Citation Numbers: 1 Cl. Ch. 179
Filed Date: 2/15/1840
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 1/12/2023
By the Revised Statutes, the court of Chancery is one court, and its powers are vested in the Chancellor, (2 R. S. p, 97, Sec. 1.) The Vice Chancellors are subordinate officers of the court, vested with certain equity powers by the legislature, but subject, under the constitution, to the appellate jurisdiction of the Chancellor. (Const. Art 5, Sec. 5.) The legal theory in relation to our equity system, is that now they are all vested in one court, the court of Chancery, and in one officer, the Chancellor, all other officers of the court, from the Vice Chancellors down are but subordinate members
So far the system is harmonious, and the powers and relative functions of each of the officers is clearly defined. How then is a person to obtain redress in the court of Chancery in a case where the Chancellor is a party or interested? The 10th section of the article last above cited, provides for even this case, (2 R. S. p. 98, Sec. 10,) and declares that “ where the Chancellor shall be a party to a suit in Chancery, or interested in the event of such suit, the bill shall be addressed to, and filed before some jone of the Vice Chancellors, who shall proceed thereon as a court of Chancery, and shall possess all the powers of that court in relation to the subject matter of such bill; and appeals from any order or decree of such Vice Chancellor, shall be made immediately to the court for the correction of errors, in the same manner as if such order or decree had been made by the
If in this case, then, the bill had been addressed to one of the Vice Chancellors, after suggesting the interest of the Chancellor, there would have been no doubt. It would have been conceded, that the appeal from the Vice Chancellor to the Chancellor, would have been irregular, and his order upon such appeal entirely null and inoperative.
But the bill was not so addressed. It was addressed in the usual way, “ To the Chancellor of the State of New-York and prayed process returnable before the Vice Chancellor of the eighth circuit, before whom the bill was actually filed ; and it is to be assumed, too, that the process issued under such bill, was, as it naturally would have been, tested in the name of the Chancellor. This might have been done, and, indeed, in this case was done, in ignorance
As the case presents itself from the papers, we must therefore assume that the Chancellor was not a stockholder when the bill was filed—that the bill was addressed to the Chancellor in the usual mode— and that, after it was filed, the Chancellor became interested by becoming a stockholder, in which case the proceedings would really be before the Chancellor as the principal officer of the court, though filed before a Vice Chancellor. The next question which is presented will then be, can there be an appeal in such case, from the Vice Chancellor directly to the court for the correction of errors, without passing before the Chancellor first for review1? This question is important, because if no appeal in such case can be taken directly from the order of the Vice Chancellor to the court for the correction of errors, it may be a matter of necessity to have it pass, pro forma, in review before the Chancellor, as a conduit to the ultimate tribunal for final decision. If the law should, in such cases, cut off all appeal from the Vice Chancellor to the court for the correction of errors, it may be a lesser evil to have the cause pass before the Chancellor, though interested, for decision, than to foreclose the other party entirely from any opportunity of having the errors of the Vice Chan
But I apprehend our laws neither compel a party to resort to an interested judge for decision, nor de-‘ prive him of his legitimate right' of appeal.
Another section of the chaptér in relation to the Court of Chancery, is as follows. (2 Rev. Stat. 107, Sec. 70.) “ An appeal shall not be made from any6 order or decree made by a Vice Chancellor, to the court for the correction of errors, until such order or decree shall have been brought before the Chancellor for review, and shall have been by him revised, modified, or affirmed, except in cases where the Chancellor is a party, or interested ”
This section, in words, covers the case when a! bill is-addressed to the Cháhcellér'ánd filed before a Vice Chancellor, and the Chancellor becomes interested in the suit, after the filing of the bill.' It may be urged that the last clause of this section contemplates only the case provided for in the 10th section above cited, where the bill is directly addressed to the Vice Chancellor. But there is nothing in the language of the 70th section, which gives counte
The defendants insist, however, that this bill should have been addressed to the Vice Chancellor, under the 10th Section ; but having been addressed to the Chancellor, it is in his court and before him; and
The cases in 1 Hopkins, I, and 19 Johns. 501, have been cited and commented upon by both sides. In both these cases the Chancellors were stockholders in incorporated companies. Chancellor Kent retained and Chancellor Sanford declined jurisdiction. The statute which existed at the time of both those decisions, was, however, different from the one now in force. The statute then provided “ that when the Chancellor shall be a party to a suit in Chancery, the bill shall be filed,” &c. Chancellor Kent deemed that being simply a stockholder in a corporation plaintiff did not constitute him a party within the meaning of the statute; and Chief Justice Spencer, upon consultation, was of the same opinion. Chancellor Sanford deemed that being a stockholder did constitute him a party within the meaning of that statute.
It is not necessary to comment upon these conflicting views. The statute is now broader and more sweeping, and was evidently framed in accordance with the reasoning of Chancellor Sanford. The statute now provides “ that when the Chancellor shall be a party to a suit in Chancery, or interested in the
Again: though the complainants may very well be presumed not to know who are the stockholders of the Albany City Bank, yet the bank themselves who took this appeal, cannot set up any such ignorance. They must be assumed to know who were their own corporators ; and they cannot plead ignorance of the fact as an excuse for appealing to a wrong tribunal. If I am correct in my course of reasoning, the appeal should have been directly from the Vice Chancellor to the court for the correction of errors; and the appeal to the Chancellor was irregular, null, and of no operation; and the order of the Chancellor thereon, was also null and of no effect. This is a delicate and not a little difficult question to decide upon—delicate, because it carries upon its face the appearance of a subordinate officer attempting to overrule the decree of his oficial superior—difficult, because counsel of acute minds, who have given their attention to it, have differed in their conclusions. I have not the benefit of the views of the Chancellor—he evidently decided it at once as a matter of mere form, in the supposition that it was his duty to decide. The questions here argued, were not raised before him, and he gave them no examination ; and I have no aid from his research or reasonings. I could have wished that the decision here might have been avoided. I could have wished that the complainants had taken the case directly to
I cannot look upon the decision I am about to make, as “ discharging, reversing, or altering” any order or decree of the Chancellor, within the meaning of the statute. If the Chancellor was not authorised to make the order, the order itself was null, void, and of no effect, and an order which cannot be discharged, reversed, or altered, for it is a null thing from the beginning, and requires no order to discharge it. The motion of the complainants to suppress the depositions indicated in their notice, must be granted ; but as the question is new, and admits of ho little doubt, it must be without costs to either party.