DocketNumber: No. 87020.
Citation Numbers: 2006 Ohio 3692
Judges: FRANK D. CELEBREZZE JR., P.J.:
Filed Date: 7/20/2006
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
{¶ 2} On March 11, 2005, appellant was charged in three counts of a four count indictment,1 specifically: Count One, drug possession (crack cocaine), in violation of R.C.
{¶ 3} In January 2005, the Cleveland Police Department received information from a confidential reliable informant ("CRI") that a woman named "Tessi" was selling crack cocaine at 11721 Union Avenue, Apartment 2, in Cleveland. The CRI also described Tessi's physical characteristics. In reliance on this information, the police set up controlled purchases at the Union Avenue location, which were successful. Based on the success of these controlled purchases and Tessi's suspected criminal history, a search warrant was obtained on February 4, 2005. The warrant authorized the search of the above address, "its curtilage, common and storage areas, vehicles on the premises and any person present therein for the property specified."
{¶ 4} On February 8, 2005, the warrant was executed. Upon entering the premises, two individuals were discovered, appellant and his mother ("Tessi"), and they were detained and handcuffed. Detective Dale Dvorak ("Dvorak") performed a pat down search of appellant, and in the course of this pat down, Dvorak felt a large bulge in appellant's left pants pocket. Based on his experience of fifteen years as a police officer and seven years in the narcotics unit, Dvorak believed this bulge to be illegal narcotics. Consequently, Dvorak removed the bulge to discover a baggy containing numerous rocks of suspected crack cocaine. A total of $593 was also found on appellant's person.
{¶ 5} On June 16, 2005, appellant waived his right to a jury and proceeded with a bench trial. At trial, the state called two witnesses. They first called Dvorak, who testified to the above facts and identified the state's exhibits of the incriminating evidence via photographs of the drugs and money. The state then called Cynthia Lewis ("Lewis") to testify. Lewis was a Scientific Examiner for the City of Cleveland in its scientific investigative unit, forensic laboratory. Lewis positively identified the substance in the baggy as crack cocaine. At the close of the state's case, appellant made a Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal, which was denied.
{¶ 6} On June 16, 2005, the trial court found appellant not guilty of drug trafficking, but guilty on the counts of drug possession (a felony of the third degree) and possession of criminal tools (a felony of the fifth degree). On August 10, 2005, appellant was sentenced to one year imprisonment on count one and ten months on count three. The terms were ordered to run concurrently.
{¶ 7} Appellant appeals his conviction asserting two assignments of error:
{¶ 8} "I. Defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of the
{¶ 9} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that he was not afforded effective assistance of counsel. He contends that since his trial attorney did not file a pretrial motion to suppress evidence found on his person, his counsel's performance was prejudicially deficient. We disagree.
{¶ 10} In order to substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the appellant is required to demonstrate that: 1) the performance of defense counsel was seriously flawed and deficient; and 2) the result of the appellant's trial or legal proceeding would have been different had defense counsel provided proper representation. Strickland v. Washington
(1984),
{¶ 11} In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, it must be presumed that a properly licensed attorney executes his legal duty in an ethical and competent manner.State v. Smith (1985),
{¶ 12} With regard to the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court of Ohio held in State v. Bradley
(1989),
{¶ 13} "`When considering an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, a two-step process is usually employed. Fist, there must be a determination as to whether there has been a substantial violation of any of defense counsel's essential duties to his client. Next, and analytically separate from the question of whether the defendant's
{¶ 14} "Even assuming that counsel's performance was ineffective, this is not sufficient to warrant reversal of a conviction. `An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the judgment. Cf. United States v. Morrison,
{¶ 15} "Accordingly, to show that a defendant has been prejudiced by counsel's deficient performance, the defendant must prove that there exists a reasonable probability that, were it not for counsel's errors, the result of the trial would have been different." State v. Bradley, supra, at 141, 142.
{¶ 16} In the case before us, we do not find that appellant has sufficiently met the first prong of the Strickland test, in that we do not find the performance of appellant's counsel to have been deficient. The record indicates that the evidence found on appellant's person was properly obtained pursuant to a validly executed search warrant. Thus, any failure to object to such evidence does not arise to deficient performance.
{¶ 17} Appellant challenges the validity of the underlying "all persons" warrant, allowing the executing officer to search "all persons" present on the property. Appellant argues that the facts and circumstances clearly do not allow for such a broad warrant. We disagree.
{¶ 18} In State v. Kinney (1998),
{¶ 19} In this case, the premises subjected to the "all persons" warrant was an apartment known for selling drugs. The police had recently performed two successful controlled buys from the premises. It was also an individual's private residence. Affidavits filed in support of this particular warrant stated that this was a known drug premises and that it was necessary to search all persons present due to its location. The Ohio Supreme Court stated in Kinney:
{¶ 20} "`Illicit drug trafficking' is `now of epidemic proportion.' People v. Thurman (1989),
{¶ 21} "In Commonwealth v. Smith (1976),
{¶ 22} "We find the logic of the Smith opinion compelling. A "crack house" is used primarily, or even exclusively, for the sale and consumption of crack. * * * Therefore, there was an overwhelming probability that anyone present possessed crack/cocaine or other contraband." Kinney, supra at 89-90.
{¶ 23} In that light, this court has reasoned that probable cause will more likely exist to support the search of all persons within a private residence. State v. Pillar,
{¶ 24} Upon review of the record, we do not find fault with the "all persons" search warrant. There is no reasonable probability that a motion to suppress evidence would have been successful in this case; therefore, counsel's failure to file such a motion does not rise to the level of deficient performance sufficient to reverse a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 25} "II. The trial court's determination of guilt on count one was not supported by sufficient evidence as required by due process."
{¶ 26} Appellant next argues that his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence. In State v. Jenks (1991),
{¶ 27} "An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (Jackson v. Virginia [1979],
{¶ 28} More recently, in State v. Thompkins,
{¶ 29} "With respect to sufficiency of the evidence, `"sufficiency" is a term of art meaning that legal standard which is applied to determine whether the case may go to the jury or whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury verdict as a matter of law.' Black's Law Dictionary (6 Ed. 1990) 1433. See, also, Crim.R. 29(A) (motion for judgment of acquittal can be granted by the trial court if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction). In essence, sufficiency is a test of adequacy. Whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of law. State v. Robinson (1955),
{¶ 30} Finally, we note that a judgment will not be reversed upon insufficient or conflicting evidence if it is supported by competent credible evidence which goes to all the essential elements of the case. Cohen v. Lamko (1984),
{¶ 31} Where there is substantial evidence upon which the trier of fact has based its verdict, a reviewing court abuses its discretion in substituting its judgment for that of the jury as to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Nicely
(1988),
{¶ 33} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a drug may be identified by circumstantial evidence. State v. McKee (2001),
{¶ 34} The state presented testimony from Detective Dvorak who, via photographs of the relevant evidence, positively identified the criminal substances found on appellant's person. There was also testimony from Lewis, who personally tested the pertinent substances for their drug content, and she stated that the substances tested positive for crack cocaine. Taking the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, there is clearly competent and credible evidence sufficient to sustain appellant's drug conviction.
Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant's conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Sweeney, J., and Calabrese, Jr., J., concur.