DocketNumber: C.A. Case No. 2003-CA-60.
Citation Numbers: 2004 Ohio 2043
Judges: BROGAN, J.
Filed Date: 4/23/2004
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
{¶ 2} Pelzl advances three assignments of error on appeal. First, she contends the trial court erred in finding a substantial change in circumstances to support a change of custody. Second, she argues that the trial court erred in finding a change of custody to be in the best interest of Meranda. Third, she claims the trial court erred in finding the disruption caused by a change of custody to be "offset" by her move to campus housing at the University of Dayton.
{¶ 3} The record reflects that Pelzl was fifteen years old and living at home with her parents in Yellow Springs when she gave birth to Meranda in 1999. The trial court held a custody hearing on September 14, 2000, while Pelzl was still in high school and residing with her parents. At the time of Pelzl's May, 2001, graduation, the trial court had not resolved the custody issue. On July 5, 2001, however, the trial court filed an order designating Pelzl as Meranda's residential parent and granting Gaines visitation rights. Shortly thereafter, in August, 2001, Pelzl enrolled as a full-time student at the University of Dayton and moved into campus housing. Following the move, Meranda continued to reside with Pelzl's parents, and she was placed in day care for several hours a day. Pelzl returned home to see her daughter one or two weekends a month and also spoke to Meranda on the telephone approximately once a week. She also sent Meranda e-mail, which Pelzl's mother read to the child. While Pelzl attended college, Gaines continued to see his daughter in accordance with a court-ordered visitation schedule, and he made all of his child support payments.
{¶ 4} On April 4, 2002, Gaines filed a motion for a change of custody. The trial court dismissed the motion on June 11, 2002, at his request. Gaines then re-filed his motion for a change of custody on August 11, 2002.1 Pelzl responded by filing a January 24, 2003, motion to terminate Gaines' visitation rights. Following a three-day hearing on the motions, the trial court filed a July 1, 2003, decision and judgment entry in which it overruled Pelzl's motion and sustained Gaines' motion. As a result, the trial court designated Gaines as Meranda's legal custodian and residential parent. This timely appeal followed. Gaines has not filed an appellate brief.
{¶ 6} Upon review, we find the foregoing argument to be without merit. Pursuant to R.C.
{¶ 7} In a second argument, Pelzl contends the trial court erred in finding a change in circumstances based on her move from her parents' house to a campus dormitory. In support, Pelzl argues that any reduction in her contact with Meranda was minimal. She also argues that her parents were actively involved in Meranda's care even before she left for college. In addition, Pelzl asserts that she has not abdicated her parental role, that her attendance at college had been anticipated all along, and that Meranda remains well attended at her parents' house.
{¶ 8} After reviewing the hearing transcript, we find Pelzl's argument to be unpersuasive. A trial court may order a change of custody if it finds that there has been a change of circumstances, that the modification is in the best interest of the child, and that any harm likely to result from a change of environment is outweighed by the advantages of the change. R.C.
{¶ 9} In the present case, the trial court found a change in circumstances based on Pelzl's decision to move into campus housing and to leave her child behind with her parents. In particular, the trial court determined that Pelzl had delegated day-to-day child care responsibilities to her mother and essentially had relinquished her role as Meranda's residential parent. The trial court's factual findings support these determinations. Among other things, the trial court found that Pelzl attended college full time, including summer school, and saw Meranda at her parents' house one or two weekends a month. As a result of Pelzl attending college, the trial court also found that Gaines now has more direct contact with Meranda through his visitation than Pelzl does on her visits home.
{¶ 10} We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's finding of a change in circumstances based on Pelzl moving out of her parents' home and leaving her child behind essentially to be raised by her parents. With regard to Pelzl's argument that any reduction in her contact with Meranda is minimal, the record suggests otherwise. By her own admission, Pelzl spent at least several hours a day with her child before leaving for college. Despite the relatively short distance between Yellow Springs and the University of Dayton, Pelzl elected to live on campus and now sees Meranda one or two weekends a month and talks to the child on the phone approximately once a week. Although Pelzl's parents may have assisted in Meranda's care before she left for college, the fact remains that Pelzl previously resided with the child and no longer does. In addition, while Pelzl's attendance at college may have been anticipated at the time of the original decree, she cites nothing to suggest that the trial court anticipated her moving into a dormitory and leaving her child behind when it designated her the residential parent. Finally, the fact that Meranda may be receiving adequate care from Pelzl's parents has no bearing on whether the trial court properly found a change of circumstances based on Pelzl's move into campus housing.2 Accordingly, we overrule her first assignment of error.
{¶ 12} Upon review, we find Pelzl's argument to be unpersuasive. Section
{¶ 13} Having reviewed the foregoing factors, we cannot say that they weigh so strongly in Pelzl's favor that the trial court's change-of-custody order is an abuse of discretion. We note too that the trial court placed considerable weight on another factor not listed in the statute. In particular, the trial court found that Pelzl effectively had relinquished her role as residential parent by moving away to campus housing and that, as between Gaines and Pelzl's parents, it was in Meranda's best interest to have Gaines, her natural father, provide for her day-to-day care. The trial court also determined that Meranda would be more likely to maintain a relationship with both parents if she were in Gaines' custody. We find no abuse of discretion in these determinations. Pelzl's second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶ 15} Upon review, we find no merit in Pelzl's argument. The trial court recognized the role that Meranda's grandparents played in her life. While a change of custody undoubtedly would reduce that role, it would increase the child's contact with Gaines, her biological father, and his role in her life. Given that Pelzl effectively relinquished her role as residential parent by moving and leaving her child behind, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's conclusion that the advantages of granting custody to Gaines outweighed the disadvantages of removing Meranda from the care of her grandparents. As a result, we overrule Pelzl's third assignment of error.
Judgment affirmed.
Fain, P.J., and Young, J., concur.