Judges: Lawrence
Filed Date: 1/15/1884
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 11/8/2024
Under the fourth -section of chapter 496 of the Laws of 1881, I think it may be argued with much force that the House of Refuge is “ an institution authorized by law to receive children on final commitment, and to receive and derive compensation therefor from city or county authorities,” and that, therefore, the institution was bound to receive the relator on the commitment of the court of special sessions. (Wallack agt. The Mayor, &c., 3 Hun, 84). In the view which I take of this case it is not, however, necessary, to pass finally on this question. It appears from the return of the sheriff that on the day after the conviction of the prisoner, to wit, on the 22d day of December, 1881, he took him to the House of Refuge and Detention, and then and there tendered the said Morris Lewinski to the superintendent and managers, to be dealt with according to law; but that the said superintendent and managers then and there refused to receive the said Lewinski, on the ground that he was committed for a specified time, and that, therefore, he (the sheriff) returned the said Lewinski to the city prison, the place from whence he had taken him. By the act of 1881, already referred to, it is provided that “ any such child convicted of any misdemeanor shall be finally committed to some such institution, and not to any prison or jail or penitentiary longer than is necessary for its transfer thereto.” If this were a direct proceeding to compel the House of Refuge to receive the petitioner into its custody, it would be necessary to definitely pass upon the question whether the House of Refuge is or is not such an institution as is described in section 4 of the act of