Judges: Rose
Filed Date: 1/10/2002
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/1/2024
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Dowd, J.), entered August 9, 2000 in Chenango County, which, inter alia, partially denied defendant’s motion for modification of a prior judgment of divorce.
While a parent’s child support obligation may be modified when he or she contributes separately to the child’s college expenses, this lies within trial court’s discretion and the particular facts of the case must warrant such relief (see, Matter of Houck v Houck, 246 AD2d 905, 906; Matter of Haessly v Haessly, 203 AD2d 700, 702). Here, at the time of their divorce, the parties agreed to equally fund a trust for their child’s college education, and their agreement made no provision for an adjustment to child support upon the child’s attendance at college. In addition, plaintiff testified that she is responsible for any college expenses not covered by the trust fund, and that she maintains the home and provides for the child’s needs when he comes home from college (see, Matter of Haessly v Haessly, supra, at 702).
We also find no abuse of Supreme Court’s discretion in imputing an annual income of $40,000 to defendant even though his actual income for the prior year was only $21,575. A parent’s child support obligation is determined by his or her ability to provide support rather than his or her current income (see, Matter of Collins v Collins, 241 AD2d 725, 727, appeal dismissed and lv denied 91 NY2d 829; Orlando v Orlando, 222 AD2d 906, 907, lv dismissed and denied 87 NY2d 1052). The record contains evidence, credited by Supreme Court (see, Creighton v Creighton, 222 AD2d 740, 742; Matter of Pancaldo v Pancaldo, 214 AD2d 879, 880), that defendant voluntarily accepted semiretirement after losing his former employment, refused available full-time employment for $40,000 to $50,000 annually, thereafter worked only part time, and received the benefit of residing with a girlfriend (see, Domestic Relations Law § 240 [1-b] [b] [5] [iv] [D]; Matter of Collins v Collins, supra, at 727).
Nor did Supreme Court err in reducing maintenance by only $100 per month. A reduction in the payor’s income will not result in decreased maintenance where it is the result of a voluntary action, such as self-imposed retirement (see, Matter of Di Novo v Robinson, 250 AD2d 898, 899; Wight v Wight, 232 AD2d 844, 845). Thus, the court here properly considered only plaintiffs increased income in determining how much to reduce defendant’s maintenance obligation (see, Matter of Sharlot v Sharlot, 110 AD2d 299, 300-301; Matter of Kronenberg v Kronenberg, 101 AD2d 951, 952).
Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Carpinello and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs.