State ex rel. L.N.B. v. Lawson

[Cite as State ex rel. L.N.B. v. Lawson, 2021-Ohio-1365.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO ex rel. L.N.B., : PER CURIAM OPINION
Relator, :
CASE NO. 2020-L-121
- vs - :
THE HONORABLE JUDGE :
KAREN LAWSON,
Respondent. :
Original Action for Writ of Prohibition.
Judgment: Petition dismissed.
Joseph G. Stafford and Nicole A. Cruz, Stafford Law Co., LPA, 55 Erieview Plaza, 5th
Floor, Cleveland, OH 44114 (For Relator).
Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Michael L. DeLeone, Assistant
Prosecutor, Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490,
Painesville, OH 44077 (For Respondent).
PER CURIAM.
{¶1} Respondent, Judge Karen Lawson, moves to dismiss the verified petition
for writ of prohibition filed by Relator L.N.B, arguing it fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6). We grant the motion and dismiss the
petition.
{¶2} “In construing a complaint upon a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim, we must presume that all factual allegations of the complaint are true and make
all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Then, before we may
dismiss the complaint, it must appear beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of
facts warranting a recovery.” (Internal citations omitted.) Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co.,
40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1988).
{¶3} Judge Lawson currently presides over case No. 2016 CV 00054, in the
Juvenile Division of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas, an action for the
allocation of parental rights and responsibilities between Relator L.N.B. (hereinafter
“Mother”) and J.C.L. (“Father”). On January 18, 2017, the trial court designated Mother
the residential parent and legal custodian of the minor child and granted Father
parenting time.
{¶4} On December 31, 2019, Judge Lawson issued a judgment entry granting
Father’s motions for custody and designating him residential parent and legal custodian.
Within the entry, the judge also issued various other orders to the parties, including that
they attend joint therapy to address communication and raising the child, and that they
cooperate with, attend sessions, and comply with all requests of the parenting
coordinator. Mother was also ordered to complete an intensive outpatient program,
intended to be an eight-week intensive mental health program. Judge Lawson further
ordered that, “As of August 27, 2020, Mother shall have parenting time pursuant to Lake
County Ohio Juvenile Rule V.” Two weeks later, Mother filed a motion to modify
parenting time, which the trial court overruled on March 24, 2020. Mother appealed
both entries, as well as the denial of a motion for new trial, and the appeals were
consolidated for review. This court affirmed all three entries on January 29, 2021, in
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[J.C.L. v. L.N.B.], 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2020-L-010, 2020-L-049, & 2020-L-050, 2021-
Ohio-246.
{¶5} On November 24, 2020, while the above appeal was still pending in this
court, Judge Lawson issued a nunc pro tunc entry with the following change: “If the
foregoing conditions are complete as of August 27, 2020, Mother shall have
parenting time pursuant to Lake County Ohio Juvenile Rule V.” (Emphasis sic.) The
“foregoing conditions” clearly refer to the above-referenced orders to the parties, which
include that Mother complete an intensive outpatient program. Mother appealed. The
appeal remains pending before this court in [J.C.L. v. L.N.B.], 11th Dist. Lake No. 2020-
L-122.
{¶6} In her petition, Mother asks us to issue an order preventing Judge Lawson
from enforcing the November 24, 2020 nunc pro tunc entry, arguing she did not have
jurisdiction to modify the December 31, 2019 entry during the pendency of the appeal
and without leave of this court under Civ.R. 60(A).
{¶7} “The three requirements which must exist to support the issuance of a writ
of prohibition are: (1) the court or officer against whom it is sought must be about to
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial power, (2) the exercise of such power must be clearly
unauthorized by law, and (3) it must appear that the refusal of the writ would result in
injury for which there is no adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” (Citation
omitted.) State ex rel. Celebrezze v. Court of Common Pleas of Butler Cty., 60 Ohio
St.2d 188, 189, 398 N.E.2d 777 (1979).
{¶8} “Absent a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction, a court having
general subject-matter jurisdiction can determine its own jurisdiction, and a party
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challenging the court’s jurisdiction possesses an adequate remedy by appeal. Where
an inferior court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction over the cause,
prohibition will lie both to prevent the future unauthorized exercise of jurisdiction and to
correct the results of previous jurisdictionally unauthorized actions.” (Internal citations
omitted). State ex rel. Stern v. Mascio, 81 Ohio St.3d 297, 298-299, 691 N.E.2d 253(1998).
{¶9} “‘[I]f there are no set of facts under which a trial court or judge could have
jurisdiction over a particular case, the alleged jurisdictional defect will always be
considered patent and unambiguous. On the other hand, if the court or judge generally
has subject matter jurisdiction over the type of case in question and [its] authority to
hear that specific action will depend on the specific facts before [it], the jurisdictional
defect is not obvious and the court/judge should be allowed to decide the jurisdictional
issue.’” State ex rel. Huntington Natl. Bank v. Kontos, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2013-T-
0089, 2014-Ohio-1374, ¶ 12, quoting State ex rel. The Leatherworks Partnership v.
Stuard, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2002-T-0017, 2002-Ohio-6477, ¶ 19.
{¶10} Judge Lawson, as the judge of the court of common pleas’ juvenile
division, generally has subject matter jurisdiction over an action for parental rights and
responsibilities. Further, once an appeal is perfected, a trial court is not divested of all
jurisdiction—the trial court retains jurisdiction over issues not inconsistent with the
appellate court’s jurisdiction and to act in aid of the appeal. In re S.J., 106 Ohio St.3d
11, 829 N.E.2d 1207, 2005-Ohio-3215, ¶ 9, citing State ex rel. Special Prosecutors v.
Judges, Court of Common Pleas, 55 Ohio St.2d 94, 97, 378 N.E.2d 162 (1978) and Yee
v. Erie Cty. Sheriff’s Dept., 51 Ohio St.3d 43, 44, 553 N.E.2d 1354 (1990). Thus, Judge
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Lawson’s authority to issue and enforce the nunc pro tunc entry depended on the
specific facts before her at the time, rendering any jurisdictional defect neither patent
nor unambiguous.
{¶11} Because Judge Lawson had jurisdiction to determine her own jurisdiction,
Mother has an adequate remedy by way of a direct appeal, whereby she may challenge
the nunc pro tunc entry as an act inconsistent with this court’s jurisdiction while the
previous appeal was pending, a violation of Civ.R. 60(A), or otherwise. In fact, Mother
currently has an appeal from that entry pending before this court, further establishing
that denial of the writ will not cause an injury for which she has no adequate remedy at
law.
{¶12} Upon construing Mother’s allegations in a manner most favorable to her,
she fails to state a claim upon which relief in prohibition can be granted. Accordingly,
we grant Judge Lawson’s motion to dismiss. Civ.R. 12(B)(6); State ex rel. Kaylor v.
Bruening, 80 Ohio St.3d 142, 144, 684 N.E.2d 1228 (1997).
{¶13} The petition for writ of prohibition is dismissed.
MARY JANE TRAPP, P.J., THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J., MATT LYNCH, J., concur.
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