Judges: III
Filed Date: 3/15/2001
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/1/2024
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Connor, J.), entered June 16, 2000 in Albany County, which, in a combined action and proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78, denied petitioners’ motion for injunctive relief and granted respondents’ cross motions dismissing the petition/complaint.
In January 2000 petitioners, who are individuals residing in the area and various community groups, commenced this combined action and proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 against NYU and respondents Dormitory Authority of the State of New York and the City of New York seeking, inter alia, to enjoin construction of the Kimmel Center on the ground that respondents were not in compliance with various environmental laws and certain restrictions contained in the Washington Square Southeast Urban Redevelopment Plan (hereinafter URP). Thereafter, petitioners moved for a temporary restraining order enjoining further construction of the Kimmel Center pending the outcome of the litigation, and respondents cross-moved to dismiss the petition/complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211. Ultimately, Supreme Court granted respondents’ cross motions to dismiss and this appeal ensued.
Initially, we reject petitioners’ assertion that Supreme Court erred in failing to accept as true the allegations contained in the petition/complaint. While it is well settled that a court must accept the facts alleged in a complaint as true when reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211 (see, Cron v Hargro Fabrics, 91 NY2d 362, 366), it is equally well settled that a court need not accept as true factual allegations that, as here, are flatly contradicted by documentary evidence (see, Maas v Cornell Univ., 94 NY2d 87, 91). Critical to this litigation, with respect to NYU, is petitioners’ assertion that the construction site is within the URP established in 1954 and, consequently, any construction is subject to the restrictions of said plan. However, a review of both the text and official maps of the URP, submitted in support of respondents’ cross motions, makes plain that the Kimmel Center is entirely outside the geographical boundaries of the URP. Accordingly, Supreme Court was correct in determining that any restrictions contained in the URP are not applicable to construction of the Kimmel Center. Moreover, the URP expired, by its own terms, in 1994 and, therefore, the restrictions contained therein could not impair construction that was not begun until 1999.
Next, petitioners claim that the construction project cannot proceed without an appropriate environmental review. It is true, as claimed by petitioners, that such review is required where a State agency funds a project such as the one at issue here (see, ECL 8-0109 [2]; PRHPL 14.09). Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, however, the documentary evidence submitted in support of the cross motions clearly demonstrates that the public bonds issued by the Dormitory Authority, as well as the proceeds derived or to be derived therefrom, had nothing to do with construction of the Kimmel Center but, rather, were devoted to construction of certain residence halls and dining facilities and refinanced preexisting debt of NYU.
Finally, Supreme Court properly rejected petitioners’ claim that the City was obligated to undertake an environmental review before approving NYU’s building permit application. Supreme Court properly determined that pursuant to the City’s Administrative Code (see, Administrative Code of City of NY § 27-191), NYU was entitled to an “as of right” building permit, which did not trigger any environmental review (see, Citizens for Preservation v Smith, 122 AD2d 827, 828-829). In light of the foregoing, it is unnecessary for us to consider petitioners’ remaining contentions.
Cardona, P. J., Mercure, Spain and Mugglin, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.