State v. O'Halloran

[Cite as State v. O'Halloran, 2021-Ohio-1521.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
GREENE COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO :
:
Plaintiff-Appellee : Appellate Case No. 2020-CA-34
:
v. : Trial Court Case No. 2020-CR-79
:
JAMES M. O’HALLORAN : (Criminal Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
Defendant-Appellant :
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 30th day of April, 2021.
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MARCY A. VONDERWELL, Atty. Reg. No. 0078311, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney,
Greene County Prosecutor’s Office, 61 Greene Street, Suite 200, Xenia, Ohio 45385
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee
APRIL CAMPBELL, Atty. Reg. No. 0089541, 46½ North Sandusky Street, Delaware, Ohio
43015
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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TUCKER, P.J.
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{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant James M. O’Halloran appeals from the judgment of the
Greene County Common Pleas Court, which convicted him of three counts of rape and
one count each of gross sexual imposition and importuning. Specifically, O’Halloran
challenges the sentences imposed on the rape offenses. For the reasons set forth
below, we conclude the trial court erred in sentencing. Accordingly, the judgment is
reversed and remanded for resentencing.
I. Facts and Procedural History
{¶ 2} On January 23, 2020, O’Halloran was indicted on three counts of rape in
violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(b), with notice that the offense was subject to the
sentencing provisions in R.C. 2971.03. He was also indicted on one count of gross
sexual imposition and one count of importuning. The victim was under the age of 13 at
the time of the offenses.
{¶ 3} A plea hearing was conducted on June 12, 2020, during which the court
noted that O’Halloran had executed a plea form. The form indicated that the counts of
rape carried “a mandatory sentence of 10 years to life imprisonment.” Plea Agreement
(June 12, 2020). The court also informed O’Halloran at the hearing that the rape charges
“carr[ied] a mandatory prison sentence of a minimum of ten years to a maximum of life
imprisonment.” Plea Tr. p. 11. The court went on the state, “I do wish to advise you
that in regard to the three Rape counts, there is a minimum of ten years as to each
individual count for parole consideration.” Id. at p. 11-12. Further, the court stated, “If
you are to be released from prison, that would be a decision by the parole board, which
they’ll make if they choose to do so. Upon release from prison, you will be on parole[.]”
-3-
Id. at p. 15. After otherwise being appropriately informed of his rights, O’Halloran
entered a plea of guilty to all five charges.
{¶ 4} A sentencing hearing was conducted on August 6, 2020. The trial court
sentenced O’Halloran to a “definite prison term” of “life” for each of the counts of rape, to
a prison term of 36 months for importuning, and to 60 months for gross sexual imposition.
Judgment Entry of Conviction. The latter two sentences were ordered to run
consecutively to each other and to the rape sentences. Thus, the aggregate sentence
imposed by the court was “a total sentence of life plus eight years of which life is a
mandatory term.” Id.
{¶ 5} O’Halloran appeals.
II. Analysis
{¶ 6} The sole assignment of error asserted by O’Halloran states:
O’HALLORAN’S SENTENCES FOR COUNTS ONE THROUGH THREE
SHOULD BE MODIFIED TO TEN-YEARS-TO-LIFE, RATHER THAN LIFE,
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
SENTENCING HIM TO LIFE.
{¶ 7} O’Halloran asserts the trial court erred by sentencing him to life prison terms
on each of the rape counts. He asserts the trial court was statutorily obligated to
sentence him to a minimum of 10 years to a maximum of life on each count. The State
concedes the error. However, the State asserts that, on remand, the trial court should
be instructed to order the sentences for all five counts to run consecutively, for an
aggregate term of 38 years to life.
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{¶ 8} O’Halloran was convicted of three counts of rape in violation of R.C.
2907.02(A)(1)(b). When considering a sentence for that specific offense, we look first to
R.C. 2907.02(B), which provides that, except for certain circumstances not applicable
here, “an offender under division (A)(1)(b) of this section shall be sentenced to a prison
term or term of life imprisonment pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.” The
portion of R.C. 2971.03 applicable to this case provides that the court shall impose a
minimum term of 10 years and a maximum term of life imprisonment. R.C.
2971.03(B)(1)(a).
{¶ 9} Under the facts of this case, R.C. 2971.03(B)(1)(a) was the only applicable
sentencing statute. However, the trial court did not impose the sentence mandated by
that statute. Instead, the trial court converted an indefinite sentence required by statute
into a de facto definite sentence, and in so doing, it exceeded its sentencing authority.
See State v. Duncan, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2016-CA-77, 2017-Ohio-8103, ¶ 14. Therefore,
we find O’Halloran’s assignment of error well-taken and conclude the trial court erred in
sentencing.
{¶ 10} We next address the State’s assertion that the trial court should impose
consecutive sentences regarding all five convictions on remand, for an aggregate
sentence of 38 years to life, of which 38 years is mandatory. In support, the State argues
that such a sentence is permissible because the trial court made the requisite findings for
the imposition of consecutive sentences. We disagree.
{¶ 11} “Sentences based on an error, including sentences in which a trial court
fails to impose a statutorily mandated term, are voidable if the court imposing the
sentence has jurisdiction over the case and the defendant.” State v. Henderson, 161
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Ohio St.3d 285, 2020-Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 1. Henderson further explained that
“[a] judgment or sentence is void only if it is rendered by a court that lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction over the case or personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” Id. at ¶ 34. Thus,
when the sentencing court has jurisdiction to act, sentencing errors “render the sentence
voidable, not void, and the sentence may be set aside if successfully challenged on direct
appeal.” State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 42.
{¶ 12} Here, there is no dispute that the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction
over O’Halloran's case and had personal jurisdiction over him. See Smith v. Sheldon,
157 Ohio St.3d 1, 2019-Ohio-1677, 131 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 8 (“[A] common pleas court has
subject-matter jurisdiction over felony cases.”). There is also no question that the court
had personal jurisdiction. See Johnson v. Geauga Cty. Court of Common Pleas, 11th
Dist. Geauga No. 2014-G-3206, 2015-Ohio-210, ¶ 11 (“[P]ersonal jurisdiction exists when
the defendant has been properly served with the indictment.). Thus, O’Halloran's
sentence could only be challenged by an objection made at the sentencing hearing or on
direct appeal. Henderson at ¶ 27, 40, 43.
{¶ 13} App.R. 3(C)(1) provides that “[a] person who intends to defend a judgment
or order against an appeal taken by an appellant and who also seeks to change the
judgment or order or, in the event the judgment or order may be reversed or modified, an
interlocutory ruling merged into the judgment or order, shall file a notice of cross appeal
within the time allowed by App.R. 4.” The State did not file an appeal or cross-appeal
seeking to challenge the sentence imposed for the rape convictions or the trial court’s
erroneous conclusion that it could not consider consecutive sentences as to the rape
counts. Thus, the State cannot challenge the issue of consecutive sentencing on appeal.
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Further, the trial court did not make the required consecutive findings as to the three rape
sentences. Instead, the court only made the consecutive findings so that the importuning
and gross sexual imposition sentences could be served consecutively to each other and
to the rape sentence.
{¶ 14} Based upon the foregoing, O’Halloran’s sole assignment of error is
sustained.
III. Conclusion
{¶ 15} O’Halloran’s assignment of error having been sustained, the trial court's
judgment of August 6, 2020, is reversed, and the matter is remanded for resentencing in
accordance with this opinion.
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DONOVAN, J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Marcy A. Vonderwell
April Campbell
Successor to Hon. Stephen Wolaver