Citation Numbers: 287 A.D.2d 357, 731 N.Y.S.2d 694, 2001 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 9918
Judges: Mazzarelli, Saxe
Filed Date: 10/23/2001
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/1/2024
dissent in a memorandum by Mazzarelli, J., as follows: I would affirm the order appealed from. “[T]he opinion of a qualified expert that a plaintiffs injuries were caused by a deviation from relevant industry standards [generally precludes granting] summary judgment in favor of [a] defendant!] (see, e.g., Trimarco v Klein, 56 NY2d 98, 106).” (Murphy v Conner, 84 NY2d 969, 972.) In this case, plaintiff submitted the affirmation of a qualified expert radiologist in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment. She opined, based in part upon 1995 American College of Radiology (ACR) and American Institute of Ultrasound in Medicine (AIUM) guidelines, that by not having a policy or procedure requiring a female employee to be present in the examination room during the sonogram, New York Downtown Hospital departed from the required standard of care.
The ACR and AIUM guidelines, first issued in 1991, recommended “that a woman be present in the examining room during a vaginal sonogram, either as an examiner or a chaperone.” The guidelines have since been periodically revised. However, the 1995 versions, which formed a part of the basis for the expert’s affirmation, were not materially different from those in effect at the time of this incident. By recommending the presence of a woman during a vaginal sonogram, the industry explicitly recognized the risk of the precise sexual misconduct which took place in this case.
Citing Ambrosio v South Huntington Union Free School Dist. (249 AD2d 346) and Ray v County of Delaware (239 AD2d 755), the majority states that the ACR and AIUM guidelines are insufficient to reflect generally accepted standards in the radiology industry. I disagree. Moreover, the cases cited by the majority are distinguishable on their facts. In Ambrosio, the complaint was dismissed based upon the conclusory nature of an expert’s affidavit, as well as the fact that it was unclear whether a State University of New York “Manual of Planning Standards” reflected generally accepted architectural safety practices in recommending the use of impact resistant glass in school windows. There was also an issue in that case as to whether the standards in the university manual even applied to the type of window at issue. In Ray (at 757), the claim for vicarious liability was dismissed upon the court’s finding that a “safeguard checklist to limit sexual exploitation by therapists, attributed to [an individual] licensed psychologist,” was insufficient to raise an issue as to an applicable standard of care.
I would find these submissions sufficient to present the issue of the hospital’s negligence to a jury (Trimarco, supra; compare, Judith M. v Sisters of Charity Hosp., 93 NY2d 932 [plaintiff did not submit any evidence that hospital deviated from standards of reasonable care]; Ray, supra [extensive evidence that clinic provided adequate supervision for social worker]; N. X. v Cabrini Med. Ctr., 280 AD2d 34 [no evidence that hospital breached any duty to protect its patients]).
“Proof of a generally accepted practice, custom or usage within a particular trade or industry is admissible as tending to establish a standard of care, and proof of a departure from that general custom or usage may constitute evidence of negligence [citations omitted] * * *. [I]t need not be shown that the particular custom or usage is universally observed, so long as it is fairly well defined within the particular field.” (See, Cruz v New York City Tr. Auth., 136 AD2d 196, 199, complaint dismissed after remand 190 AD2d 651, lv denied 82 NY2d 654.)
I disagree with the contrast drawn by the majority between the facts of this case and Miller v Long Is. R. R. (212 AD2d 515) and French v Ehrenfeld (180 AD2d 895). In both Miller and French, appellate courts reversed trial verdicts for failure to allow expert testimony on the issue of common industry practice. Other than the context of the submissions, I see no distinction between the nature of the improperly precluded testimony in those cases and the evidence offered here in opposition to defendant’s motion for summary judgment. In fact, I would urge that because these cases both emphasize the probative value of expert testimony as to custom and practice, Miller and French actually support denying the instant motion for summary judgment.