Citation Numbers: 177 Misc. 2d 59, 675 NYS2d 757
Judges: Lifson
Filed Date: 3/25/1998
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 2/5/2022
OPINION OF THE COURT
Counsel for John Campbell, a patient admitted to Pilgrim Psychiatric Center (hospital), moves by order to show cause dated February 13, 1998 (Baisley, J.), for an order permitting counsel for said patient to record by voice tape the entirety of the interview/examination of said patient to be conducted by the hospital’s forensic psychiatrist and for other relief. The
The circumstances giving rise to this application are as follows. At an appearance on January 30, 1998, the court appointed a psychiatrist to examine the patient, Mr. Campbell. Counsel for the hospital informed the patient’s counsel that he intended to have Mr. Campbell examined by Dr. Kanji, the hospital’s forensic expert. While counsel for the hospital agreed to have the patient’s counsel present to observe the examination by Dr. Kanji, he did not consent to the request by patient’s counsel for the voice tape recording of the psychiatric examination of the patient. The hearing on the hospital’s petition for retention of the patient is presently scheduled for March 27, 1998.
Movant relies herein upon Ughetto v Acrish (130 AD2d 12, 25 [2d Dept 1987]), which holds that an involuntarily committed mental patient “who exercises his right to a hearing on the issue of whether the continuation of his confinement may legally be allowed, and who is compelled to undergo a psychiatric examination in preparation for such a hearing, has the right to have an attorney observe the examination”. Movant’s counsel requests that this court permit voice taping relying upon the due process rationale expressed by the Ughetto Court, further relying upon Ughetto for the proposition that “the State must affirmatively establish a ‘substantial countervailing disadvantage’ (Ughetto, supra.)” (see, affirmation of Murray B. Schneps, dated Feb. 11, 1998, at 5) will result from the proposed voice taping. Furthermore, movant contends, in essence, that the objective record created by the proposed taping is consistent with the court’s concern, as expressed in Ughetto, with “enhancing] the reliability of the truth-finding function of the hearing” and protecting the patient’s basic procedural right to cross-examination (affirmation of Murray B. Schneps, dated Mar. 5, 1998, alluding to Ughetto v Acrish, supra).
With respect to movant’s expressed concern regarding creation of “an indisputable record” of the interview/examination (affirmation of Murray B. Schneps, dated Mar. 5, 1998, at 3),
Although counsel for the hospital alleges that voice taping would be intrusive, no direct proof by any forensic expert is offered by the hospital to establish that voice taping would be intrusive or any other disadvantage which might counterbalance considerations of the patient’s right to due process
In the absence of proof by the examining (or other) expert to establish that taping would be intrusive or would otherwise interfere with or undermine the examination of the patient, the patient’s due process rights must prevail (Ughetto v Acrish, 130 AD2d 12, supra). Based on the papers presented the hospital has failed to establish a “substantial countervailing disadvantage” to the advantage to be had in safeguarding the patient’s constitutional right to due process. However, this court finds and concludes that only videotaping will give a sufficient, accurate portrayal and record of the interview/ examination. In this case, videotaping will achieve a balance between the competing needs of the parties to conduct the exam and to preserve an accurate record for the subsequent legal proceeding. The court shall permit the videotaping of the patient’s psychiatric examination subject to the same operational safeguards concerning the conduct of such taping which were established by the Mosel court. Parenthetically, as also noted by Justice Cannavo in Mosel, the determination approving the videotaping does not constitute a “determination of the admissibility of any such videotape” (Mosel v Brookhaven Mem. Hosp., supra, at 77) if it is sought to be introduced at the hearing.
In reaching its conclusion herein, this court has considered the decisions of the First and Third Departments (respectively) in Savarese v Yonkers Motors Corp. (205 AD2d 463 [1st Dept 1994]) and Lamendola v Slocum (148 AD2d 781 [3d Dept 1989]). However, the factual contexts of those personal injury cases are distinguishable from the matter at bar which involves (as did Ughetto v Acrish, supra, and Mosel v Brookhaven Mem. Hosp., supra) the rights of an impaired or incompetent person, or one alleged to be so.
Ughetto v Acrish (supra) was most recently cited in Matter of Jerome G. (201 AD2d 562 [2d Dept 1994]).