Citation Numbers: 40 Misc. 2d 551
Judges: Nathae, Sobel
Filed Date: 10/3/1963
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 2/5/2022
This is a motion to dismiss the indictment. The indictment charges (1) incest, (2) assault, second degree, with intent to commit incest, (3) impairing the morals of a minor. All charges arise from a single act of intercourse allegedly committed on November 21, 1962. I have read the Grand Jury minutes. The only evidence before the Grand Jury is the testimony of the 15-year-old prosecutrix. She testifies that the act of intercourse took place on November 21, 1962, but that she made no disclosure until December 30, 1962. No evidence of a physical examination was presented. No other evidence, direct or circumstantial, supports the child’s accusations. Nor was she questioned concerning the circumstances surrounding the incident. She merely answered “ Yes ” to the question, “ Did an act of sexual intercourse take place? ”
The moving papers allege that a matrimonial dispute is in the background.
On such evidence, without more, no conviction has ever been sustained by our appellate courts. (People v. Christie, 16 A D 2d 598; cf. People v. Porcaro, 6 N Y 2d 248; People v. Oyola, 6 N Y 2d 259.)
But “ The Legislature has specifically relegated the question of whether a trial jury would return a conviction on this evidence to the judgment of the Grand Jury ”. (People v. Eckert, 2 N Y 2d 126, 129.) Until the Legislature changes this law or the People catch up with the universal trend and abolish the Grand Jury system in this State, the courts are bound by a Grand Jury finding even though it represents a futile act.
Rape requires independent supporting evidence (Penal Law, § 2013). Incest does not. (People v. Gibson, 301 N. Y. 244.) Yet both have as a root accusation an act of sexual intercourse.
A 15-year-old consenting female is not an accomplice in rape or incest. (People v. Gibson, supra.) But such a female is an accomplice whose testimony must be independently corroborated if the charge is sodomy. (People v. Rosenthal, 289 N. Y. 482; People v. McKinney, 20 Misc 2d 976.)
There is no logical basis for either of the foregoing distinctions.
People v. Lo Verde (7 N Y 2d 114) is a first recognition of one aspect of this problem. It holds that where the ‘ ‘ impairing ’ ’ charge specifically alleges an act of sexual intercourse, section 2013 which requires “corroboration” of a rape accusation would require corroboration of the impairing accusation. In logic, section 2013 should require corroboration of an incest