People v. Degale

People v Degale (2020 NY Slip Op 01196)

People v Degale

2020 NY Slip Op 01196

Decided on February 19, 2020

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Decided on February 19, 2020 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P.
JOSEPH J. MALTESE
BETSY BARROS
VALERIE BRATHWAITE NELSON
ANGELA G. IANNACCI, JJ.

2018-09831

[*1]People of State of New York, respondent,

v

Craig Degale, appellant. Paul Skip Laisure, New York, NY (Hannah Zhao of counsel), for appellant.

Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, NY (Leonard Joblove, Anthea H. Bruffee, and Jonathan Andrew Perez of counsel), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER

Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Guy J. Mangano, Jr., J.), dated July 11, 2018, which, after a hearing, designated him a level two sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The defendant was convicted, upon his plea of guilty, of criminal sexual act in the third degree. After a hearing pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law art 6-C; hereinafter SORA), the Supreme Court denied the defendant's request for a downward departure from the presumptive risk level and adjudicated the defendant a level two sex offender. The defendant appeals.

A defendant seeking a downward departure from the presumptive risk level has the initial burden of "(1) identifying, as a matter of law, an appropriate mitigating factor, namely, a factor which tends to establish a lower likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community and is of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the [SORA] Guidelines; and (2) establishing the facts in support of its existence by a preponderance of the evidence" (People v Wyatt, 89 AD3d 112, 128; see People v Gillotti, 23 NY3d 841, 861; see also Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 4 [2006] [hereinafter Guidelines]). If the defendant makes that twofold showing, the court must exercise its discretion by weighing the mitigating factor to determine whether the totality of the circumstances warrants a departure to avoid an overassessment of the defendant's dangerousness and risk of sexual recidivism (see People v Gillotti, 23 NY3d at 861; People v Champagne, 140 AD3d 719, 720).

Here, the defendant failed to demonstrate that a downward departure was warranted. In particular, the defendant provided proof that he had completed sex offender treatment and other programs, but he failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his response to treatment was exceptional (see People v Boutin, 172 AD3d 1253; People v Brathwaite, 172 AD3d 1115; People v Figueroa, 138 AD3d 708, 709; People v Santiago, 137 AD3d 762, 764). The other allegedly mitigating circumstances identified by the defendant were either adequately taken into account by the Guidelines, or the defendant failed to demonstrate that the circumstances resulted in the overassessment of his risk to public safety (see People v Saintilus, 169 AD3d 838, 839).

Accordingly, we agree with the Supreme Court's determination to deny the defendant's request for a downward departure from his presumptive risk level, and to designate him a level two sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.

RIVERA, J.P., MALTESE, BARROS, BRATHWAITE NELSON and IANNACCI, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Aprilanne Agostino

Clerk of the Court