State v. Rollison

[Cite as State v. Rollison, 2021-Ohio-1556.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
MARION COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, CASE NO. 9-20-41
v.
RYAN ROLLISON, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Appeal from Marion County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 19-CR-252
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: May 3, 2021
APPEARANCES:
W. Joseph Edwards for Appellant
Nathan R. Heiser for Appellee
Case No. 9-20-41
ZIMMERMAN, J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Ryan Rollison (“Rollison”), appeals the
September 1, 2020 judgment entry of sentence of the Marion County Court of
Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} The unfortunate circumstances of this case arise out of a single-car
traffic accident that occurred on the evening of May 12, 2019 in Marion, Ohio
involving the pickup truck operated by Rollison. There were two other passengers
in the vehicle—Caleb Smale (“Smale”), who was riding in the passenger seat, and
Jacqueline Burgett (“Burgett”), who was seated between Rollison and Smale. The
accident, which was witnessed by James Spears (“James”) and Aaliyah Spears
(“Aaliyah”), occurred on the dark and rainy night after Rollison “ran the light that
was on Greenwood and Fairground” and lost control of his vehicle striking multiple
poles. (Aug. 12, 2020 Tr., Vol. II, at 432-434). After his vehicle came to rest,
Rollison “got out, and he ran,” while Smale tended to Burgett’s injuries. (Id. at
396). Burgett suffered a spinal-cord injury and later died on September 16, 2019.
{¶3} On May 29, 2019, the Marion County Grand Jury indicted Rollison on
Count One of vehicular assault in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(2), a third-degree
felony, and Count Two of failure to stop after an accident in violation of R.C.
4549.02(A), a fifth-degree felony. (Doc. No. 1). On May 31, 2019, Rollison
appeared for arraignment and entered pleas of not guilty. (Doc. No. 4).
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{¶4} On October 16, 2019, the Marion County Grand Jury indicted Rollison
under a superseding indictment on two additional counts: Count Three of failure to
stop after an accident in violation of R.C. 4549.02(A), a fourth-degree felony, and
Count Four of aggravated vehicular homicide in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a),
a second-degree felony. (Doc. No. 24). On October 22, 2019, Rollison appeared
for arraignment and entered pleas of not guilty to the new indictment. (Doc. No.
27).
{¶5} The case proceeded to a jury trial on August 11-13, 2020. (Doc. No.
169). The jury found Rollison guilty of all the indicted counts. (Doc. Nos. 158,
159, 160, 161).
{¶6} On September 1, 2020, the trial court sentenced Rollison to 17 months
in prison on Count Three and to a minimum term of 7 years in prison on Count Four,
and ordered Rollison to serve the sentences consecutively for an aggregate
minimum term of 8 years and 5 months in prison. (Doc. No. 169). For purposes of
sentencing, however, the trial court merged Counts Two and Three and Counts One
and Four, respectively. (Id.).
{¶7} Rollison filed his notice of appeal on November 6, 2020 and raises one
assignment of error for our review. (Doc. No. 183).
Assignment of Error No. I
The Trial Court Erred and Deprived Appellant Due Process of
Law as Guaranteed By the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
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States Constitution and Article One of the Ohio Constitution By
Finding Him Guilty of Aggravated Vehicular Homicide as That
Verdict Was Not Supported By Sufficient Evidence and Was Also
Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence. (Record Reference:
Tr. Vol. II, PP 388-560, Tr. Vol. III, PP. 573-673)
{¶8} In his sole assignment of error, Rollison argues that his aggravated-
vehicular-homicide conviction is based on insufficient evidence and is against the
manifest weight of the evidence.1 In particular, Rollison argues that the State
presented insufficient evidence that he operated his motor vehicle recklessly.
Standard of Review
{¶9} Manifest “weight of the evidence and sufficiency of the evidence are
clearly different legal concepts.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 389
(1997). Therefore, we address each legal concept individually.
{¶10} “An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at
trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average
mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio
St.3d 259 (1981), paragraph two of the syllabus, superseded by state constitutional
amendment on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 89 (1997). Accordingly,
“[t]he relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential
1
Rollison does not challenge his failure-to-stop-after-an-accident or vehicular-assault convictions.
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elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. “In deciding if the
evidence was sufficient, we neither resolve evidentiary conflicts nor assess the
credibility of witnesses, as both are functions reserved for the trier of fact.” State v.
Jones, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-120570 and C-120571, 2013-Ohio-4775, ¶ 33,
citing State v. Williams, 197 Ohio App.3d 505, 2011-Ohio-6267, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.).
See also State v. Berry, 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-12-03, 2013-Ohio-2380, ¶ 19
(“Sufficiency of the evidence is a test of adequacy rather than credibility or weight
of the evidence.”), citing Thompkins at 386.
{¶11} On the other hand, in determining whether a conviction is against the
manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court must examine the entire record,
“‘weigh[ ] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ ] the credibility of
witnesses and determine[ ] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier
of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that
the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387,
quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983). A reviewing
court must, however, allow the trier of fact appropriate discretion on matters relating
to the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. State v. DeHass,
10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231 (1967). When applying the manifest-weight standard,
“[o]nly in exceptional cases, where the evidence ‘weighs heavily against the
conviction,’ should an appellate court overturn the trial court’s judgment.” State v.
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Haller, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-11-34, 2012-Ohio-5233, ¶ 9, quoting State v.
Hunter, 131 Ohio St.3d 67, 2011-Ohio-6524, ¶ 119.
Sufficiency of the Evidence Analysis
{¶12} We will begin by addressing Rollison’s sufficiency-of-the-evidence
argument as it relates to his aggravated-vehicular-homicide conviction. See State v.
Velez, 3d Dist. Putnam No. 12-13-10, 2014-Ohio-1788, ¶ 68, citing State v.
Wimmer, 3d Dist. Marion No. 9-98-46, 1999 WL 355190, *1 (Mar. 26, 1999).
Rollison was convicted of aggravated vehicular homicide in violation of R.C.
2903.06, which provides, in its relevant part, “[n]o person, while operating * * * a
motor vehicle * * * shall cause the death of another * * * [r]ecklessly.” R.C.
2903.06(A)(2)(a). The requisite mental state for aggravate-vehicular-homicide
under R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a) is “recklessly.” Reckless-mental culpability is defined
under R.C. 2901.22, which provides as follows:
A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the
consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the person’s conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is
likely to be of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to
circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the consequences,
the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such
circumstances are likely to exist.
R.C. 2901.22(C). “Recklessness may be inferred from a combination of excessive
speed and the surrounding circumstances.” State v. Schmidt, 9th Dist. Medina No.
10CA0071-M, 2012-Ohio-537, ¶ 9, quoting State v. Thomas, 12th Dist. Butler No.
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CA93-03-046, 1994 WL 266546, *3 (June 13, 1994), and citing State v. Moore, 2d
Dist. Montgomery No. 22904, 2009-Ohio-3766, ¶ 8 (“A driver’s grossly excessive
speed, particularly when combined with other factors, will support a finding of
recklessness.”).
{¶13} On appeal, Rollison argues only that a rational trier of fact could not
have found that he acted recklessly. Specifically, Rollison contends that the State
did not present sufficient evidence that he acted recklessly because “Smale and both
Aaliyah and James Spears, testified that they thought [Rollison’s] vehicle was
moving fast, but could not precisely testify as to its speed” and “the testimony
regarding speed did not address if the speed occurred after the tire ‘blowout’ when
control of the vehicle was lost.” (Appellant’s Brief at 6-7). Because it is the only
element that Rollison challenges on appeal, we will review the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting only whether he acted recklessly.
{¶14} “Generally, the intent of a person cannot be proven by direct evidence,
thus proof of intent may be shown from circumstantial evidence.” State v. Cole, 3d
Dist. Seneca No. 13-10-30, 2011-Ohio-409, ¶ 23, citing State v. Lott, 51 Ohio St.3d
160, 168 (1990) and State v. O’Black, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-10-25, 2010-Ohio-4812,
¶ 18. “Circumstantial evidence is ‘“the proof of certain facts and circumstances in
a given case, from which the jury may infer other connected facts which usually and
reasonably follow according to the common experience of mankind.”’” Id., quoting
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State v. Fisher, 3d Dist. Auglaize No. 2-10-09, 2010-Ohio-5192, ¶ 26, quoting State
v. Duganitz (1991), 76 Ohio App.3d 363, 367 (8th Dist.1991), citing Black’s Law
Dictionary 221 (5th Ed.1979).
{¶15} Circumstantial evidence has no less probative value than direct
evidence. State v. Griesheimer, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 05AP-1039, 2007-Ohio-
837, ¶ 26, citing Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d at paragraph one of the syllabus. See also
State v. Heinish, 50 Ohio St.3d 231, 238 (1990) (“This court has long held that
circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if that evidence would
convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
“‘[A]ll that is required of the jury is that it weigh all of the evidence, direct and
circumstantial, against the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v.
Miller, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103591, 2016-Ohio-7606, ¶ 61, quoting Jenks at
272. “‘“Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain,
satisfying, and persuasive than direct evidence.”’” Id., quoting State v. Hawthorne,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 96496, 2011-Ohio-6078, ¶ 9, quoting Michalic v. Cleveland
Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325, 330, 81 S.Ct. 6 (1960).
{¶16} Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we
conclude that Rollison’s aggravated-vehicular-homicide conviction is based on
sufficient evidence. That is, the State presented sufficient evidence at trial from
which the trier of fact could reasonably infer that Rollison acted recklessly.
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Specifically, the State presented evidence that demonstrated that Rollison was
driving erratically and at an excessive speed on a rainy night. Accord State v. Wade,
8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 67206, 1995 WL 229110, *2 (April 13, 1995). See State v.
Moore, 6th Dist. Wood No. WD-18-030, 2019-Ohio-3705, ¶ 49. Indeed, Patrolman
Dylan Reese (“Patrolman Reese”) of the Marion City Police Department and James
testified that the accident occurred at night and in the rain. Further, James testified
that Rollison was operating his vehicle “[e]rratic and fast” and Smale testified that
Rollison “was going fast * * * and there was a whiteout, and he was acting all crazy.
And then the next * * * thing [he] kn[e]w [they] hit the first pole.” (Aug. 12, 2020
Tr., Vol. II, at 393, 434). Smale also testified that Rollison “was doing donuts and
burnouts, [and] lost control.” (Id. at 394). Moreover, James and Aaliyah testified
that they witnessed Rollison run the traffic light before striking the pole.
{¶17} According to Smale, the first pole that Rollison struck was on the left
side of the road, which required Rollison to travel across two opposite lanes of travel
to strike the pole. After striking the first pole, Rollison’s vehicle “hit the Genova
Pizza sign pole” across the street. (Id.). Smale testified that Rollison “was trying to
straighten her out, straighten out the wheel; but he couldn’t do it. It was too late”
and that the vehicle “was sliding because it was wet.” (Id. at 395). Compare State
v. Nguyen, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 02AP-1138, 2003-Ohio-2328, ¶ 37 (concluding
that “there was evidence of other unusually dangerous conditions, in that [Nguyen]
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was driving on a wet, poorly lit road” as “proof of recklessness”). Smale further
testified that “[t]he whole entire wheel” “fell out” after the vehicle struck the
Genova Pizza sign pole. (Id. at 395-396). Aaliyah and James testified that they saw
one of the tires came off of the vehicle after it struck one of the poles.
{¶18} Based on that evidence, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have
found beyond a reasonable doubt that Rollison acted recklessly—that is, the jury
could infer from the evidence presented by the State at trial that Rollison, with
heedless indifference to the consequences, disregarded a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that his conduct (while operating his motor vehicle) was likely to
cause Burgett’s death. In other words, the trier of fact could conclude (based on the
evidence presented by the State at trial) that Rollison’s ability to react to the road
conditions was greatly compromised given the nighttime conditions, the rain, the
wet pavement, and his high rate of speed, and further conclude that Rollison
disregarded that substantial and unjustifiable risk. See Schmidt, 2012-Ohio-537, at
¶ 14. Consequently, Rollison’s aggravated-vehicular-homicide conviction is based
on sufficient evidence.
{¶19} Having concluded that Rollison’s aggravated-vehicular-homicide
conviction is based on sufficient evidence, we next address Rollison’s argument that
his aggravated-vehicular-homicide conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence. Velez, 2014-Ohio-1788, at ¶ 76.
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Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶20} Although Rollison contends that his aggravated-vehicular-homicide
conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence in his assignment of error,
his argument pertains only to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting that
conviction. Accord State v. Frye, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-17-30, 2018-Ohio-894, ¶ 44
(“Although Frye asserts that he is challenging the weight of the evidence supporting
his convictions * * *, his argument pertains only to the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting those convictions.”). (See Appellant’s Brief at 8). Because Rollison
presented only a sufficiency-of-the-evidence argument regarding his aggravated-
vehicular-homicide conviction, we decline to conduct a manifest-weight-of-the-
evidence analysis on his behalf. State v. Yoder, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 15AP0017,
2016-Ohio-7428, ¶ 23, citing State v. Schmitz, 9th Dist. Lorain Nos. 11CA010043
and 11CA010044, 2012-Ohio-2979, ¶ 36 and App.R. 16(A)(7). See State v.
Tabassum, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25568, 2011-Ohio-6790, ¶ 5 (“Although, in the
statement of his first assignment of error, Tabassum raises the issue of manifest
weight, his arguments pertain only to the sufficiency of the evidence, and we limit
our discussion accordingly.”), citing App.R. 12(A)(2) and 16(A)(7).
{¶21} For these reasons, Rollison’s assignment of error is overruled.
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{¶22} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
MILLER and SHAW, J.J., concur.
/jlr
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