Judges: Carni, Centra, Curran, Man, Peradotto, Trout
Filed Date: 4/29/2016
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/1/2024
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Oneida County (Erin P. Gall, J.), entered May 17, 2015. The order, inter alia, granted defendant summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: Plaintiff commenced this malicious prosecution action after a Town Justice dismissed a criminal information charging him with public lewdness (Penal Law § 245.00). The Town Justice concluded that the evidence at the bench trial was legally insufficient to establish that plaintiff engaged in a lewd act when he exposed his genitals to his neighbors on a public street. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 or, in the alternative, for summary judgment dismissing the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3212. Supreme Court denied the motion insofar as it sought to dismiss the complaint but granted the motion insofar as it sought summary judgment dismissing the complaint. We affirm.
We reject plaintiffs contention that the court was required to give the parties notice that it was treating the motion as one for summary judgment. “[A] court may treat a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment when the parties have otherwise received adequate notice by expressly seeking summary judgment or submitting facts and arguments clearly indicating that they were deliberately charting a summary judgment course” (Village of Webster v Monroe County Water Auth., 269 AD2d 781, 782 [2000] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see generally Mihlovan v Grozavu, 72 NY2d 506, 508 [1988]). Here, plaintiff was on notice that defendant was seeking summary judgment in the alternative and, indeed, opposed that part of the motion.
Contrary to plaintiffs further contention, the court properly granted the motion. A plaintiff asserting a cause of action for malicious prosecution must demonstrate “ ‘that a criminal proceeding was commenced; that it was terminated in favor of the accused; that it lacked probable cause; and that the