DocketNumber: No. 24092.
Citation Numbers: 2008 Ohio 3956
Judges: WHITMORE, Judge.
Filed Date: 8/6/2008
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
{¶ 3} After the officers stopped their car, Moss and Turner came up to the passenger side window and asked them what they needed. The officers responded that they "were looking to get high." The women asked to get into the car, but the officers refused for safety reasons. Turner asked the officers how much they wanted, and they answered that they wanted two $20 pieces. Moss told the officers to pull up further south on Wildwood.
{¶ 4} Then Moss and Turner walked into separate houses. When they came out of the houses, they met for a few seconds before returning to the officers' car. Turner handed Detective Malick two rocks of crack cocaine and he paid her $40. Moss was standing next to Turner when the exchange took place. The two rocks of crack cocaine weighed a total of 0.45 grams. Shortly after the exchange, a team of officers arrested Moss and Turner.
{¶ 5} Moss was indicted for trafficking in cocaine in violation of R.C.
{¶ 6} On December 19, 2007, a jury found Moss guilty of trafficking in cocaine, and the trial court found her guilty of possession of marijuana. Moss received an eleven month prison sentence.
{¶ 7} Moss appeals her conviction, raising five assignments of error for our review. We consolidate several of the assignments of error for analysis purposes.
"DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION WAS BASED UPON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AND/OR WAS AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE[.]"
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S RULE 29 MOTION[.]"
{¶ 8} In her first assignment of error, Moss contends that the trial court erred because her conviction was based on insufficient evidence, or in the alternative, was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Similarly, in her second assignment of error, Moss argues that because there was insufficient evidence to sustain her conviction, the court erred in failing to grant her Crim. R. 29(A) motion for a judgment of acquittal. We disagree.
{¶ 9} A review of the sufficiency of the evidence and a review of the manifest weight of the evidence are separate and legally distinct determinations. State v. Gulley (Mar. 15, 2000), 9th Dist. No. 19600, at *1. "While the test for sufficiency requires a determination of whether the state has met its burden of production at trial, a manifest weight challenge questions whether the state has met its burden of persuasion." Id., citing State v. Thompkins (1997),
"An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus; see, also, Thompkins,
78 Ohio St.3d at 386 .
{¶ 10} In State v. Roberts, this Court explained: *Page 4
"[S]ufficiency is required to take a case to the jury[.] * * * Thus, a determination that [a] conviction is supported by the weight of the evidence will also be dispositive of the issue of sufficiency." (Emphasis omitted.) State v. Roberts (Sept. 17, 1997), 9th Dist. No. 96CA006462, at *2.
Accordingly, we address Moss' challenge to the weight of the evidence first, as it is dispositive of her claim of sufficiency.
{¶ 11} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence an appellate court:
"[M]ust review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered." State v. Otten (1986),
33 Ohio App. 3d 339 ,340 .
A weight of the evidence challenge indicates that a greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of the issue than supports the other. Thompkins,
{¶ 12} After reviewing the record, we cannot conclude that the jury lost its way or created a manifest miscarriage of justice.
{¶ 13} Moss argues that the evidence fails to show that she either sold drugs or offered to sell drugs. Moss indicates that the sales transaction took place solely between Turner and Detective Malick. Moss contends that she did not return to the car with drugs. Moss claims to have just stood there during the exchange, saying nothing. Also, she notes that Detective Malick *Page 5 conceded in his testimony that when the women initially asked "what are you looking for," they could have been referring to prostitution. In addition, she argues that when Detective Malick responded that the officers were "looking to get high," it could have meant they were looking for sex. Finally, Moss contends that that she did not "knowingly" sell drugs within the statutory meaning of the word.
{¶ 14} R.C.
{¶ 15} The Ohio Supreme Court has ruled that "[a] person can `offer to sell a controlled substance' in violation of R.C.
{¶ 16} Both police officers testified on behalf of the State. Detective Malick indicated that both women flagged the officers down and asked them what they wanted. The incident occurred in a high drug area around midnight. When Detective Malick responded that he wanted to get high, Turner asked the officers how much they wanted. Moss was standing next to Turner *Page 6 when she asked this question. When Detective Malick answered that they wanted two $20 pieces, it was Moss who asked them to pull their car further up the street. Then the two women went into separate houses. The house Moss entered was later subject to an investigation where police made controlled drug buys. Detective Malick testified that when the women came out of the respective houses, they met for a few seconds "real tight with each other." When the women returned to the car, Turner handed Detective Malick the cocaine through the passenger window, and he gave her $40. Moss was standing next to Turner when the sale took place. The officers then pulled away while another team of officers came and arrested the women.
{¶ 17} Detective Gilbride's testimony essentially corroborated Detective Malick's testimony. Moss did not testify at trial and no other witnesses testified on her behalf.
{¶ 18} The evidence shows that Moss and Turner acted in concert from start to finish. First, they flagged the officers' car down together. Although Moss argues that the officers' initial response could have been construed as a request for sex, there is no question that as the incident progressed, the officers were asking to buy crack cocaine and that Moss was an active participant. After Detective Malick said the officers were looking for two $20 pieces, it was Moss who asked them to pull further up the street. At this point, because Moss was aware that the circumstances involved the sale of crack cocaine, there is no question that she was acting "knowingly" within the meaning of the statute.
{¶ 19} After knowing of the officers' desire to make the purchase, Moss and Turner went into separate houses, met together after they left the houses, and returned to the officers' car together with the crack cocaine. Although it was Turner who actually made the transfer to Detective Malick, Moss was by her side. A person can be found guilty of offering to sell a controlled substance without actually transferring the substance to the buyer. Scott, supra. See, *Page 7
also, State v. Townsend, 9th Dist. No. 23397,
{¶ 20} Further, because both Moss and Turner went into separate houses and then met on the street before returning to the officers' car, it is reasonable to infer that Moss was a link in the chain of supply and, as such, was equally culpable with Turner for the illegal sale.Jones, supra.
{¶ 21} Moss flagged down the officers' car, asked the officers what they wanted, asked them to pull further up the street, and, while they were waiting, went into a house implying that she intended to satisfy their request. The weight of the evidence points to Moss' guilt, and the jury did not lose its way.
{¶ 22} Having disposed of Moss' challenge to the weight of the evidence, we similarly dispose of her sufficiency challenge. SeeRoberts, supra, at *2. The trial court did not err by failing to find that there was insufficient evidence to convict Moss or that Moss' conviction was against the manifest weight of the evidence. As such, Moss' first assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 23} Having determined that there was sufficient evidence to convict Moss, we may now dispose of her second assignment of error. Crim. R. 29(A) provides that a trial court "shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal * * * if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses." Because we find that there was sufficient evidence to convict her, the trial court did not err in denying Moss' Crim. R. 29(A) motion. Therefore, Moss' second assignment of error is overruled.
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON ATTEMPT[.]"
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON ENTRAPMENT[.]"
{¶ 24} In her third and fourth assignments of error, Moss contends that the trial court erred in failing to provide instructions to the jury on attempt and entrapment. We disagree.
{¶ 25} When reviewing a trial court's jury instructions, this Court reviews the record to determine whether the trial court's decision to give or decline to give a requested jury instruction constitutes an abuse of discretion under the facts and circumstances of the case.State v. Wolons (1989),
{¶ 26} In her third assignment of error, Moss claims that the court erred in not instructing the jury on attempted drug trafficking. "Even though an offense may be statutorily defined as a lesser included offense of another, a charge on such lesser included offense is required only where the evidence presented at trial would reasonably support both an acquittal on the crime charged and a conviction upon the lesser included offense." State v. Thomas (1988),
{¶ 27} In this case, there was evidence that Moss offered to sell crack cocaine to the police officers. The act of offering to sell crack cocaine is sufficient to support a conviction for drug trafficking pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 28} In her fourth assignment of error, Moss claims that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on entrapment. "The defense of entrapment is established where the criminal design originates with the officials of the government, and they implant in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and induce its commission in order to prosecute." State v. Doran (1983),
{¶ 29} A jury instruction on entrapment would not have been appropriate in this case. Moss claims that she did not actively participate in the drug transaction. This is not consistent with the defense of entrapment because entrapment presupposes active participation in the transaction at the instigation of governmental officials. Doran, supra. Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to include an instruction on entrapment. Accordingly, Moss' fourth assignment of error is overruled.
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL BASED UPON THE PROSECUTOR'S IMPROPER ARGUMENT DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT[.]"
{¶ 30} In her fifth assignment of error, Moss contends that the trial court erred in failing to grant her motion for mistrial based on inaccurate statements made by the prosecutor during her closing argument. We disagree.
{¶ 31} "The test regarding prosecutorial misconduct in closing arguments is whether the remarks were improper and, if so, whether they prejudicially affected substantial rights of the defendant." State v.Smith (1984),
{¶ 32} During closing argument, the prosecutor remarked:
"I think it was Detective or Sergeant Malick who indicated to you that [Moss and Turner] raced to the car. `You want drugs? All right. Pull around the corner, park the car.'"
Improper remarks will not result in prejudice to Moss if it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that, absent the remarks, the jury would have found Moss guilty. State v. Davidson (June 20, 1990), 9th Dist. No. 89CA004641, at *2, citing Smith,
{¶ 33} As we noted in our findings with respect to Moss' first two assignments of error, the weight of the evidence favored Moss' conviction. Therefore, we cannot conclude that, but for the prosecutor's statement, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Also, when the prosecutor made the contested comment, Moss' counsel objected. The court overruled the objection and cautioned the jurors that remarks made by the prosecutor were not evidence. Further, the contested statement would have been made in response to the officers' request for crack cocaine. At this point, the evidence showed that by asking the officers to pull their car forward, Moss was a willing participant in the drug sale whether or not she actually made any statement soliciting the sale of drugs at the time. Moss' words and actions throughout the incident were more than adequate to support her conviction. The prosecutor's comment was an isolated incident in the argument. Judging the prosecutor's remarks in the context of the whole *Page 11 case, we cannot conclude that Moss' rights were prejudicially affected or that she was denied a fair trial. Moss' fifth assignment of error, therefore, is overruled.
Judgment affirmed.
The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App. R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App. R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App. R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
*Page 1SLABY, J. CARR, P. J. CONCUR