DocketNumber: No. 77300.
Judges: SPELLACY, J.:
Filed Date: 12/14/2000
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
Defendant-appellant Steve Anthony McLeod appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting Debra McLeod's complaint for divorce.
Appellant has assigned the following errors for review:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INDEPENDENTLY ANALYZE THE MAGISTRATE'S DECISION IN ACCORDANCE WITH CIVIL RULE 53(D)(4).
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PROCEEDING WITH THIS CASE WHEN THE COURT SPECIFICALLY FOUND THAT THE PARTIES INVOLVED WERE IN THE MIDST OF CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY, AND THERE HAD BEEN NO RELIEF GRANTED FROM THE AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISION PURSUANT TO
11 U.S.C. § 362 .III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT VALUING THE ASSETS IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR AN EQUITABLE DIVISION OF THE PROPERTY.
The second assignment of error has merit. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The matter came before a magistrate for hearing on April 8, 1999. Appellant did not attend the hearing or communicate with the court about any reason for his failure to appear. Debra McLeod was present and testified. According to the magistrate's decision, Debra McLeod presented documents which included an order reflecting the amount she paid to the Bankruptcy Court. Both Debra McLeod and appellant were in Chapter 13 bankruptcy at the time of the divorce. The magistrate found that the McLeods had lived separate and apart for more than one year. Based upon the earnings statement attached to appellant's pretrial statement, the magistrate calculated appellant's salary to be seventy-four thousand nine hundred ninety-two dollars ($74,992.00) annually. The magistrate then added disability income of two thousand ninety-five dollars ($2,095.00) for a total income of seventy-seven thousand eighty-seven dollars ($77,087.00).The magistrate then proceeded to divide the marital property. Spousal support of four hundred dollars ($400.00) a month was awarded to Debra McLeod. The spousal support was to be for a term of five years. A monthly child support order of one thousand one hundred ninety-five dollars and sixty-one cents ($1,195.61) was entered.
On June 24, 1999, appellant filed his objections to the magistrate's decision. In his brief in support, appellant explained his absence by stating he thought the hearing was to be held on the day after the actual hearing date. Appellant disputed the magistrate's finding regarding his salary. Appellant attached a pay-stub indicating his annual salary was sixty-six thousand four hundred forty-two dollars ($66,442.00). Appellant argued that the magistrate mistakenly included reimbursements which were made because of his job transfer and included disability income which actually was used to support his parents. Appellant submitted that the magistrate erred by not valuing marital assets. Appellant stated the magistrate could not divide the marital assets because the automatic stay provision of Chapter 13 bankruptcy deprived the Domestic Relations Court of jurisdiction over the marital property.
On October 25, 1999, the trial court issued its judgment entry. In the entry, the trial court stated it had reviewed the magistrate's decision and appellant's objections. The trial court overruled appellant's objections and adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the magistrate.
The filing of a bankruptcy petition creates an estate which includes all the debtor's legal and equitable interests in his or her property existing at the commencement of the case. In re Roberge (Bkrtcy.E.D.Va. 1995),
Both appellant and Debra McLeod were debtors in Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings when the trial court issued its decree granting the McLeods' divorce. Apparently, the marital property was part of their respective bankruptcy estates. There is no indication in the record that the automatic stay had been lifted by the bankruptcy courts at any time. Therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adopt the part of the magistrate's decision concerning the award of marital property.
The state court cannot enter an order garnishing the wages of a Chapter 13 debtor without violating the automatic stay. This is because garnishment is an act collecting from the property of the bankruptcy estate. In re Suarez (Bkrtcy.D.N.M. 1993),
In Mudd v. Jacobson (In re Jacobson) (Bkrtcy.D.Ariz. 1999),
The case is remanded to the trial court for a determination of the status of both parties' bankruptcy cases. The parties, if still subject to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, should consider asking that the automatic stay be lifted to allow for the division of marital property. The bankruptcy court also may lift the stay to permit issuance of a support order or to include the support order in the Chapter 13 payment plan.
Appellant's second assignment of error is well-taken.
Judgment reversed and remanded.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this Journal Entry and Opinion.
It is ordered that appellant recover of appellee his costs herein taxed.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
DIANE KARPINSKI, P.J. and TIMOTHY E. McMONAGLE, J. CONCUR IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
In Re Jacobson , 231 B.R. 763 ( 1999 )
In Re Robert Gruntz, Debtor. Robert Gruntz v. Opinion ... , 202 F.3d 1074 ( 2000 )
Matter of Rogers , 164 B.R. 382 ( 1994 )
In Re Bamman , 239 B.R. 560 ( 1999 )
In Re Walter , 153 B.R. 38 ( 1993 )
Matter of Palmer , 78 B.R. 402 ( 1987 )
In Re Henry , 143 B.R. 811 ( 1992 )
In Re Roberge , 181 B.R. 854 ( 1995 )
In Re Hohenberg , 143 B.R. 480 ( 1992 )