DocketNumber: 15-cv-1888 (SAS)
Citation Numbers: 166 F. Supp. 3d 450
Judges: Scheindlin
Filed Date: 2/22/2016
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 7/25/2022
OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Susan Eisner brings this action under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”) for disability discrimination and retaliation by her former employer, the City of New York (“the City”), and its employees. She alleges that as a result of her disability and the filing of earlier disability discrimination complaints she received negative employment reviews, had 'pay withheld, and was ultimately terminated.
Defendants now move for summary judgment on all claims. For the following reasons that motion is GRANTED.
II. BACKGROUND
From May 2000 until her termination in June 2013, Eisner was employed as an Assistant Corporation Counsel (“ACC”) by the City’s Law Department, which is “responsible for all of New York City’s legal affairs.”
Eisner had previously complained of disability discrimination and retaliation both internally and through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). These claims were settled on July 20, 2012, and pursuant to that settlement the parties have stipulated that Eisner will not attempt to recover from claims arising prior to the settlement.
A. Settled Claims
In 2009, the quality of Eisner’s work at the Appeals Division began to suffer, which she attributed to her subsequent diagnosis with “Major Depression, Severe, Single Episode ... induced post-partum following the birth of a child” and “Anxiety and Obsessive-Compulsive disorders.”
In 2010, the Law Department was forced to “eliminate three attorney positions” due to budgetary constraints and selected Eisner and two other attorneys deemed to be the “lowest performers” in the division for transfer to other divisions.
As a result of being forced to accept a part-time position, on February 28, 2011, Eisner filed a complaint with the EEOC because she felt the decision to transfer her resulted from continued disability discrimination and retaliation for her earlier complaint against Helmers.
B. Present Claims
Eisner continued to work for the Appeals Division until her termination on June 3, 2013. Defendants offer two reasons for her termination: (1) a negative 2012 performance evaluation and her performance on the cases evaluated therein and (2) “questions about plaintiffs ability to follow supervisory direction and legitimate concerns about the honesty of plaintiffs timekeeping” following Hurricane Sandy.
1. 2012 Performance Review
On July 23, 2012, the first business day after the settlement of the 2011 charge, defendant Leonard Koerner, Chief of the Appeals Division, completed Eisner’s 2012 performance review.
Koerner’s and Caputo’s testimony about why Koerner conducted the review conflicts. Koerner testified that Caputo did not want to evaluate Eisner because he was “uncomfortable” conducting the evaluation and that McGrath had declined to do so, although Koerner concedes he never spoke to McGrath after his retirement in January 2012.
The review focused on three specific instances of poor performance. First, the evaluation referenced her work in Matter of Rosenblum v. New York City Conflicts of Interest Board (“COIB”). In June 2010, Eisner represented the COIB at oral argument before the New York Appellate Division, First Department.
Second, the evaluation referenced her work in the joint argument to the New York Court of Appeals of Nash v. New York City Department of Education and Kahn v. Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York. Eisner worked on the Nash case prior to it reaching the Court of Appeals while another ACC handled the Kahn appeal.
McGrath emailed Eisner to request that she either argue the overlapping issues between Kahn and Nash — requiring her to be prepared to answer questions about the record in Kahn — or allow the other ACC to take the entire argument.
Third, Koerner criticized her work on the case of D’Angelo v. Scoppetta, an appeal from a case out of the Labor and Employment Law Division of the Law Department. Defendant Georgia Pestana, Chief of the Labor and Employment Law-Division, was so displeased with Eisner’s work on the case that she “made it quite clear to [Koerner] that if leave [to appeal] was granted, [plaintiff] was to have nothing to do with the case.”
Eisner does not contest the fact of Pestana’s complaint but instead points out that at the same time Pestana complained to Koerner, Pestana was simultaneously overseeing the Law Department’s defense of Eisner’s 2011 EEO complaint.
Despite the poor evaluation, the defendants testified that there was no discussion about whether to terminate Eisner based on her performance at that time.
2. Hurricane Sandy Billing
On October 29, 2012, Hurricane Sandy struck New York City. Eisner’s house took on “ten feet of salt water and sewage” and “[t]he lower level was completely destroyed.”
Eisner’s emails to Caputo after the storm describe a “war zone.”
The dispute over her work and relevant billing centers on the time she spent drafting a brief in the case of Haas v. Department of Education before returning to the office. Defendants characterized the amount of time she spent working from home on the brief following Sandy to be “not only shocking but highly incredible” given the circumstances.
Caputo, finding the billing records unbelievable when viewed in light of the quality of the draft she submitted, “advised plaintiff by email thát he would not approve her weekly time sheet” submitted in the wake of Sandy.
3. Related EEO Complaints
Eisner filed two internal EEO complaints based on the aforementioned incidents. First, following receipt of the negative 2012 evaluation, Eisner filed an internal EEO charge with Goode-Trufant on September 10, 2012, alleging the negative review was the product of discrimination and retaliation.
Goode-Trufant consolidated the two appeals, conducted an investigation, and issued a finding of “no probable cause.”
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate where, “viewing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party ... ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”
“The moving party bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine dispute as to any material fact.”
“‘The function of the district court in considering the motion for summary judgment is not to resolve disputed questions of fact but only to determine whether, as to any material issue, a genuine factual dispute exists.’”
IV. APPLICABLE LAW
A. ADA Claims
Both discrimination and retaliation claims brought under the ADA are analyzed under the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.
There is an open question in the Second Circuit on which causal theory courts
The Supreme Court’s reasoning casts doubt on the standard applicable to the ADA. In both cases the Court focused heavily on the statutes’ use of the causal word “because” in reaching its conclusion.
In light of the Second Circuit’s treatment of the issue as an open question, I conclude that the “but-for” standard applies to ADA claims. The ADA, ADEA, and Title VII all “bar discrimination ‘because of an employee’s age or disability, meaning that they prohibit discrimination that is a ‘ “but-for” cause of the employer’s adverse decision.’”
B. NYCHRL Claims
Discrimination and retaliation claims under the NYCHRL are analyzed “under a similar framework” whereby “the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case, and the defendant then has the opportunity to offer legitimate reasons for its actions.”
V. DISCUSSION
A. Retaliation
Eisner has successfully established a prima facie case of retaliation, and defendants do not contest this point. To make out a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: “(1) [s]he engaged in an activity protected by the ADA; (2) the employer was aware of this activity; (3) the employer took adverse employment action against [her]; and (4) a causal connection exists between the alleged adverse action and the protected activity.”
Eisner undoubtedly engaged in protected activity that her employer was aware of when she filed her initial complaints of disability discrimination in 2009 and 2011. She subsequently suffered adverse employment action in the form of the negative 2012 evaluation, the withholding of her direct deposit, and her eventual termination.
Defendants offer two legitimate non-retaliatory reasons for the adverse actions: (1) the negative 2012 evaluation and the specific cases of poor performances includ
Because of the legitimate non-discriminatory reasons offered by defendants, the burden shifts to Eisner to prove that the proffered reasons are pretextual. Even drawing all inferences in Eisner’s favor, she has failed to carry her burden of demonstrating that retaliation was the but-for cause of these adverse employment actions.
1. 2012 Performance Review
Although Eisner contests the validity of Koerner’s assessment, she fails to point to sufficient evidence that would permit the trier of fact to conclude that retaliation was the but-for cause of the poor evaluation. Indeed, to the extent that Eisner raises disputes of fact about whether the reasons put forward are false, she falls short of demonstrating, as she must, that a fact finder could conclude that these reasons are'pretext for retaliation.
Eisner points to the circumstances surrounding her evaluation as evidence of pretext. Koerner authored only Eisner’s evaluation despite the fact that McGrath’s retirement affected many attorneys, and there is conflicting testimony about why Koerner conducted the evaluation himself instead of Eisner’s then-supervisor Caputo.
Even assuming Eisner has demonstrated that it was improper for Koerner to conduct the evaluation, she must demonstrate that the evaluation itself was flawed. This she fails to do. The specific factual issues that Eisner raises about the three cases that formed the basis for the evaluation — Rosenblum, Nash/Kahn, and D’Angelo — go to the reasonableness of the City’s judgment in evaluating her performance, not the legitimacy or veracity of the reasoning. Factual disputes of this sort do not prevent summary judgment because the Court “do[es] not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions.’”
Rosenblum: Eisner disputes that the Rosenblum case should have been included
Nash/Kahn: Eisner’s challenge related to the Nash/Kahn appeal similarly misses the mark. Eisner does not point to any facts that draw into question Koerner’s conclusion that the refusal to argue both cases reflected poor judgment. Rather, she points solely to the fact that McGrath’s emails to her about how the oral argument would be conducted were cordial.
D’Angelo: Eisner concedes that Pestaña was displeased with her work on the D’Angelo case, but she challenges Pestana’s motivation for complaining about it. At the time Pestaña complained about Eisner’s work on D’Angelo, she was simultaneously supervising the attorney tasked with defending the Law Department against Eisner’s EEO complaints.
2. Hurricane Sandy Billing
Eisner concedes the facts surrounding the conditions she lived and worked in after Hurricane Sandy. Yet she does not provide any evidence to contest the fact that the brief she submitted contained “little original drafting” despite the number of hours she billed.
Eisner’s attempt to split hairs about the precise number of hours she billed does not raise an inference of retaliation when she concedes that Caputo and Koerner’s conclusion that she did a “terrible job on [the brief] — is primarily a matter of opinion[ ] ... Plaintiff cannot seek to refute.”
Nothing in the record indicates that Eisner’s work product was ever praised. In essence, Eisner’s argument as to the falsity of the proffered reasons boils down to her claim that although her work may have been poor, it was not that poor. Yet defendants themselves concede this. They tell a story of a consistent underperformer, not the worst employee ever. Koerner testified that “in light of Nash and some of the other cases ... it was not fair to the rest of the office to keep her on the payroll” because “you don’t want people doing average work when you have people coming in from other divisions that will do outstanding work.”
Eisner has failed to carry her burden of demonstrating that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that retaliation was the but-for cause of the adverse employment actions.
B. Disability Discrimination
Eisner’s disability discrimination claims must be dismissed because she fails to make out a prima facie ease of discrimination. A prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA and the NYCHRL requires showing “(1) [her] employer is subject to the [statute]; (2) [s]he was disabled within the meaning of the [statute]; (3) [s]he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of [her] job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) [s]he suffered adverse employment action because of [her] disability.”
Eisner has failed to adduce any facts that would give rise to an inference of disability discrimination. She contends that “every single adverse action against [her] flows from her initial disclosure of her disability.”
Eisner also claims that Koerner, when conducting the 2012 evaluation,. relied on “negative statements about Eisner by her former supervisor Helmers” in particular comments that “Eisner cannot handle complex cases.”
Eisner’s disability discrimination claim is nothing more than an argument that because she suffered from a disability and endured an adverse employment action, the former must have caused the latter. Such a tenuous connection fails to make out even a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA or NYCHRL.
C. NYCHRL Retaliation Claim
In the absence of a viable federal claim, I decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining retaliation claim under the NYCHRL. The question of whether the NYCHRL claims survives summary judgment is a close call and depends on the precise contours of the summary judgment standard. Given the ambiguity surrounding the standard, New York state courts are better positioned to address the NYCHRL claims on summary judgment.
VI. CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The NYCHRL retaliation claim is hereby dismissed without prejudice. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this motion (Dkt. No. 25) and this case.
SO ORDERED.
. Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts Pursuant to Local Rule 56.1 ("Def. 56.1”) ¶¶ 1-4.
. See id. ¶¶ 3, 10.
. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (“Def. Mem.”) at 5 n.3.
. Amended Complaint ¶ 15.
. See Plaintiff's Local Civil Rule 56.1 Statement in Response to, and in Contravention of, Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement ("PL 56.1”) ¶ 14.
. Amended Complaint ¶ 19.
. See id. ¶¶ 21-22.
. See Pl. 56.1 ¶ 14.
. See id. ¶ 15.
. Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 11-14.
. Amended Complaint ¶ 21.
. See id. ¶ 22.
. See Def. 56.1 ¶ 23.
.Settlement Agreement, Ex. H to the Decía-ration of Eric Eichenholtz, counsel for defendants, in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Eichenholtz Decl.”), at 1.
. See Settlement Agreement ¶ 1.
. Def. Mem. at 6-12.
. Def. 56.1 ¶ 136 (quoting Defendants’ Cardozo Transcript (“Def. Cardozo Tr.”), Ex. A to Eichenholtz Decl., at 114:22).
. See id. ¶¶ 27-28.
. Pl. Mem. at 3.
. See Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 30-31.
. Plaintiff’s Koerner Transcript (“PL Koerner Tr.”), Ex. 12 to the Declaration of Edward Hernstadt, counsel for plaintiff, in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (“Hernstadt Decl.”), at 141:22-23, 153:19-154:22.
. Id. at 147:23-25.
. Id. at 145:19-25, 152:21-25.
. Plaintiff’s Caputo Transcript (“PL Caputo Tr.”), Ex. 14 to Hernstadt Decl., at 87:16-24.
. See Def. 56.1 ¶ 38.
. Id. ¶ 44.
. 2011 Evaluation, Ex. 2 to Hernstadt Decl., at 3.
. 2012 Evaluation, Ex. I to Eichenholtz Decl., at 3.
. See Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 6.
. See Def. 56.1 ¶ 50.
. Court of Appeals Letter, Ex. K to Eichenholtz Decl.
. See Nash/Kahn Emails, Ex. 6 to Hernstadt Decl., at SE0008159.
. Id.
. See id. at SE0008158.
. 2012 Evaluation at 2.
. Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 7, 72 (quoting Defendants’ Koerner Transcript ("Def. Koerner Tr.”), Ex. F to Eichenholtz Decl., at 49:11-15).
. See 2011 Retaliation Allegation, Ex. 5 to Hernstadt Decl., at D001591-92.
. See id. at D001591-92.
. See Def. Cardozo Tr. at 86:20-87:19, 121:9-122:9; Defendants’ Mills Transcript ("Def. Mills Tr.”), Ex. C to Eichenholtz Decl., at 105:19-23.
. Def. Eisner Tr. at 140:22-141:8.
. See id. at 138:10-21
. See zd. at 141:13-14.
. Post-Sandy Emails, Ex. M to the Eichenholtz Decl.
. Id.
. Id.
. See Def. 56.1 ¶ 106.
. Def. Mem. at 10.
. Id.
. See Def. 56.1 ¶ 112.
. See Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 110, 112
. See id. ¶ 98.
. Def. 56.1 ¶ 115.
. Def. Koerner Tr. at 280:12-17.
. See Pl. Mem. at 20.
. See Def. 56.1 ¶ 127.
. Id. ¶ 128 (quoting Def. Goode-Trufant Tr., Ex. E to Eichenholtz Decl., at 258:14-259:4).
. Id. ¶ 129.
. Pl. 56.1 ¶ 129. Cardozo is allegedly implicated in the investigation because Eisner contends he reviewed her 2012 evaluation. See id. ¶ 32.
. Id. ¶ 127.
. Robinson v. Concentra Health Servs., Inc., 781 F.3d 42, 44 (2d Cir.2015) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
. Simpson v. City of New York, 793 F.3d 259, 265 (2d Cir.2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 192 (2d Cir.2012), aff’d, — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 186 L.Ed.2d 808 (2013) (quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted).
. Crawford v. Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp., 758 F.3d 473, 486 (2d Cir.2014) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970)).
. Robinson, 781 F.3d at 44 (quoting Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., 654 F.3d 347, 358 (2d Cir.2011)).
. Chen v. New Trend Apparel, 8 F.Supp.3d 406, 430 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (further citations omitted)).
. Rogoz v. City of Hartford, 796 F.3d 236, 245 (2d Cir.2015) (quoting Kaytor v. Electric Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 545 (2d Cir.2010)).
. Crawford, 758 F.3d at 486 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
. See Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir.2006) (ADA discrimination claims); Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir.2002) (ADA retaliation claims).
. Sista, 445 F.3d at 169 (citing Heyman v. Queens Vill. Comm. for Mental Health for Jamaica Cmty. Adolescent Program, 198 F.3d 68, 72 (2d Cir.1999)).
. Quaratino v. Tiffany & Co., 71 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir.1995) (citing St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)).
. 204 F.3d 326, 337 (2d Cir.2000).
. 557 U.S. 167, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009); — U.S. —, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 186 L.Ed.2d 503 (2013).
. See Gross, 557 U.S. at 176, 129 S.Ct. 2343 ("[T]he ordinary meaning of the ADEA's requirement that an employer took adverse action 'because of' age is that age was the 'reason' that the employer decided to act. ... It follows, then, that under [the ADEA], the plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion to establish that age was the 'but-for' cause of the employer's adverse action.”); Nassar, 133 S.Ct. at 2528 ("This enactment, like the statute at issue in Gross, makes it unlawful for an employer to take adverse employment action against an employee 'because’ of certain criteria. Given the lack of any meaningful textual difference between the text in this statute and the one in Gross, ... Title VII retaliation claims require proof that the desire to ret-aliate was the but-for cause of the challenged employment action.”).
. See Widomski v. State Univ. of New York (SUNY) at Orange, 933 F.Supp.2d 534, 546 n. 8 (S.D.N.Y.2013) (collecting cases).
. See Wesley-Dickson v. Warwick Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 586 Fed.Appx. 739, 745 n. 3 (2d Cir.2014) (“This 'but-for’ standard might also apply to her ADA retaliation claim.”).
. Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312, 321 (6th Cir.2012).
. Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir.2010) (holding that there is no "mixed-motive” provision in the ADA that would allow the' court to distinguish the ADA from the ADEA).
. Ya-Chen Chen v. City Univ. of New York, 805 F.3d 59, 75-76 (2d Cir.2015).
. See id. at 76.
. Id. at 75 (quoting Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N. Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 109 (2d Cir.2013)).
. Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 110 n. 8.
. Id. (quoting Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 62, 78 n. 27, 872 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1st Dep’t 2009)) (brackets in original).
. Ya-Chen Chen, 805 F.3d at 76 (quoting Mihalik, 715 F.3d at 110 n. 8).
. Treglia, 313 F.3d at 719 (citing Cifra v. General Electric Co., 252 F.3d 205, 216 (2d Cir.2001)).
. Id. (citing Richardson v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 444 (2d Cir.1999)).
. See id. at 720 ("Moreover, we have made clear that adverse employment actions are not limited to 'pecuniary emoluments.' Lesser actions such as negative employment evaluation letters may also be considered adverse." (citation omitted)).
. Typically, temporal proximity is sufficient to prove causation when the time the employer gains knowledge of the protected activity is followed closely by the adverse activity. See Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 104 (2d Cir.2011). However, the Second Circuit has also considered the termination of a lawsuit to be a relevant point for measuring temporal proximity. In Espinal v. Goord, the Second Circuit found that "the passage of only six months between the dismissal of [plaintiff's] lawsuit and an allegedly retaliatory beating by officers ... is sufficient to support an inference of a causal connection.” See 558 F.3d 119, 129 (2d Cir.2009).
. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (“The dissent takes this to mean that if the plaintiff proves the asserted reason to be false, the plaintiff wins. But a reason cannot be proved to be a pretext for discrimination’ unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.”).
. See Pl. Koerner Tr. at 147:8-23.
. Eisner was already one of the lowest performing attorneys when she was selected for transfer in 2010, and McGrath subsequently gave Eisner the lowest grade of anyone in the Appeals Division in her 2011 evaluation. See ACC Evaluation Scores, Ex. O to the Reply Declaration of Eric Eichenholtz in Further Support of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. While Caputo never completed an evaluation, he testified that “she [didn’t have] a good grasp [of brief writing].” Id. at 111:18-25. The COIB and Pestana, as noted previously, also complained about her work.
. See Def. 56.1 ¶26.
. Delaney v. Bank of Am. Corp., 766 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir.2014) (quoting Scaria v. Rubin, 117 F.3d 652, 655 (2d Cir.1997)). Cf. Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 105 (2d Cir.2001) ("That is to say that ’[w]hile the business judgment rule protects the sincere employer against second-guessing of the reasonableness of its judgments, it does not protect the employer against attacks on its credibility.’”).
. Def. Koerner Tr. at 85:17-86:5.
. Pl. Mem. at 16-17.
. See Pl. 56.1 ¶ 33. It is worth noting that Eisner contradicts her own argument that there is a conflict of interest. After Eisner filed her 2011 EEOC complaint, Pestaña decided not to assign her additional Labor and Employment Division cases on "‘Conflict’ grounds.” 2011 Retaliation Allegation at 2. At the time Eisner argued this decision was retaliatory and wrote "how does the fact that an attorney in the Labor and Employment Division will defend against the Charge create a conflict?” Id. She now contends that any criticism of her work on a Labor and Employment Division case is inherently suspect because of a conflict of interest.
. See Pl. 56.1 ¶ 73.
. See id.
. Def. Koerner Tr. at 280:13.
. Def, Goode-Trufant Tr. at 260:21-25.
. Pl. Mem. at 19-20.
. Id. at 20.
. Pl. Koerner Tr. at 260:10-14, 286:5-16. Accord id. at 226:6-13 ("But when I put [Rosenbluml together with everything else, Nash and D’Angelo, it starts to become a problem.”).
. Def. 56.1 ¶ 129. While Eisner disputes whether Goode-Trufant should have conducted the investigation herself, there is nothing in the record that would contradict the underlying factual basis for Goode-Trufant's conclusion. Goode-Trufant extensively analyzed time records and remote access usage in reaching her conclusion. See generally 2013 EEO Report, Ex. 3 to Hernstadt Decl.
. McMillan v. City of New York, 711 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir.2013). Accord Benimovich v. Fieldston Operating LLC, No. 11 Civ. 780, 2013 WL 1189480, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2013).
. Plaintiff Susan Eisner's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 24.
. Id.
. Def. Koerner Tr. at 128:2-14.
. See White v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., No. 12 Civ. 1376, 2014 WL 1273770, at *13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014) (“[P]laintiff relies on conclusory allegations that fall into the familiar and tired false syllogism: I am African-American, something bad happened to me at work, therefore it must have happened because I am African-American.”).
. See Spiegel v. Schulmann, 604 F.3d 72, 83 (2d Cir.2010) (“[The district Court] may determine that this area of law would benefit from further development in the state courts and therefore dismiss the claim without prejudice to refiling in state court.”).