by the defendants to confirm the same and a motion made by the plaintiff that the Special Term should refuse to confirm the same. After a hearing on these motions, the motion of the plaintiff was denied, and that of the defendants granted, and the report was confirmed by an order of the Special Term dated December 29, 1945. On such dispositions of these motions, the Special Term wrote a long opinion which, in effect, stated that the second commission, from the viewpoint of the Special Term, had fully performed its duties as to the contents of its report and had reached the correct determination of facts and conclusions. The order and judgment confirming the second report provided that the award, including interést, costs and allowances, should be docketed as a judgment against the plaintiff. Subsequent motions were made to resettle such order of December 29, 1945, with the result that such order was resettled so as not only to grant the motion to confirm and approve the report, but to further provide that the judgment entered against the plaintiff in favor of the defendants “ be paid, in the first instance by
The appeals of the parties are as follows: The plaintiff appeals on the ground of excessiveness of the award and on the further ground of errors of law made by the commission and Special Term in reaching its conclusions as to damages. The defendants owner and lienors appeal from that portion which ordered the judgment to be paid in the first instance by the People of the State of New York and directed action by the Comptroller of the State of New York. The Comptroller of the State of New York and the People of the State of New York appeal from that portion of the resettled order and amended judgment both on the ground of excessiveness of the award and on the ground that the directions for the payment in the first instance from State moneys and for action by the Comptroller are erroneous in law. The Syracuse Grade Crossing Commission appeals from the resettled order as it may be affected by the same.
We may not set aside a finding of value unless such finding is based on an erroneous theory of law, or an erroneous ruling as to evidence, or because consideration has not been given to the relative weight of testimony and the value arrived at is excessive or inadequate. (Matter of City of New York [Newtown Creek], 284 N. Y. 493, reargument denied, 285 N. Y. 613; Matter of City of Rochester [Smith St. Bridge], 234 App. Div. 583.)
Of course, the primary question to be considered and disposed of on this appeal is as to the propriety of the amount of the award for compensation made by the second commission and confirmed by Special Term. To determine this question, there must be borne in mind that the task of the commission was to
: The plaintiff railroad company further contends on this appeal, and had contended at Special Term, that compensation has been awarded, but should not have been awarded, the defendants owner and lienors for interference with easements by the structure of elevation placed on the plaintiff’s own land abutting and northeast of the property of the defendants owner and lienors.
The record affords difficulty in determining the question raised by the plaintiff as to whether the award included damages resulting from the use of its own property. In both reports the commissions stated that they fully considered the right of the railroad to elevate on its own land and that they have determined the value of the Stratford property with full knowledge of such rights of the abutting plaintiff. Despite this, it can be
As has been told above, the only piece or parcel of real property taken in this proceeding was a small parcel (No. 316) about 25 square feet. This parcel was to be used and was used to afford support for a portion of one pylon of the elevated structure, the remainder of which pylon rested on James Street in the vicinity of the heating plant and boiler room. The ordinary method of figuring the amount of award, where a portion of property is taken, is to value the entire property at the time of the taking and to deduct therefrom the value of the property left, the difference being the amount of compensation for the portion taken. (Matter of City of New York [Newtown Creek], 284 N. Y. 493, reargument denied, 285 N. Y. 613.) This was done by the two commissions insofar as Parcel No. 316 is concerned.
Now comes the consideration of the value of the easements of light, air and access which the defendants enjoyed at the time of the beginning of the proceeding in James Street and in North State Street. These are the easements with which the commission, or commissions, or Special Term, should have concerned themselves in determining the award of compensation to be made to the defendants owner and lienors. In other words, what was the value of the damage or injury which came to the defendants by consequence of the structures erected across North State Street and James Street interfering with access to the property, its use of light and its use of air.? These easements were property rights and could be valued in money. (Syracuse Grade Crossing Comm. v. Wellin Oil Co., 268 App. Div. 627, affd. without opinion, 295 N. Y. 738; St. Peter’s Italian Church Syracuse v. State of New York, 261 App. Div. 96; Adirondack Power & Light Corporation v. Evans, 226 App. Div. 490.) The commissions and the Special Term chose to use the following method of determining the value of the easements : There was fixed the value of the property at the time of the taking and before the taking. The first commission fixed that value at $143,000; the second commision fixed the value at $162,000, and this latter figure was approved at Special Term. As has been indicated above, there was no serious difference as to the value of the property as a parking lot after the building Avas razed, the first commission placing that at $21,000, and the second at $19,000. As to the valuation fixed by the second
The result so far has been, and is now, to require that this proceeding again go to Special Term so as to afford consideration by a commission in accordance with the viewpoint expressed in this opinion. Thus should result "a proper valuation of the injury and damage to the easements over James Street and North State Street which the defendant owner and lienors enjoyed in the property prior to the talcing in this proceeding.
The other two questions — the rate of interest to be applied by the commissions, and the form of judgment used by Special Term — now remain to be discussed.
The award and judgment should be against the plaintiff railroad alone (N. Y. Const., art. VII, § 14; Syracuse Grade Crossing Elimination Act, L. 1928, ch. 825, § 8, subd. 1; State Condemnation Law, § 17) that being the party who brought the proceeding. It is true that eventually the State, the county and the plaintiff will share in the payment of the award, but the provisions of the statute provide for certain action on the part of the State Comptroller that is to be taken after-the judgment is entered, and such action on the part of the State Comptroller was not under cognizance of Special Term.
As to the rate of interest to be computed on the award for compensation, there is no doubt but that in the judgment against the railroad company the defendants would be entitled to the legal rate, to wit: six (6%) percentum, on the amount of such judgment from the time of the taking. Section 16 of the State Finance Law has no application to the judgment in the present litigation between the plaintiff and the defendants. By stipulation in the declaratory judgment action, it was provided
Whether or not the State of New York, or any other public authority, should bear and repay to the railroad any portion of such interest, or any portion of the expenses of any of the parties hereto, need not he considered now, because, as has been indicated above, the judgment is to be entered against the plaintiff railroad alone; the apportionment of what is to be paid by the State, or any other public authority, is for later determination, after the entry of judgment. (N. Y. Const., art. VII, § 14; Syracuse Grade Crossing Elimination Act, L. 1928, ch. 825, § 8, subd. 1; State Condemnation Law, § 17.) '
The resettled order and the amended judgment, from which appeals have been taken, and all parts thereof, should be reversed and this matter remitted to the Special Term to proceed as indicated in this opinion.
All concur, except Taylor, P. J., not voting, and McCuru, J., who dissents and votes to modify the resettled order so as to strike out the provision that the judgment docketed against the plaintiff be paid in the first instance by the State. Present — Taylor, P. J., Harris, McCurk, Larkin', and Love, JJ.
Resettled order and amended judgment reversed on the law and facts and matter remitted to the Special Term to proceed in accordance with the opinion. [See 273 App. Div. 805.]