Judges: Brown
Filed Date: 5/11/1885
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/3/2024
On the twenty-fifth of April, 1885, the libel of information in this case was filed for the forfeiture and condemnation of the steam-ship City of Mexico, for an alleged violation of the neu
The steamer having been seized, and having remained without bonding in the custody of the government, the cause has been brought to immediate trial. Section 5283 provides for the forfeiture of every vessel fitted out or armed, “within the limits of the United States, with intent that such vessel shall be employed in the service of any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district, or people, to cruise or commit hostilities against the subjects, citizens, or property of any foreign prince or state, or any colony, district, or people, with whom the United States are at peace.”
The libel, in eight different counts, varying somewhat in form, charges, in substance, that the steamer, on or about the twelfth day of March, 1885, within the.Southern district of New York, was fitted out with intent that she should be employed in the service of certain rebels, citizens of the United States of Colombia, then in insurrection against the United States of Colombia, to cruise and commit hostilities against the subjects, citizens, and property of the latter, with whom-the United States-were at peace. Some of the counts state that the alleged rebels then constituted a cle facto government at the city and district of Baranquilla and Savanilla. The answer consists of a general-denial.
The proofs show that during some months previous to the seizure of the steamer an insurrection had existed in the state of Bolivar, one of the states of the United States of Colombia, of which Bar-anquilla was the interior capital, and Savanilla, about 30 miles distant, was the seaport; that theiinsurgents were in possession of these cities, had established a de facto government there, and that the recognition of belligerent rights had been accorded them by the lawful government of that country, and a notification thereof made to our government on the twelfth of March, 1885. On the same day, the steamer City of Mexico, of about 660 tons, sailed from New York with a cargo consisting of 20 cases of guns, 50 cases of cartridges, 50 b.oxés of builders’ hardware, 300 barrels of flour, 100 hemlock boards, 50 spruce scantlings, and two boxes containing $1,540 in specie. The hardware, as well as the guns and cartridges, were military' supplies consigned to Perez & Co., merchants at Baranquilla, upon whose account and order they had been purchased shortly before in this city by S. P. Triana, an established and reputable commission merchant here. The order for the goóds and the funds to pay for them were brought from Baranquilla by one G-aitan, who was in fact a com
Before the vessel sailed an arrangement was effected to procure for the return voyage a fruit cargo for a house in New York from Bocas del Toro. That port is about 500 miles to the westward of Savanilla. The specie, scantling, and boards, part of the cargo shipped at New York, as above stated,'were for the purchase and binning of the fruit to be obtained at Bocas del Toro.
The steamer sailed in the afternoon of the twelfth of March, arrived without incident off Savanilla on the 21st, commenced discharging that night upon lighters, and finished without any impediment at half-past 2 p. m. of the following day. The master on the same day went to Baranquilla and deposited the ship’s papers with the American consul there. The next day Capt. O’Brien was introduced by Perez & Go., his consignees, to some agent or officer of the insurgent government, and on the twenty-fifth of March he made a contract with him by which he agreed “to take on board the steamer about 250 passengers, to be conveyed and landed at Rio 'Hacha, for the sum of $400, and 100 tons of ballast to be put on board the
Does a voyage of such character infringe the provisions of section 5283 of the Revised Statutes above referred to ? The offense under that act, it will be observed, is confined to1 cases in which the vessel shall be fitted out, etc., “with intent that she shall be employed to cruise or commit hostilities,” etc. The expedition from Savanilla to
There is not sufficient evidence before me to determine properly to what extent Capt. O’Brien, in making the contract at Baranquilla to carry tho 250 passengers to Rio Hacha, was chargeable with knowledge of its military and hostile character. There is nothing to contradict his testimony that he was assured and believed that Rio Hacha was in the possession of the insurgents, and that he had no idea of any use of his vessel other than as a peaceable transport. If it bo said that Capt. O’Brien ought to have known, or to have ascertained, whether Rio Hacha was actually in possession of the insurgents or not, some allowance is certainly due to him from the fact that he was not accustomed to trade in that region, and that the political status of tho provinces and cities of that coast is neither so stable nor so notorious that a captain, not having previous dealings with them, should have known their political affiliations. Some inferential support of- his testimony may, perhaps, be found in tho fact that the American consul at Baranquilla gave him a clearance for that port; although the whole force of this inference would be broken if it should appear, as may have been tho fact, that tho consul had no knowledge of the purpose of the trip. If Capt. O’Brien had no knowledge that any military demonstration was intended, but contracted only to transport insurgent troops from one port in their possession to another port supposed by him to be in their own possession, wholly unconnected with any particular military enterprise, it is certain that he committed no offense against our municipal law, and no offense even against the law of nations, save to subject his ship to capture by the other belligerents if caught during the voyage. But, however this may be, the contract to carry troops to Rio Hacha was not made “within the limits of the United States.” It is only against designs formed within those limits that our statute is directed. Upon this trial, therefore, tho Rio Hacha excursion has no importance, except in two respects: First, in case it was designed in this country; and, secondly, as regards the light, if any, that it may shed upon the general intent with which the ship was fitted out in New York.
There is no_ evidence that Rio Hacha formed any part of the orig
I must regard the excursion to Rio Hacha, therefore, as wholly disconnected from the fitting out of the vessel in New York, and as affording no ground for a proceeding against the ship under our municipal law, which has reference solely to plans formed and completed in this country. So strictly in that respect is the statute in question construed, that in the case of U. S. v. Quincy, 6 Pet. 445, the supreme court held that “the intention with respect to the employment of the vessel should be formed before she leaves the United States; and this must be a fixed intention.” Accordingly, in that case, whore the defendant was indicted for fitting out the Bolivar as a privateer at Baltimore, the court held that instructions should have been given to the jury that if, “wherrthe Bolivar was fitted and equipped at Baltimore, the owner and equipper intended to go to the West Indies in search of funds with which to arm and equip the said vessel, and had no present intention of using or employing the said vessel as a privateer, but intended, when he equipped her, to go to the West Indies to endeavor to raise funds, to prepare her for a cruise, then the defendant is not guilty;” also, “that if the jury believe that when the Bolivar was equipped at Baltimore, and when she left the United States the equipper had no fixed intention to employ her as a pri-
In its other relations, the Rio Hacha incident, as one of the results of the interview between Capt. O’Brien and Perez & Co., the ostensible consignees of the military supplies at Baranquilla, does tend to give support to the inference which numerous other circumstances also indicate, viz., that these supplies were ordered for the direct and immediate use of the insurgent forces at Savanilla and Baran-quilla; and that the insurgent government was probably the beneficial purchaser, acting through Perez & Go., as its agents only. On the latter point, however, there is no certain proof. It may be assumed that the military supplies were designed for the immediate use of the troops there, and that Gaitan, as agent of the de facto government, came to New York in its behalf to expedite as rapidly as possible the obtaining and shipping of these supplies. But it would not follow that because the insurgent government, as between it and Perez & Co., was the real principal, that Perez & Co., who ordered the supplies, can be ignored; or that Mr. Triana, in New York, in acting upon and filling the orders of Perez & Co., his supposed principals, and in shipping the goods to them from this port, is to be treated as dealing directly with the insurgent government. He has a right to stand upon the contract according to its form, because its form in such case is material. A contract of this kind stamps the transaction, so far as our own citizens are concerned, as a commercial venture only; because it is strictly and wholly, so far as our citizens are concerned, a purchase and shipment by one merchant here, upon the order and for the account of another merchant abroad. I do not include cases where the use of a foreign merchant’s name by a belligerent is known to be a mere sham. But there is not sufficient evidence here to sustain that theory. All that can be legitimately inferred is that the supplies were intended for the immediate use of the insurgent government through the consignment to Perez & Co., and upon their order. The fact that Gaitan was in constant communication with Mr. Triana, and that he directed all the important arrangements for the dispatch of the goods, warrants that inference; but that is not enough, against Mr. Triana’s testimony, to sustain the charge that the supplies were furnished directly to the insurgent government.
The case turns upon the construction to be given to the language of section 5283. The counsel for the government contends that, in substance, the steamer was engaged as a transport in the service of the insurgent government; and that she was fitted out in New York,
It is impossible, however, to hold, in this ease, that the City of Mexico was in the employ of the insurgent government or in its possession. She was never out of the possession of the Provincial Steamboat Company, her owners. She was not chartered to the insurgent government, nor to any of its representatives, but to Mr. Triana, a merchant of this city; and the charter itself was but a charter of af-freightment for an outward voyage, and was manifestly for no other purpose than a commercial venture to carry these military supplies to Sava-nilla, for the ultimate use, it may be conceded, of the insurgent government, and thence to proceed to Bocas del Toro, to obtain cargo for her return voyage. But even if Perez & Co. were to be ignored, and the charter were treated as a charter for the delivery of the supplies directly to the insurgent government, it would have been none the less a commercial venture only. The law of nations does not prohibit the citizens of neutral states from carrying supplies, even contraband of war, to either belligerent; although those that engage in it run the risk of search, capture, and confiscation. Neither our laws, nor our treaties forbid such traffic.
Mr. Webster, in his letter to Mr. Thompson of July 8, 1842, upon this subject, observes:
“It is not the practice of nations to undertake to prohibit their own subjects, by previous laws, from trafficking in articles contraband of war. Such trade is carried on at the risk of those engaged in it, under the liabilities and penalties prescribed by the law of nations or particular treaties. If it be true, therefore, that citizens of the United States have been engaged in a commerce by which Texas, an enemy of Mexico, has been supplied with arms and munitions of war, the government of the United States, nevertheless, was not bound to prevent it, — could not have prevented it without a manifest departure from the principles of neutrality, — and is in no way answerable for the consequences. The eighteenth article (of the treaty between the United States and Mexico) enumerates those commodities which shall be regarded as contraband of war; but neither that article nor any other imposes on either nation any duty of preventing, by previous regulation, commerce in such articles. Such commerce is left to its ordinary fate according to the law of nations.” Lawrence’s Wheat. Internat. Law, 813, note 232; 6 Webst. Works. 452; IIall, Internat. Law, 70; Seton v.Low, 1 Johns. Cas. 1.
Mr. Layará, in the English house of commons in 1862, said:
*41 “The law of nations exposes such persons to have their ships seized and their goods taken and subjected to confiscation; and it further deprives them of the right to look to the government of their own country for any protection. And tiiis principle of non-interference in things which the law does not enable the government to deal with, so far from being a violation of the duty of neutrality, is in accordance with all the principles which have been laid down by jurists, and more especially by the groat jurists of the United States of America. ”
Mr. Marey, in his dispatch to Mr. Bucliahan of April 13, 1854, (Cong. Doc. 33d Cong. 1st Sess. II. R. Doc. 103, p. 21,) says:
“As the law lias been declared by the decisions of the courts of admiralty and elementary writers, it allows belligerents to search neutral vessels for articles contraband of war and for enemies’ goods. If the doctrine is so modified as to except from seizure and confiscation enemies’ property under a neutral Hag, still the right to seize articles contraband of war, on board of neutral vessels, implies the right to ascertain the character of the cargo. A persistent resistance by a neutral vessel to submit to a search renders it confisca-ble, according to the settled determination of the English admiralty. ”
President Pierce, also, in his message to the first session of the thirty-fourth congress, speaking of articles contraband of war, says:
“The laws of the United States do not forbid their citizens to sell to either of the belligerent powers articles contraband of war, or take munitions of war or soldiers on board their private ships for transportation; and although in so doing the individual citizen exposes his property or person to some of the hazards of war, his acts do not involve any breach of national neutrality, nor of themselves implicate the government.”
Kent, in his Commentaries, vol. 1, p. 142, sets it down as the established law that “neutrals may lawfully sell at home to a belligerent purchaser, or carry themselves to the belligerent powers, contraband articles subject to the right of seizure in transitu” And that “the right of neutrals to transport, and of the hostile power to seize, are conflicting rights, and neither party can charge the other with a criminal act.” The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283, 340; Richardson v. Maine Ins. Go. 6 Mass. 113.
The provisions of section 5283, and of the neutrality act of 1818, are not directed against commercial adventures, nor against peaceable aid, however important, rendered by our citizens to either belligerent, so long as such aid arises indirectly only through commercial dealings, and in the ordinary channels of trade. The statute is directed Solely against warlike enterprises. It does not forbid giving aid and comfort to either belligerent. Had that been its design it would have been expressed. Its language is: “To cram or commit hostilities against the subjects, citizens, or property,’’.etc. This plainly means acts of force, injury, or destruction, that are of a warlike character, as distinguished from the peaceable interchanges of commerce, which, however much they may indirectly aid a belligerent, involve no hostilities committed or participated in by tlie ship herself. If a vessel should engage to take part as a transport in a hostile expedition, she might be held to be involved in the general
In the case of U. S. v. Quincy, 6 Pet. 466, above quoted, the court say:
“The intention is the material point on which the legality or criminality of the act must turn, and decides whether the adventure is of a commercial or warlike character. The law does not prohibit armed vessels, belonging to the citizens of the United States, from sailing out of our ports, and it Only requires the owners to give security that such vessels shall not be employed by them to commit hostilities against foreign powers at peace with the United States. The collectors are not authorized to detain vessels, although manifestly built for warlike purposes, and about to depart from the United States, unless circumstances shall render it probable that such vessels are intended to be employed by the owners to commit hostilities against some foreign power at peace with the United States. All the latitude necessary for commercial purposes is given to our citizens, and they are restrained only from such acts as are calculated to involve the country in war. ”
The voyage of the City of Mexico appears to me, beyond controversy, to have been intended to be wholly peaceable. She was, in all respects, in men and in equipment, in the same condition as upon her customary voyages, without armament of any sort. The port of Savanilla was in the undisputed, peaceful possession of the insurgents. ' There was no blockade, or attempted blockade, of it by the lawful government. The sole object of the owners of the ship, who remained all the time in possession of her, was to deliver these military supplies at Savanilla. There was no intent to commit hostilities, or even a breach of the peace; or to disturb any rights, in person or in property, of any subject of the lawful government of Colombia.
But for the excursion to Bio Hacha, it is improbable that any suspicion would have attached to the voyage. Coupled with that excursion, however, the precautions against detention found in the charter, and in the letters of instruction to the captain; the delay in filing the supplementary manifest, which recited the shipment of arms and military supplies taken on board at -New York; and the false destination of these supplies, stated in the supplemental ma’nifest,' together with the fac.t of the two passengers accompanying Capt. O’Brien, under whose orders in respect to landing the supplies he was to act, —all these things tended to give an appearance of illegality to the voyage in its inception, which I am nevertheless fully satisfied it did not possess. The Rio Hacha incident, as I have said, was an afterthought, into which Capt. O’Brien was himself deceived and misled. When he discovered that the ship was used, and was sought áo be still further used, for treacherous and hostile purposes, his conduct, so far as I can perceive, was praiseworthy and blameless, both in resisting
I find nothing, therefore, in the ease authorizing any inferences to he drawn adverse to the entirely peaceable and commercial character of the adventure, as it was designed and planned when the vessel sailed from this port. The Rio Hacha excursion was an independent incident, during which Capt. O’Brien found himself surprised by the violent and treacherous acts of the troops, which he could not have anticipated, and which he did everything in his power to repair.
The libel should therefore be dismissed, and the vessel discharged from custody.