Judges: Barnard, Cullen, Dykman
Filed Date: 2/15/1883
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/12/2024
The evidence shows that one John S. Duffy agreed to sell to the defendants fifty tons of scrap steel at two cents per pound. The steel was to be delivered in the following proportions : Fifteen tons tool steel and fifteen tons file steel to twenty tons of other scrap steel. Subsequently Duffy found at Newburgh a lot of steel scrap of about eighty tons, which belonged to the plaintiffs, which they agreed Duffy might sell to defendants for them on a commission. Duffy then agreed to sell the eighty tons in the proportions aforesaid. The steel was subsequently delivered, and was not in the proportions agreed upon. The plaintiffs then agreed to sell twenty
The referee decides that the defendants must pay the entire agreed px'ice for the steel, notwithstanding the non-delivery of the proper proportions of heavy steel. This conclusion seems to be ei’roneous. The learned referee puts the case upon those authorities which hold that an executoi’y conti’act is deemed pei’foi’med by an acceptance of the subject of the contract after opportunity to examine. It seems to me that those cases do not include the present one. The case of Reed v. Randall (29 N. Y., 358) was an executory contract for the sale of tobacco. The tobacco was delivered as merchantable, and was accepted, without objection, in execution of the contract. It was held that the vendee coixld not sue for damages based upon the xxnmei’chantable chai’acter of the tobacco.
The case of Beck v. Sheldon (48 N. Y., 365) was one similar in principle. The contract called for No. 1 and No. 2 pig iron at certain prices. The quality of pig iron is determined by the granulation. The skilled employer determines by the fracture to which grade it belongs. The grades thus determined were delivex’ed as the gi’ades called for; and it was held that after acceptance the contract was performed, and that the grades received and accepted were to be deemed thus contracted for. To the same purport is Dounce v. Dow (64 N. Y., 411).
The case of The Dutchess Company v. Harding (49 N. Y., 321) has no’ relevancy to the question presented. In that case the ■vendor had induced an acceptance of sumac by fraud. The case of McCormick v. Sarson (45 N. Y., 265) holds that after lumber is received as prime and xnerchantable it is too late to object. The contract was performed when the lumber was received in execution of it.
The judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted, costs, to abide event, and order of reference vacated.
So ordered.