Citation Numbers: 80 N.Y.S. 710
Judges: Jenks
Filed Date: 3/6/1903
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/12/2024
The plaintiff complains of assault by a conductor of the defendant. The plaintiff’s version is that while boarding a car he was abused in foul language by the conductor for brushing against him. Upon the plaintiff’s retort that it was the conductor’s own fault, and plaintiff’s inquiry why the car started so quickly, the con
We are asked to reverse this judgment upon the ground that the evidence on behalf of the defendant is “so wildly incredible that it should have been disregarded by the jury.” The "case of the plaintiff rests upon his own testimony, save his witness Williams. But Williams saw nothing that occurred before the conductor struck the plaintiff, and her testimony is entirely reconcilable with that of the defendant’s witnesses that the plaintiff first struck the conductor, who thereupon retaliated. It is also contended that the plaintiff, while suffering from a broken ankle, could not have arisen and have walked a few steps after the conductor in order to assault him. The physician called by the plaintiff testified that the two bones forming the leg immediately above the ankle were fractured, but there was no evidence that .a man thus injured could not, at the time of the injury, have arisen to his feet and have followed the conductor a short distance so as to strike him. I see no reason why the verdict of the jury should be disturbed on the ground that reasonable men, in the exercise of their judgment upon the evidence, could not have credited the version of the defendant. If a passenger fall from a car, and, when a conductor alights to make inquiry, meet the conductor with a blow, he cannot expect to hold the employer liable for an assault provoked by violence.
It is insisted that the plaintiff was prejudiced by the admission of evidence to show that the conductor was finally discharged after arraignment in the police court for assault. But the learned counsel for the plaintiff opened the door for the defendant when, upon his cross-examination of the motorman, he elicited that the conductor had been arrested, and therefore I think that the court could, in its discretion, receive testimony upon the same subject. Keeler v. Delavan, 4 Barb. 317; Abbott’s Trial Brief, Civil Jury Trials (2d Ed.) 238, and authorities cited.
The judgment should be affirmed, with costs. All concur.
2. See Carriers, vol. 9, Cent. Dig. § 1121.