Citation Numbers: 120 Misc. 2d 586
Judges: Ferraro
Filed Date: 8/12/1983
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 2/5/2022
OPINION OF THE COURT
Plaintiffs make this application to vacate a decision, order and judgment of this court and for reargument and renewal of the motion for summary judgment granted in favor of defendant Swim and Play Company.
Upon the original application the only opposition was an affidavit of plaintiffs’ attorney which failed to set forth evidentiary facts to sustain a cause of action. (Freedman v Chemical Constr. Corp., 43 NY2d 260; Ehrlich v American Moninger Greenhouse Mfg. Corp., 26 NY2d 255; Mintz v Long Is. Daily Press Pub. Co., 75 AD2d 595; Valenti v Purdy, 71 AD2d 1019.)
The decision and order of the court was rendered on March 31,1982. However, the judgment was not submitted to the court until March of 1983.
In addition to the technical grounds for vacating the judgment the plaintiffs seek to vacate upon the basis of additional facts which they claim justify a denial of the motion for summary judgment.
The additional papers submitted upon this application consist of an affidavit of the father of the injured plaintiff, photographs of the alleged defective ladder and an examination before trial of an officer of defendant Swim and Play Company. The examination elicited that the Swim and Play Company made no recommendations as to ladders to be attached to the pools they manufacture and offered no literature regarding the types of ladders to be used.
It is conceded that the Swim and Play Company manufactured only the pool and had nothing to do with the manufacture, installation or maintenance of the ladder from which the infant plaintiff fell.
The plaintiffs contend that since Swim and Play Company manufactured a pool which was intended for above-the-ground use and since the pool was four feet high the pool manufacturers should have given some instructions and made certain recommendations as to a ladder to be used for entrance and exit to the pool.
The plaintiffs advance a novel theory of liability and research has revealed no reported authority to substantiate their theory.
In a products liability case a plaintiff may ground his action on four theories: (1) negligence, (2) breach of express warranty, (3) breach of implied warranty, and (4) strict liability. (Victorson v Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 37 NY2d 395; Lancaster Silo & Block Co. v Northern Propane Gas Co., 75 AD2d 55.)
In the instant case since the defendant Swim and Play Company did not manufacture the ladder there could be no
There remains for consideration the defendant Swim and Play Company’s possible liability on the theory of negligence. Negligence is founded on an underlying duty owed to another, the possible danger to whom is reasonably foreseeable as a result of the conduct of the alleged wrongdoer. The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed. (Palsgraf v Long Is. R. R. Co., 248 NY 339.) Only reasonable foresight is required, not prophetic vision. (Cartee v Saks Fifth Ave., 277 App Div 606, affd 303 NY 832; Gattner v Coliseum Exhibition Corp., 17 AD2d 44, affd 12 NY2d 933; Morris v Troy Sav. Bank, 32 AD2d 237, affd 28 NY2d 619.) Failure to guard against a remote possibility of accident is not negligence. (Polemenakos v Cohn, 234 App Div 563, affd 260 NY 524; Hubbell v City of Yonkers, 104 NY 434.) The question of duty and foreseeability is for the court when the facts are undisputed and but one inference may be drawn. (Donahue v Copiague Union Free School Dist., 64 AD2d 29, affd 47 NY2d 440.) In the instant case it is undisputed that the infant plaintiff fell off of the ladder while leaving the pool and landed on a bucket near the foot of the ladder. It has been held as a matter of law that it was not foreseeable in an action against a bank that a bank patron would fall over the leash of a seeing eye dog of another patron (Morris v Troy Sav. Bank, 32 AD2d 237, affd 28 NY2d 619, supra), nor, in an action against the State that a member of the public would be assaulted by a
In the case at bar the court concludes that a fall from a defective ladder manufactured by another onto a bucket placed at the foot thereof by the owner could not reasonably have been foreseen by the pool manufacturer and that even if it could have been foreseen the pool manufacturer could not be held liable because it had no control over the manufacture, use or maintenance of the ladder nor the placement of the bucket at the foot thereof.
The motion to vacate the judgment and for reargument and renewal is therefore denied.