DocketNumber: CASE NO. CA98-02-002.
Judges: WALSH, J.
Filed Date: 1/4/1999
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
In November of 1996, Officer Tom Queen of the Washington Court House Police Department began an investigation of possible criminal activity at appellant's 113 East Paint Street residence in Washington Court House, Ohio. Queen began the investigation based upon information he received from several confidential informants. Over the next several weeks, Queen conducted several "trash pulls" in which he retrieved trash bags from the street in front of appellant's residence. On each occasion, a field test conducted on the trash contents revealed evidence of drug use. Queen attached a property tag to each trash bag providing the date upon which each trash pull was conducted. The last trash pull also contained a name tag along with several pieces of mail addressed to the occupant of 113 East Paint Street.
On December 20, 1996, Queen presented the physical evidence obtained from the trash pulls along with his affidavit to a Fayette County judge who issued a search warrant for the residence at 113 East Paint Street. Upon execution of the warrant by Queen and three other officers, appellant was arrested for trafficking in marijuana and having a weapon while under disability. On December 30, 1997, she entered a no contest plea and was convicted on both counts. Appellant timely filed this appeal raising two assignments of error:
Assignment of Error No. 1:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT IN FAILING TO SUSTAIN APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE.
Assignment of Error No. 2:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF APPELLANT IN FAILING TO SUSTAIN APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE INDICTMENT FOR LACK OF SPEEDY TRIAL.
In her first assignment of error, appellant argues that Queen's affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause for the search warrant and that the issuing judge improperly considered evidence not contained within the "four corners" of the affidavit. This assignment raises the same two issues discussed by the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. George (1989),
(1) does the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant contain sufficient probable cause to support the decision of the magistrate to issue the warrant under the "totality-of-the-circumstances" test of Illinois v. Gates (1983),
462 U.S. 213 , and (2) if not, should the evidence obtained by law enforcement officers as the result of the execution of this search warrant be admissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief in any event, under the "good faith exception" to the exclusionary rule set forth in United States v. Leon (1984),468 U.S. 897 ?
George at 327.
The Ohio Supreme Court has clearly outlined the standard for issuing a search warrant as follows:
the task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the `veracity' and `basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.
George at paragraph one of the syllabus, quoting Gates at 238.
We note that when reviewing a determination of probable cause, neither the trial court nor the appellate court
should substitute its judgment for that of the magistrate * * *. Rather, the duty of the reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate has a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. * * * [A]ppellate courts should accord great deference to the magistrate's determination of probable cause, and doubtful or marginal cases in this area should be resolved in favor of upholding the warrant.
George at paragraph two of the syllabus, citing Gates at 238-39.
Appellant argues that Queen's affidavit is insufficient because it does not contain any information regarding the informants' reliability, nor any details regarding the basis of the informants' knowledge, nor the specific dates upon which Queen spoke to the informants. By making these arguments, appellant is attempting to impose the requirements of the two-prong test established by Aguilar v. Texas (1964),
Under the current test, the correct inquiry for the issuing judge is not whether the affidavit includes reference to the informant's basis of knowledge, veracity, or reliability. Rather, the judge must determine whether there exists a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. George at 329. This determination is to be based upon a practical, common-sense evaluation of all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit, including the veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information. Id. To the extent that appellant's argument is based upon the incorrect legal standard, we find it to be without merit.
Appellant also argues that it was improper for the issuing judge to consider the evidence obtained from the trash pulls since some of these facts were not contained within the "four corners" of the affidavit. In support of this proposition, appellant relies on State v. Bean (1983),
Appellant's reliance on Bean is misplaced because appellant has failed to distinguish between cases involving facts supplied by confidential informants and cases involving facts supplied solely by the affiant-police officer. In the former situation, the supplemental information is generally the result of an outside police investigation conducted to corroborate the informant's tip. This bolsters the informant's credibility as a part of the totality of circumstances. See Gates,
In the first situation, it is appropriate for the issuing judge to consider the outside information because it merely corroborates facts already contained within the affidavit. However, in the second situation, it is inappropriate for the issuing judge to consider evidence outside the affidavit as a basis for finding probable cause. In the case at bar, the trash pulls provided supplemental information presented to the issuing judge to corroborate the tips received from the informants. Thus, it was permissible for the judge to consider the evidence from the trash pulls.
Although Queen's affidavit was not as complete as it might have been, we find, as did the court in Bean, that "the omission of the identity of the source was unintentional and not in bad faith. * * * The defect in the affidavit herein was essentially a technical error, an omission, inadvertently made by an officer making a good faith effort to comply with the law." Bean at 72. We further recognize that we are required to resolve any marginal case in favor of upholding the warrant. George, 45 Ohio St.3d at paragraph two of the syllabus.
Therefore, based upon the totality of the circumstances, including the tips from several informants and corroboration of the tips by Queen's independent investigation, the affidavit sufficiently supported the determination that there was a fair probability that evidence of criminal activity would be found at appellant's residence. Further, there was a substantial basis for the judge's determination that probable cause existed to issue the search warrant.
Even if the affidavit had been insufficient to support probable cause in this case, we find that the trial court did not err in holding that the evidence was admissible under the good faith exception set forth in United States v. Leon (1984),
It was objectively reasonable for [the police officer] to believe that [he] presented enough information for [the magistrate] to make a determination of probable cause. If an error was made, it was made by the issuing magistrate. "[T]he exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates."
Johnson at 7-8, quoting Leon at 916.
In the case at bar, Queen conducted a thorough investigation to corroborate information he had received from several different confidential informants. Queen presented an affidavit, along with the corroborating evidence, to the judge who issued the search warrant. We find that it was objectively reasonable for Queen to believe that the affidavit, along with the corroborating evidence, was sufficient for the judge to make a determination of probable cause. Thus, we find that the trial court did not err in applying the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in overruling appellant's motion to suppress. Appellant's first assignment of error is overruled.
Under her second assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in overruling her motion to dismiss because she was not brought to trial within the statutory time limit of R.C.
(C) A person against whom a charge of felony is pending:
* * *
(2) Shall be brought to trial within two hundred seventy days after his arrest.
* * *
(E) For purposes of computing time under divisions (A), (B), (C)(2), and (D) of this section, each day during which the accused is held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge shall be counted as three days.
The time requirements set forth in R.C.
The time within which an accused must be brought to trial, * * * may be extended only by the following:
* * * (D) Any period of delay occasioned by the neglect or improper act of the accused;(E) Any period of delay necessitated by reason of a plea in bar or abatement, motion, proceeding, or action made or instituted by the accused * * *.
When a defendant moves for discharge on the ground that the state has not provided him with a trial within the time limits of R.C.
Three hundred seventy-five calendar days elapsed between appellant's arrest on December 20, 1996 and the date on which she entered her no contest plea, December 30, 1997. However, according to our determination, the speedy trial period was tolled on several occasions by appellant's own actions, see R.C.
After her arrest on December 20, 1996,1 appellant was held in jail for four days until December 24, 1996. Pursuant to R.C.
On August 22, 1997, appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence. This motion also falls under R.C.
According to our determination, one hundred twenty-seven days are chargeable against appellant due to her own actions under R.C.
In addition to the foregoing actions by appellant, we note that the state filed a request for discovery on May 9, 1997 to which there was no response by appellant. On June 16, 1997, the state filed a demand for discovery. Again, appellant failed to respond. On July 23, 1997, the state filed a motion to compel discovery. Finally, on August 22, 1997, appellant responded to the state's discovery request. We find that part of the delay in this case was due to appellant's failure to provide a timely answer to the state's lawful request for discovery. We have previously held that "a defendant's untimely compliance with the state's discovery request is chargeable to the defendant under R.C.
While it is unnecessary for us to determine the exact number of days which were tolled by appellant's inaction under R.C.
Judgment affirmed.
YOUNG, P.J., and KOEHLER, J. concur.