Citation Numbers: 140 A.D.3d 1644, 33 N.Y.S.3d 621
Judges: Carni, Curran, Lindley, Peradotto, Troutman
Filed Date: 6/10/2016
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/1/2024
Appeal from a judgment of the Onondaga County Court (Joseph E. Fahey, J.), rendered May 23, 2013. The judgment convicted defendant, upon a jury verdict, of driving while intoxicated, a class E felony, aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree and resisting arrest.
It is hereby ordered that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon a jury verdict of driving while intoxicated, a class E felony (Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1192 [3]), aggravated unlicensed operation of a motor vehicle in the first degree (§ 511 [3] [a]), and resisting arrest (Penal Law § 205.30).
We reject defendant’s contention that County Court erred in denying his request for a missing witness charge. Defendant failed to establish that the witness’s testimony would have been noncumulative (see People v Welch, 307 AD2d 776, 777-778 [2003], lv denied 100 NY2d 625 [2003]), and defendant’s assertion that the witness “presumably” could have provided noncumulative testimony is speculative (see People v Gonzalez, 16 AD3d 283, 284 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 766 [2005]). In any
We reject defendant’s further contention that the court issued an erroneous jury instruction. “Generally, in determining whether a jury charge was proper, the test is ‘whether the jury, hearing the whole charge, would gather from its language the correct rules which should be applied’. . . Parts of jury charges cannot be read ‘alone and in a vacuum’ ” (People v McDaniels, 19 AD3d 1071, 1071 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 830 [2005]). Considering the adequacy of the jury charge as a whole against the background of the evidence presented at the trial (see People v Andujas, 79 NY2d 113, 118 [1992]), we conclude that the charge here was proper (see People v Waldriff, 46 AD3d 1448, 1448 [2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 1040 [2008]; see also People v Fisher, 101 AD3d 1786, 1787 [2012], lv denied 20 NY3d 1098 [2013]).
Finally, contrary to defendant’s assertion, New York’s persistent felony offender statute is constitutional on its face and as applied in this case (see People v Battles, 16 NY3d 54, 59 [2010], cert denied 565 US —, 132 S Ct 123 [2011]; People v Tuszynski, 120 AD3d 1568, 1569 [2014], lv denied 25 NY3d 954 [2015]), and the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant as a persistent felony offender (see People v Boykins, 134 AD3d 1542, 1543 [2015]).