Citation Numbers: 27 A.D. 219, 51 N.Y.S. 93
Judges: Barrett, Ingraham, Rumsey
Filed Date: 7/1/1898
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/12/2024
I concur with Mr. Justice Ingraham in this case. The question presented to us is not whether the contract was enforcible at law. Such cases as Miller v. McKenzie (95 N. Y. 575) and Beckwith v. Brackett (97 id. 52) have, therefore, no application.
It is undoubtedly good law that a promise to pay, given by A. to B., ill consideration of future services to be rendered by the latter, becomes valid and binding upon the rendition by B. of the services, in reliance upon A.’s promise. But how could such a contract be specifically enforced in equity ? It seems to me that any discussion of the doctrine of consideration in this aspect, or in its relation to an action for damages for breach of the contract, only tends to obscure the real question. That is, whether the contract here is such that it can be specifically enforced. Upon this question the acts of the parties under it are of but little moment. Equity looks at the terms of the contract itself, not at its sequences or results. In my judgment this contract cannot be specifically enforced ; not because of anything the plaintiff did under it, but because of what it had the power to do. Equity cannot aid the plaintiff, because the contract permitted it to discharge the defendant at its pleasure, and because its agreement to give him an interest in the profits was hopelessly indefinite. It would be a new doctrine of equity that a contract which fails to define with precision the legal obligation of one of the parties, can be specifically enforced because, under it, that party acted fairly and did the best he could in view of subse
Ingraham,, J., concurred.,
Judgment reversed, new trial ordered, costs to appellant to abide event.