DocketNumber: No. 04CA008608.
Citation Numbers: 2005 Ohio 5111
Judges: DONNA J. CARR, JUDGE.
Filed Date: 9/28/2005
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
{¶ 3} Appellant timely appealed his conviction of possession of cocaine with a major drug offender specification, setting forth seven assignments of error for review.
{¶ 4} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that he did not knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial. This Court disagrees.
{¶ 5} According to Crim. R. 23(A), a defendant may knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive his right to a jury trial. State v.Emch, 9th Dist. No. 20372, 2002-Ohio-3861, at ¶ 27. See, also, State v.Harris (Dec. 22, 1999), 9th Dist. No. 98CA007142. The waiver "shall be in writing, signed by the defendant, and filed in said cause and made a part of the record thereof." R.C.
{¶ 6} R.C.
"I . . . ., defendant in the above cause, hereby voluntarily waive and relinquish my right to a trial by jury, and elect to be tried by a Judge of the Court in which the said cause may be pending. I fully understand that under the laws of this state, I have a constitutional right to a trial by jury."
Before beginning the bench trial, the court engaged in the following colloquy with appellant and his counsel, reiterating verbatim the waiver language from R.C.
"THE COURT: * * *
"I, Lamar Reed, defendant in the above-captioned cause, hereby voluntarily waive and relinquish my right to a trial by jury and elect to be tried by the Judge in which the said cause may be pending. I fully understand under the laws of this state I have a constitutional right to a trial by jury. And this is signed by Lamar Reed.
"Is that your signature, Mr. Reed?
"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, your Honor.
"THE COURT: Counsel, is this correct?
"MR. ORTNER: Yes, your Honor.
"THE COURT: Very well. The Court will proceed with the court trial."
{¶ 7} The written jury waiver was signed by appellant on the date of the trial, witnessed by the trial judge, and filed with the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. The record further shows that the court read appellant's waiver into the record at the commencement of the trial, and both appellant and his trial counsel acknowledged that appellant wished to waive his right to a jury trial.
{¶ 8} To support his argument, appellant argues that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in United States v. Martin (C.A. 6, 1983),
"There is no constitutional requirement that a court conduct an on the record colloquy with the defendant prior to the jury trial waiver. SeeScott,
"Today, we decline to join several courts which have adopted mandatory supervisory rules requiring trial courts to personally interrogate defendants prior to accepting a jury trial waiver. See United States v.Scott,
{¶ 9} Although this Court agrees that the better practice is to conduct a colloquy with the defendant, we, like the Sixth Circuit, decline to adopt a rule requiring trial courts to personally interrogate defendants prior to accepting a jury trial waiver. Consequently, appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 10} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred when it permitted Lieutenant James Rohner to testify in a manner which expressed his opinion of appellant's guilt.
{¶ 11} Appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay and allowing Lieutenant Rohner to testify as to the credibility of Quiana Ross' testimony and appellant's guilt.
{¶ 12} The State argues that the admission of Lieutenant Rohner's testimony was not error, because he was qualified to testify as an expert. Whether Lieutenant Rohner was testifying as an expert is irrelevant. This Court notes that the opinion of a witness as to whether another witness is being truthful is inadmissible. State v. Miller (Jan. 26, 2001), 2nd Dist. No. 18102. "In our system of justice, it is the fact finder, not the so-called expert or lay witnesses, who bears the burden of assessing the credibility and veracity of the witnesses." State v.Boston (1989),
{¶ 13} Appellant argues in his third assignment of error that he was denied his right of confrontation and cross-examination when the trial court admitted into evidence a report prepared by the Bureau of Criminal Investigation ("BCI") without hearing testimony from any individual regarding the report.
{¶ 14} While the record is not clear, the State argues that appellant stipulated to the admission of the report. In addition, the State argues that appellant failed to object to the admission of the report. Ordinarily, appellant's failure to object to the admission of the report would constitute waiver. See State v. Dalton (Nov. 20, 1996), 9th Dist. No. 17659. However, appellant argues that the admission of the report constituted plain error, because it denied him his right of confrontation and cross-examination.
{¶ 15} Pursuant to Crim.R. 52(B), a plain error or defect in the proceedings that affects a substantial right may be addressed by an appellate court even though it was not brought to the attention of the trial court. The error, however, must be obvious, that is it should have been apparent to the trial court without an objection. State v. Kobelka (Nov. 7, 2001), 9th Dist. No. 01CA007808. Plain error is not present here. First, the State indicated that the defense was willing to stipulate to the report. The defense gave no response. Second, the trial court continued on by asking for objections, and no objection was noted regarding the admission of the report. Under these circumstances, the trial court could logically conclude that the defense was acquiescing to the admission of the report. No plain error exists. This is not the type of evidence that is clearly inadmissible. It is only inadmissible upon objection.
{¶ 16} In addition, appellant argues that R.C.
{¶ 17} Appellant's third assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 18} In his fourth assignment of error, appellant avers that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Quiana Ross, because she lacked personal knowledge of the ownership of the drugs which were found in her apartment. This Court disagrees.
{¶ 19} Although appellant's assignment of error states that Quiana Ross testified as to the ownership of the drugs that were found in her apartment, a review of the record does not support such an argument. Appellant cites the following excerpt from the transcript to support his argument:
"Q. But a few moments ago you said you had a bad feeling about that. Why did you have a bad feeling?
"A. Because I knew what he was going to do.
"Mr. Ortner: Objection, Judge. It's just a feeling.
"The Court: Overruled.
"Q. How did you know what he was going to do?
"A. Because he paid me.
"Q. He paid you. How much did he give you?
"A. $20.
"Q. And did that seem right to you?
"A. No, but I still took it."
{¶ 20} The above excerpt as well as the remainder of Ross' testimony does not support appellant's argument. At no time during her testimony does Ross give an opinion as to the ownership of the drugs which were found in her apartment. Given the broad discretion afforded a trial court in admitting evidence, this Court cannot find an abuse of discretion in the admission of Ross' testimony. Appellant's fourth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 21} In his fifth assignment of error, appellant argues that his conviction of possession of crack cocaine, with a major drug offender specification was not supported by sufficient evidence and was against the manifest weight of the evidence. This Court disagrees.
"In determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered." State v. Otten (1986),
{¶ 22} This discretionary power should be exercised only in exceptional cases where the evidence presented weighs heavily in favor of the defendant and against conviction. Id. at 340. Further, "[b]ecause sufficiency is required to take a case to the jury; a finding that a conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence must necessarily include a finding of sufficiency." State v. Hoehn, 9th Dist. No. 03CA0076-M,
{¶ 23} Appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine in violation of R.C.
{¶ 24} Detective Roger Watkins of the Lorain Police Department's Narcotics Division testified on behalf of the State. Detective Watkins testified that he accompanied the Adult Parole Agency to Quiana Ross' apartment on October 17, 2002. Detective Watkins stated that four baggies containing what appeared to be crack cocaine were found underneath a mattress in Ross' bedroom. Detective Watkins further testified that two scales were found in Ross' apartment, and that appellant's fingerprint was found on one of the scales.
{¶ 25} Quiana Ross also testified on behalf of the State. Ross testified that appellant came to her apartment almost every day in the summer of 2002. Ross stated that appellant would cook dope in her apartment, specifically cocaine. Ross further testified that appellant was in her apartment on October 16, 2002, the day before the search of her apartment which led to appellant's arrest and conviction of possession in the underlying action to this appeal. Ross stated that appellant was in her apartment for a couple of hours on October 16, 2002. Ross stated that she was at someone else's apartment most of the time that appellant was in her apartment on October 16, 2002, but that she did go over to her apartment and she saw appellant cooking what she believed was dope.
{¶ 26} The State also called Jodi Ganda, a fingerprint technician for Lorain County, to testify. Ms. Ganda testified that she was given three latent lift cards and three fingerprint charts to compare. Ms. Ganda stated that she was asked to compare the three lift cards with the latent prints to the known fingerprint charts of Quiana Ross, Taru Smith, and appellant. Ms. Ganda further testified that she matched one of the latent prints to Quiana Ross and one to appellant.
{¶ 27} Lieutenant James Rohner, supervisor of the Narcotics Division of the Lorain Police Department, also testified on behalf of the State. Lieutenant Rohner testified that, about seven weeks after the search of Quiana Ross' apartment, appellant was arrested on another charge. At that time, Lieutenant Rohner interviewed appellant regarding the search that was conducted at Quiana Ross' apartment on October 17, 2002.
{¶ 28} Lieutenant Rohner stated that, during the interview, appellant first said that he cooked up the crack cocaine, then denied knowing how to cook up crack cocaine and said that he just bagged it up for Quiana Ross. Lieutenant Rohner testified that appellant admitted that the white scale found in Quiana Ross' apartment was his and that appellant stated that he used it to weigh marijuana.
{¶ 29} Given the above, this Court concludes that appellant's conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Further, as previously discussed, our conclusion that appellant's conviction was not against the manifest weight of the evidence is dispositive of the issue of sufficiency. Roberts, supra. Accordingly, appellant's fifth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 30} In his sixth assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred when it sentenced him to an additional prison term due to his drug offender specification, in violation of his constitutional rights.
{¶ 31} Appellant raises the issue of constitutionality of R.C.
{¶ 32} In his seventh assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court failed to make the findings set forth in R.C.
{¶ 33} Appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine under R.C.
"If the amount of the drug involved equals or exceeds one thousand grams of cocaine that is not crack cocaine or equals or exceeds one hundred grams of crack cocaine, possession of cocaine is a felony of the first degree, the offender is a major drug offender, and the court shall impose as a mandatory prison term the maximum prison term prescribed for a felony of the first degree and may impose an additional mandatory prison term prescribed for a major drug offender under division (D)(3)(b) of section
{¶ 34} R.C.
"The court imposing a prison term on an offender under division (D)(3)(a) of this section may impose an additional prison term of one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, or ten years, if the court, with respect to the term imposed under division (D)(3)(a) of this section and, if applicable, divisions (D)(1) and (2) of this section, makes both of the findings set forth in divisions (D)(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of this section."
{¶ 35} "R.C.
"(i) The terms so imposed are inadequate to punish the offender and protect the public from future crime, because the applicable factors under section
"(ii) The terms so imposed are demeaning to the seriousness of the offense, because one or more of the factors under section
{¶ 36} Appellant argues that the trial court erred because it did not state its reasons for imposing an additional one year sentence pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 37} In the present case, the trial court was required to make both of the findings set forth in divisions R.C.
{¶ 38} The trial court's imposition of an additional one to ten year prison term pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 39} Appellant also argues that his sentence is unconstitutional pursuant to Blakely v. Washington (2004),
{¶ 40} Having found that the trial court made the required findings in the journal entry and that Blakely is not applicable, appellant's seventh assignment of error is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to appellant.
Exceptions.
Whitmore, P.J., Moore, J., Concur.
United States v. Richard Mitchell , 427 F.2d 1280 ( 1970 )
United States v. Robert Kenneth Hunt, Jr. And Joseph John ... , 413 F.2d 983 ( 1969 )
Bruce Witherspoon v. United States , 633 F.2d 1247 ( 1980 )
United States v. James Scott , 583 F.2d 362 ( 1978 )
United States v. Manuel Delgado , 635 F.2d 889 ( 1981 )
Raul Estrada v. United States , 457 F.2d 255 ( 1972 )
Hawkins v. United States , 385 A.2d 744 ( 1978 )
United States v. Reginald E. David , 511 F.2d 355 ( 1975 )
Biddle v. State , 40 Md. App. 399 ( 1978 )
Ciummei v. Commonwealth , 378 Mass. 504 ( 1979 )