DocketNumber: No. 23472.
Citation Numbers: 2008 Ohio 1911
Judges: DICKINSON, Judge.
Filed Date: 4/23/2008
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/18/2021
{¶ 3} To widen the road, the City appropriated a 25-foot-wide strip of land along the western edge of the Genoveses' property. As a result, the Genoveses had to reconfigure the marina's parking lot, remove one of the marina's piers, construct a new boat ramp, move the marina's outdoor boat storage area, modify the mobile home park's driveway, and replace a sign, some trees, and several lights. Construction of the new boat ramp required the Genoveses to remove a second marina pier. To avoid losing any dock space from the project, the *Page 3 Genoveses extended four of their remaining piers 25-feet further into the lake and added an additional set of fingers perpendicular to each of those piers. The project also affected the marketability of the Genoveses' unused parcels because the City has an ordinance requiring commercial properties to be at least one-acre in size and the taking had made the parcels smaller than that. A purchaser, therefore, would need to obtain a variance from the City before it could develop the parcels.
{¶ 4} The project did not only involve widening the road next to the Genoveses' property, it also called for the replacement of two short county-owned bridges that crossed the lake north of the Genoveses' property. Because the City did not want traffic to bottleneck at the bridges, it entered into an agreement with the county for the county to widen the bridges at the same time the City widened the road. In the agreement, the City and county stated that they would share the costs of widening the road and bridges. Instead of widening the two existing bridges, however, the county replaced them with a single long bridge. It used land the City had appropriated from the Genoveses to construct one of the embankments for the new bridge.
{¶ 5} The Genoveses' engineer opined that, in addition to having to reconfigure its layout, the project had created a new problem for the marina. He noted that, before the project, the marina's piers had not experienced damage from moving ice. Although the piers had been surrounded by ice during the winter months, they had not suffered damage because they did not protrude very far into *Page 4 the lake and were protected from movement by the bridges' embankments. Because ice moves more freely on the lake farther from shore, however, the extension of four of the marina's piers 25-feet further into the lake had made those piers more susceptible to ice flow damage. The engineer also explained that the new bridge had more space between its shorelines. This increased the amount of ice that could flow under the bridge and greatly reduced the piers' protection from ice movement.
{¶ 6} The engineer concluded that, not only were the piers more exposed to moving ice after the project, but that since they were 25-feet longer, it was "a probable reality" that they would suffer damage from moving ice. He noted that, if the piers were not removed from the water during the winter, they could be completely destroyed by ice movement. He, therefore, recommended taking the piers out of the lake each fall and returning them in the spring. The engineer opined that this new yearly expense was "caused by the intrusion of the new highway into the property and business of [the marina]."
{¶ 7} The Genoveses' appraiser also opined that the marina's new layout was disadvantageous because it increased the piers' exposure to moving ice. The appraiser noted that, because excessive ice damage can put a marina out of business, the physical layout of a marina and harbor is "very important to the desirability of a particular location." Noting that the marina's operators would have to remove and reinstall the piers on an annual basis, he characterized the *Page 5 corresponding loss in market value to the marina as "[u]ncurable permanent damage to the residue."
{¶ 8} Before trial, the City moved in limine seeking to exclude evidence about potential ice flow damage to the piers. It argued that the increased risk of damage to the piers was from the county's construction of the new bridge, not its widening of the road. The City also noted that the Genoveses had not removed their piers from the lake during the two winters since the new bridge had been constructed. The Genoveses, on the other hand, argued that because the road and bridge projects had been submitted by the City and county together for federal funding purposes, they should be considered a joint project. The Genoveses also noted that one of the new bridge's embankments had been built on land taken from them by the City.
{¶ 9} The trial court excluded the Genoveses' evidence about ice flow damage to the piers for three reasons. It concluded that the direct cause of the potential damage to the piers was the new bridge and the change it caused in the course of ice flow on the lake. It also concluded that, because the Genoveses only had a license to operate their marina on the state's property, they had not suffered a compensable taking. Finally, it concluded that any damage to the piers from moving ice was speculative.
{¶ 10} The jury awarded the Genoveses $50,000 in compensation for the land the City had permanently taken, $11,320 in compensation for land the City *Page 6 had temporarily taken to store its construction vehicles, $175,507 in damages for the reduced value of the residue of the Genoveses' property after the project, and $3173 in compensation for a retaining wall easement. The Genoveses have appealed, assigning eight errors.
{¶ 12} "The test of just compensation . . . is the `fair market value' of the property." Masheter v. Brewer,
{¶ 13} "The rule of valuation in a land appropriation proceeding is not what the property is worth for any particular use but what it is worth generally for any and all uses for which it might be suitable, including the most valuable uses to which it can reasonably and practically be adapted." Sowers v. Schaeffer,
{¶ 14} "Where damage is caused to the residue of property remaining after a taking,`[if], by the expenditure of money in an amount less than the difference *Page 8
between the before-and-after fair market value of the residue, the property owner could make improvements to such residue to restore the fair market value of the residue to that which it was before the improvement, then, evidence of such cost of cure would be admissible and, if proved, would limit the amount of damages to be assessed.'"Wray v. Stvartak,
{¶ 17} In In re Appropriation for Hwy. Purposes of Lands ofArnold,
{¶ 18} Although the landowner had a right of direct access to the county roads, the court noted that a predecessor in title had conveyed away his right of direct access to the highway. Accordingly, the landowner only had a privilege of indirect access to the highway via the county roads. Id. at 65. Because the landowner did not have a right of direct access to the highway, he could not recover from the county for vacating its road where that road intersected the highway. Id. at 65-66.
{¶ 19} The court noted that the goal of the project was to conform the highway to federal interstate standards by eliminating at grade crossings. Id. at 69. There were at least nine alternatives regarding the two county roads. Id. To achieve the federal standards, the state's plans, and the public's interests, however, it "was not possible to do anything [to one county road] intersection without also doing something to the [other county road] intersection, or vice versa." Id. The project involved vacating one road as much as it involved overpassing the other road, and, although the "piece of land taken was physically taken to provide additional right of way for [the overpass], it was also taken to make it possible to vacate [the other county road] and to bring [the highway] up to interstate standards." Id. The court, therefore, concluded that, although the landowner had no right to recover from the county for vacating its road, "he was entitled in the *Page 11 appropriation appeal to have the vacation [of the county road] considered as part of the improvement . . . for which the appropriation was authorized in otherwise determining his right to, and the measure of, compensation." Id. at 69-70. The landowner's privilege of accessing the state highway via the county roads could be considered in assessing the market value of his property before the taking. Id. at 70.
{¶ 20} The Genoveses proffered a resolution by the City indicating that it was in the public interest to reconstruct and widen the road north and south of the Genoveses' property and that the reconstruction project would require the replacement of the county's bridges. The resolution authorized the City's mayor to enter into an agreement with the county to share the costs of reconstructing the road and designated the road widening as phase one and the new bridge construction as phase two. The resolution further indicated that the parties would share the cost of both phases. The Genoveses also proffered an agreement of cooperation between the City and the county indicating that they would share the costs of widening the road and replacing the bridges.
{¶ 21} The documents proffered by the Genoveses establish that the construction of the new bridge was a necessary part of the City's road widening project. If the county had not replaced the old bridges at the same time the City widened the road, traffic would bottleneck at the bridges. In addition, the county used part of the land the City appropriated from the Genoveses to construct one of *Page 12
the new bridge's embankments. This Court, therefore, concludes that the Genoveses may recover from the City for any decrease in the market value of their property that is attributable to the county's construction of the new bridge. The piers' protection from ice movement by the bridges' embankments is an element that the trial court should have allowed the jury to consider in determining the before market value of the Genoveses' marina and in calculating the damage to the residue of their property. See Arnold,
{¶ 22} Regarding the trial court's second reason for excluding the Genoveses' ice flow damage evidence, it is immaterial that the Genoveses only have a license to use the state's land for their marina. There was no dispute that the Genoveses could recover for the cost of replacing their lost dock space and boat ramp, both of which were on state-owned property. The Genoveses are entitled to recover for anything that affects the fair market value of their property. "[Consequential damages which would be damnum absque injuria in the absence *Page 13
of a taking, may be compensable damages to the residue in the event of a taking of a portion of an owner's property." City of Columbus v. FarmBureau Co-op. Ass'n,
{¶ 23} Furthermore, regarding the trial court's third reason for excluding the ice flow damage evidence, the potential for damage to the market value of the Genoveses' marina was not speculative. The relevant question was not whether ice flow damage to the piers will happen, but whether a buyer would offer less for the marina because of the potential of ice flow damage to them. The Genoveses' appraiser stated that the marina's new configuration was disadvantageous because of the piers' increased exposure to moving ice. The appraiser noted that the physical layout of a marina and harbor is "very important to the desirability of a particular location" and that excessive ice damage can put a marina out of business. He, therefore, concluded that the change in the marina's layout had caused incurable permanent damage to its value. Accordingly, because the trial court focused only on whether ice flow damage would happen rather than *Page 14 whether the market value of the Genoveses' property would be affected by the increased potential for damage, this Court concludes that it improperly excluded the Genoveses' evidence as speculative. The Genoveses' first assignment of error is sustained.
{¶ 24} Because reversal on this ground requires the reappraisal of the before and after market value of the Genoveses' property, a new trial must be held on the amount of both the Genoveses' compensation and damages. The Genoveses' remaining assignments of error, therefore, are moot, and they are overruled on that basis. See App. R. 12(A)(1)(c).
Judgment reversed, and cause remanded.
*Page 15The Court finds that there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(E). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to appellee.
*Page 1SLABY, P. J., MOORE, J., CONCUR