Citation Numbers: 14 Del. 530
Judges: Comegys
Filed Date: 2/15/1891
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/20/2022
charged the jury as follows:
The State, in prosecutions under the ninth Sec. of Chap. 16 of the Rev. Code, must prove to the satisfaction of the jury:
1st. The right to vote of the alleged voter: in this case that Stepanes had been duly naturalized, his residence as required by the Constitution, and his payment of a County tax assessed at least six months before the election held as aforesaid.
2d. That being thus qualified he offered to vote at said election, and that his vote was refused by the defendant.
With respect to the first requirement, it may be said to be without dispute that De Stepanes had a valid right to vote at that election of the 4th of November last. That is not disputed.
In regard to the second, the proof produced by the State, through its witnesses examined upon that point, is that Stepanes did offer to vote by handing in at the window, as other voters do on similar occasions, his ballot; that at the same time he handed in his tax receipt, and that the certificate of his naturalization, by which he was clothed with citizenship in the Unitrd States and this State, was presented to the election officers at the same time. On the other hand some of those present, like the other witnesses either as officers or clerks of the officers, testified, one of them that no offer to vote was in fact made by Stepanes, and the others that they did not hear or see any such offer made. This creates a conflict of testimony upon that point, and it must be clear to the jury that such offer was in fact made, otherwise the State has not supported the charge in the indictment of the refusal by the defendant of the vote of Stepanes. It is difficult to understand why the election officers should have considered the right of Stepanes, unless he had attempted to assert it, by offer of his ballot. But the question whether he did offer to vote, or not, is for the jury alone and not one for the Court to pass upon.
Supposing you believe from the testimony that, upon the occa
It is a general rule of law that judicial officers (which may be taken to include all who have power to judge and decide before final action)are not responsible for what are called errors of judgment alone: that is, they are not held to infallible judgment. When they act honestly, and yet erroneously or by mistake, they are answerable to no punishment, nor to damages in a civil action by a party aggrieved. Whether however, their action is from mistake or error of judgment, or is a wilful act, that is, an act which they know to be wrong, then they are liable and must answer the consequences of their misconduct. “ What is then the proof to be, that the defendant, in a prosecution for such misconduct, knows he was acting wrong ? That question was answered by this Court in the case of the State against Alexander Porter, 4 Harr., 557, (cited here by the defendant’s counsel) tried in this county in 1845, in which the jury put to the Court a question which called for an expression ' upon this very point. The Court said: “ What we understand the jury to mean by positive proof of cor
As to the connection of other persons in such violations of ■duty, where the corruption is proved, their participation can be no shelter or excuse for the defendant; but their consent to the act may be regarded in considering the probability of the defendant’s •corruption.”
Additionally we may state to you that if, before a defendant charged with wilful and deliberate violation of duty, has acted, he has had produced before him the legal documentary proof by which he is required to act in making his decision, and yet he disregard that proof and act against the necessity it imposes upon him, his course will be entirely without justification, or excuse, and must therefore be taken to be wilful, and with knowledge. Any other estimate of his behavior, if sanctioned by Courts and juries, would place it absolutely in the power of election officers, to disfranchise, for the time being, voters of different political views from their own. In this case, the defendant had before him the legal proof ■of the naturalization of Stepanes in the form used by the District Court of this District in cases of naturalization of foreigners, with the hand of the Clerk of the Court signed to it, and the seal of the Court affixed. This was the legal documentary evidence that Stepanes had a right to vote, if he possessed the qualifications, required by our Constitution and laws, in the case of natural born citizens. There was no controversy about his possessing them, -therefore .the rejection of his vote must, independent of the proof,
But the plea is made for the defendant, that he was misled by the blank which was delivered to him by one of those officious persons who obtained it from the office of the District Court, and who were themselves, it is most likely, quite sharp enough to know it only applied to one class of cases of naturalization. The slightest comparison of that form with the certificate of Stepanes would have made it manifest that they were dissimilar, and that the paper in possession of the defendant was not, in any respect, authenticated. Now before he adopted the latter as his guide of validity,
Having thus given you the law in this case it only remains to say that unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt from the defendant’s conduct and the other circumstances shown in the proof (of the credibility of which you are the sole judges) that the defendant wilfully and knowingly refused to receive the vote of Stepanes, you should acquit him; otherwise you should find him guilty. The weight to be given to the testimony of the witnesses is for you alone ; and the case is delivered to you to be dealt with according to your conscientious convictions after having weighed and duly considered all the proof, and the law as now given to you.
V rdi ct, disagreed.