Filed Date: 12/4/1989
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
In an action to foreclose a second mortgage, the defendants Robert and Camille Cotromano appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Márchese, J.H.O.), dated March 7, 1989, which, inter alia, directed that an interlocutory judgment of foreclosure be entered in favor of the plaintiff and against them.
Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The appellants Robert and Camille Cotromano were the sole shareholders and officers of the defendant Matty’s Superservice, Inc. (hereafter Matty’s Superservice). In 1978, Matty’s Superservice was dissolved by proclamation for nonpayment of franchise taxes. Notwithstanding, it continued to operate and function as before the dissolution. In 1985, the Cotromanos met with AAA Associates Incorporated, mortgage brokers, to arrange a loan. Earlier, AAA Associates had been contacted
After the closing, the accountant for Matty’s Superservice prepared the paperwork for reinstatement and a $3,506.17 check was drawn from its escrow account, made payable to the New York State Corporation Tax Bureau for payment of the back taxes. However, as a $55 reinstatement fee was never paid, the corporate status of Matty’s Superservice was never legally reinstated.
Matty’s Superservice defaulted on the loan interest payments and in January 1986 this action was commenced to foreclose on the mortgage given as security. In response thereto, the Cotromanos raised the defenses of civil and criminal usury.
The Supreme Court, Nassau County, granted an interlocutory judgment of foreclosure in favor of the plaintiff, finding that Matty’s Superservice was a de facto corporation and that the loan’s rate of interest did not constitute civil or criminal usury. We affirm.
The general rule is that where a corporate term of existence has expired but the corporation carries on its affairs and exercises corporate powers as before, it is a de facto corporation (see, Garzo v Maid of Mist Steamboat Co., 303 NY 516). In the case at bar, Matty’s Superservice carried on the same mode of operation from the date it was incorporated in 1972 up to and including the time of the trial. As such, it is deemed a de facto corporation and the $60,000 loan was therefore made to a corporation. Furthermore, the appellants have failed to establish that the loan was made for personal, and not corporate, purposes. Therefore, even though the rate of interest on the instant loan exceeded 16% (see, General Obligations Law § 5-501), the appellants are precluded from asserting the defense of civil usury (see, General Obligations Law § 5-521; Schneider v Phelps, 41 NY2d 238, 242).
We have reviewed the appellants’ remaining arguments and find them to be without merit (see, King v American Home Sales Corp., 15 AD2d 932, affd 13 NY2d 780; Michaelson v Sardu, 258 App Div 91). Mangano, J. P., Bracken, Kunzeman and Spatt, JJ., concur.