Brookville Ents., Inc. v. Seibel

[Cite as Brookville Ents., Inc. v. Seibel, 2020-Ohio-948.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
:
BROOKVILLE ENTERPRISES, INC. :
: Appellate Case No. 28561
Plaintiff-Appellant :
: Trial Court Case No. 2018-CV-4650
v. :
: (Civil Appeal from
PHYLLIS SEIBEL, et al. : Common Pleas Court)
:
Defendants-Appellees :
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OPINION
Rendered on the 13th day of March, 2020.
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ROBERT C. WIESENMAYER, Atty. Reg. No. 0007207, 15 Willipe Street, Suite 300, P.O.
Box 299, Wapakoneta, Ohio 45895
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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FROELICH, J.
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{¶ 1} Brookville Enterprises, Inc., dba Brookhaven Nursing & Rehabilitation Center
(“Brookhaven”), appeals from two judgments of the Montgomery County Court of Common
Pleas: (1) the August 13, 2019 dismissal of Brookhaven’s action and (2) the September 20,
2019 denial of Brookhaven’s motion for relief from judgment, pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). For
the following reasons, the trial court’s dismissal of Brookhaven’s action will be reversed, and
the matter will be remanded for further proceedings.
I. Procedural History
{¶ 2} On October 10, 2018, Brookhaven brought suit against Phyllis and Paul Seibel
for unpaid nursing home expenses. The complaint alleged that Mrs. Seibel was a resident
of the facility and had accrued unpaid charges totaling $32,362.51, plus interest.
Brookhaven brought a breach of contract claim against Mrs. Seibel (Count 1), a quantum
meruit claim against both defendants (Count 2), and a spousal obligation claim against Mr.
Seibel (Count 3). Brookhaven attached to the complaint Mrs. Seibel’s Consent to Treat &
Admission Agreement and a billing statement for Mrs. Seibel dated October 4, 2018.
{¶ 3} Mrs. Seibel was served by certified mail to Brookhaven on October 15, 2018;
the return receipt was signed by Wanda Jones. Mr. Seibel was served by personal service
on October 23, 2018. Neither defendant filed an answer.
{¶ 4} On December 5, 2018, the trial court issued an order for Brookhaven to file a
motion for default judgment, pursuant to Civ.R. 55, within 14 days or the case would be
dismissed, absent cause. Brookhaven did not file a motion for default judgment. Instead,
on December 19, 2018, Brookhaven filed a suggestion of death indicating that Mrs. Seibel
had died on November 18, 2018. Brookhaven’s counsel indicated that he learned of her
death on November 20. On December 20 (the day after Brookhaven’s filing), the trial court
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dismissed the matter for failure to prosecute.
{¶ 5} On December 27, 2018, Brookhaven moved for the trial court to reinstate the
proceedings. Counsel for Brookhaven explained that the suggestion of death was intended
to notify the court that Brookhaven “intend[ed] to prosecute the proceedings, but would have
a slight delay due to the death of one of the Defendants.” Concurrently, Brookhaven filed
a motion for default judgment against both defendants. Counsel pointed out that Mrs.
Seibel had died more than 28 days after she had been served with the complaint, i.e., after
her answer was due. On December 28, the trial court ruled that “these proceedings should
be reinstated and the Court should proceed to make its ruling on the Motion for Default
Judgment filed herewith.”
{¶ 6} On February 15, 2019, Brookhaven moved for additional time to open an estate
for Mrs. Seibel so that a special administrator could make an appearance in the proceedings
as a substitute party for her. Brookhaven requested a 30-day extension to complete the
appointment of a special administrator. The trial court granted the motion.
{¶ 7} On March 13, 2019, Brookhaven sought an additional 60-day extension.
Counsel for Brookhaven indicated that Brookhaven’s attempt to appoint a special
administrator was denied by the probate court, that the probate court was requiring a full
administration, and that the probate court would be setting a hearing. The trial court found
Brookhaven’s request to be reasonable and granted the extension.
{¶ 8} On May 15, 2019, Brookhaven filed a motion to substitute HCF Management,
Inc.,1 administrator of Mrs. Seibel’s estate, as defendant for Mrs. Seibel. The trial court
1 The record indicates that HCF Management and Brookhaven have a business
relationship, including that HCF Management maintains the business records for
Brookhaven, but the exact relationship is not detailed in the record.
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promptly granted the motion.
{¶ 9} On June 6, 2019, in a document signed by Jodi Bennett, business office support
specialist for HCF Management, Mrs. Seibel’s estate filed an “Appearance and Answer of
Administrator HCF Management, Inc. as Substitute Defendant for Phyllis Seibel, deceased.”
The answer portion of the document stated that Mrs. Seibel, during her lifetime, was in
default for answer or other pleadings and thereby admitted the allegations in the complaint.
HCF Management indicated that it was unaware of any defense that would be available to
the estate and asked the court “to protect the interest of the Estate in these proceedings and
to award such relief as may be equitable and proper to all parties * * *.”
{¶ 10} On June 7, 2019, the trial court ordered the parties to file “any and all
dispositive motions within 30 days.” The court scheduled a pretrial hearing and trial date
for the matter. On June 20, Brookhaven filed another motion for default judgment with
supporting documentation. The documentation consisted of an affidavit from an employee
of HCF Management authenticating the business records attached to Brookhaven’s
complaint and an affidavit from Brookhaven’s counsel regarding his attorney fees as part of
collecting the charges incurred by Mrs. Seibel as a resident of Brookhaven.
{¶ 11} On August 13, 2019, the trial court struck HCF Management’s answer and
dismissed the action. The court ruled:
Claim Against the Decedent’s Estate
A document entitled Appearance and Answer of Administrator HCF
Management, Inc. As Substitute Defendant for Phyllis Seibel, Deceased,
signed by HCF Management, Inc. was filed on 6/6/2019 with a certificate of
service signed by plaintiff’s counsel, for service on defendant, Paul Seibel.
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The document purports to agree that the decedent was in default prior to her
death despite this Court’s denial of the earlier motion.
It is well established that a corporation cannot appear in court through
an officer or employee who is not an attorney admitted to practice law in this
state. Union Sav. Ass’n. v. Home Owners Aid, Inc., 23 Ohio St. 2d 60 (1970),
syllabus. See R.C. 4705.01. Accordingly, the Court STRIKES the subject
document. Civ. R. 12, Ohio R. Civ. P.
Plaintiff filed this action on 10/10/2018. The Court has checked the
Probate Division files and finds that an estate for the decedent, Phyllis Seibel,
was filed as Case No. 2018 EST 140, on February 1, 2018. There is no
indication that plaintiff has made a claim against the estate and a final account
was filed on August 6, 2018. Nevertheless, plaintiff started another estate
proceeding in the Probate Division.
Plaintiff’s Claims Against Defendants
Plaintiff’s complaint asserts a breach of contract claim against Phyllis
Seibel, a quantum meruit claim against both Phyllis and Paul Seibel, a
“Spousal Obligation” claim against Paul Seibel, each for the alleged unpaid
balance for services rendered to Phyllis prior to her death. It argues for
“quantum meruit” if the contract with Phyllis is found not to be enforceable.
The Court concludes that the agreement is no longer enforceable simply
because the contracting party, Phyllis is deceased, and plaintiff has failed to
file a claim against her estate. Plaintiff’s quantum meruit claim exists only if
there is not a contract. Here, there is no dispute that Phyllis signed the
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contract.
Plaintiff’s Claim Under R.C. 3103.03
Thus, plaintiff’s only claim for payment is against Paul Seibel. Plaintiff
asserts that Paul is liable to it for failure to pay the unpaid balance as
necessaries for his wife. It asserts that its claim is the cost of the care provided
to Phyllis Seibel. It describes the claim as “spousal obligation.” It bases the
claim on R.C. 3103.03. Complaint, par. 24. The plaintiff asserts that it has
standing to pursue payment from Paul Seibel under the necessaries statute.
The statute specifically provides the claim to a creditor of a spouse.
The Supreme Court of Ohio recently addressed this issue in Embassy
Healthcare v. Bell, 155 Ohio St. 3d 430, 2018-Ohio-4912, 122 N.E.3d 117.
The Court stated: “We conclude that a creditor must present its claim for
unpaid necessaries to the decedent’s estate under R.C. 2117.06 before it can
pursue a claim individually against the surviving spouse under R.C. 3103.03.”
¶2 and ¶34. Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment does not indicate that it
filed a claim with the decedent’s estate and the Probate Court records confirm
that no such claim was filed even though the estate was in existence since
February 1, 2018. Such a claim must be presented within six months of the
decedent’s death. Id. Phyllis Seibel died on November 18, 2018. It is now
barred. Therefore, plaintiff has not met the requirements for pursuing
payment of the alleged unpaid balance against Paul Seibel. By not timely
filing a claim against the decedent’s estate, plaintiff has forfeited any right to
use R.C. 1303.03 to pursue payment from Paul Seibel.
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CONCLUSION
The Court finds that plaintiff cannot pursue a claim for necessaries
against the surviving spouse, Paul Seibel, because it fails to set forth
compliance with a condition precedent to filing such a claim. The time for
filing such a claim with the decedent’s estate has expired. Accordingly, this
action is DISMISSED.
{¶ 12} On August 21, 2019, Brookhaven sought relief from judgment, pursuant to
Civ.R. 60(B). Brookhaven argued that the court apparently was referring to a Phyllis Seibel
who died on December 31, 2017 as probated in Montgomery P.C. No. 2018 EST 00140;
Brookhaven stated that this was not the Phyllis Seibel at issue in this case. Brookhaven
informed the court that this case involved a Phyllis Seibel who died on November 18, 2018,
as probated in Montgomery P.C. No. 2019 EST 00357. Brookhaven argued that “the
Court’s reasoning and assumption that Plaintiff filed suit against a person who was known
to be deceased is false and therefore cannot provide the basis for the Court’s conclusion.”
{¶ 13} Brookhaven further argued that the trial court had previously recognized that
a motion for default judgment was appropriate and had acknowledged Brookhaven’s efforts
regarding Mrs. Seibel’s estate. Brookhaven asserts that its claim under R.C. 3103.03 was
valid and complied with the Ohio Supreme Court’s requirements in Embassy Healthcare v.
Bell, 155 Ohio St. 3d 430, 2018-Ohio-4912, 122 N.E.3d 117.
{¶ 14} Brookhaven attached to its Civ.R. 60(B) motion (1) Mrs. Seibel’s death
certificate showing a date of death of November 18, 2018, (2) the Entry Appointing Fiduciary
naming HCF Management, (3) Brookhaven nursing home’s claim, dated May 14, 2019, (4)
the Inventory and Appraisal, and (5) the Schedule of Assets.
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{¶ 15} The trial court denied the motion for relief from judgment. The trial court
acknowledged that it made an “incorrect reference” to the estate of Phyllis Seibel, but
considered the mistake to be inconsequential to its resolution of the motion for default
judgment. It reasoned that Brookhaven “did not provide documentation that it had filed its
claim against the estate in seeking a default judgment” against Mr. Seibel and the estate
administrator. The court further indicated that “arguably the decedent Phyllis Seibel had
not been properly served.” The court further reasoned:
At no time prior to judgment did plaintiff present evidence that it complied with
the condition precedent for standing to pursue its claim against Phyllis’s
husband, Paul Seibel. “We conclude that a creditor must present its claim for
unpaid necessaries to the decedent’s estate under R.C. 2117.06 before it can
pursue a claim individually against the surviving spouse under R.C. 3103.03.”
Embassy Healthcare v. Bell, 155 Ohio St. 3d 430, 2018-Ohio-4912. Plaintiff
now argues that it filed its claim against the Estate of Phyllis R. Seibel on
5/14/2019, within six months of her death. It argues that the Court erred in
stating that it had not filed its claim against the estate within the statutory time
period. Although the reference was to the incorrect estate, the Court correctly
noted that it had not been informed that such a claim had been made or that
the estate was not solvent. The erroneous reference was not determinative.
Plaintiff had not shown that it was entitled to pursue relief against Paul Seibel
because it had exhausted any remedy against Phyllis Seibel’s estate before
pursuing the claim under R.C. 3103.03. Embassy Healthcare v. Bell, supra.
{¶ 16} As to the Civ.R. 60(B) requirements, the court noted that the motion was
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timely, but concluded that Brookhaven did not allege a meritorious claim even if it had
standing. The court further stated that Brookhaven did not argue that its failure constituted
excusable neglect, and that “[n]o other Rule 60 ground is apparent.”
{¶ 17} Brookhaven appeals from the dismissal of its action and the denial of its Civ.R.
60(B) motion. In its assignment of error, Brookhaven claims that the trial court erred “by
not granting Plaintiff a default judgment when Defendants were both in default for answer or
other pleading, and Plaintiff’s Complaint stated a valid claim for relief. (Civ.R. 55(A)).”
Although not raised as a separate assignment of error, Brookhaven further argues that the
trial court abused its discretion by denying Brookhaven’s motion for relief from judgment.
II. Timeliness of Brookhaven’s Appeal from Dismissal Judgment
{¶ 18} At the outset, the trial court entered its judgment of dismissal on August 13,
2019, and denied Brookhaven’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion on September 20, 2019. Brookhaven
filed its notice of appeal from both judgments on October 7, 2019, within 30 days of the
denial of the Civ.R. 60(B) motion, but more than 30 days after the dismissal judgment.
{¶ 19} Civ.R. 58(B) addresses the entry of judgment. It provides:
When the court signs a judgment, the court shall endorse thereon a direction
to the clerk to serve upon all parties not in default for failure to appear notice
of the judgment and its date of entry upon the journal. Within three days of
entering the judgment upon the journal, the clerk shall serve the parties in a
manner prescribed by Civ.R. 5(B) and note the service in the appearance
docket. Upon serving the notice and notation of the service in the appearance
docket, the service is complete. The failure of the clerk to serve notice does
not affect the validity of the judgment or the running of the time for appeal
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except as provided in App.R. 4(A).
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 20} App.R. 4(A)(1) requires that the notice of appeal be filed within 30 days of the
entry of judgment. However, App.R. 4(A)(3) further provides: “In a civil case, if the clerk
has not completed service of the order within the three-day period prescribed in Civ.R. 58(B),
the 30-day periods referenced in App.R. 4(A)(1) and 4(A)(2) begin to run on the date when
the clerk actually completes service.” The Ohio Supreme Court has unanimously held that
“[t]he 30-day time period to file a notice of appeal begins upon service of notice of the
judgment and notation of service on the docket by the clerk of courts regardless of actual
knowledge of the judgment by the parties.” Clermont Cty. Transp. Improvement Dist. v.
Gator Milford, L.L.C., 141 Ohio St. 3d 542, 2015-Ohio-241, 26 N.E.3d 806, syllabus.
{¶ 21} The record reflects that the court served Brookhaven with the August 13, 2019
judgment electronically and served Mr. Seibel by ordinary mail. The record does not show,
however, that the clerk noted the service in the appearance docket. As a result, the clerk
did not “complete service” of the August 13, 2019 judgment and the time for filing an appeal
from that judgment did not begin to run. Although Brookhaven’s notice of appeal was filed
more than 30 days after the entry of the August 13 judgment, we conclude that Brookhaven’s
appeal from both judgments was timely.
III. Dismissal of Brookhaven’s Action
{¶ 22} At the time the trial court dismissed Brookhaven’s action, the motion before it
was Brookhaven’s motion for default judgment, filed on June 20, 2019. Default judgments
are governed by Civ.R. 55, which provides in part: “When a party against whom a judgment
for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these
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rules, the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply in writing or orally to the court
therefor[.]”
{¶ 23} Civ.R. 55 generally authorizes the entry of a default judgment based on the
fact that the defending party has failed to plead or otherwise defend against the claims. See
Lane v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-197, 2018-Ohio-3140, ¶ 9, citing
Ohio Valley Radiology Assocs., Inc. v. Ohio Valley Hosp. Assn., 28 Ohio St. 3d 118, 121,
502 N.E.2d 599 (1986) (“Typically, the entry of default judgment is proper because the failure
to appear or defend against the plaintiff’s claims is deemed a confession of their veracity,
and, therefore, an admission of liability.”).
{¶ 24} Here, Mr. Seibel was served with the complaint and failed to answer. The
record reflects that Mrs. Seibel was served and failed to file a timely answer within her
lifetime. After her death, the administrator of Mrs. Seibel’s estate was substituted as a party
for Mrs. Seibel, yet the administrator failed to file an answer by and through counsel. The
burden was on the defending parties to raise, by answer or motion, any deficiencies in
Brookhaven’s claims.
{¶ 25} The trial court’s August 13 judgment stated that the matter was before the trial
court “on the submission by counsel for plaintiff of an entry for default judgment,” but the
court did not mention Civ.R. 55 nor did it discuss that Rule’s requirements in its analysis.
Rather, the trial court appeared to convert the motion to one under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) or Civ.R.
56 and sua sponte dismissed Brookhaven’s action, concluding that Brookhaven “fail[ed] to
set forth compliance with a condition precedent to filing” a claim for necessaries against Mr.
Seibel and failed to file a claim against Mrs. Seibel’s estate. Further, the court based its
factual findings and legal conclusions on the record in Probate Case No. 2018 EST 140,
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which was unrelated to the parties in this case.
{¶ 26} A court may dismiss a complaint sua sponte if the complaint “is frivolous or the
claimant obviously cannot prevail on the facts alleged in the complaint.” State ex rel. Scott
v. Cleveland, 112 Ohio St. 3d 324, 2006-Ohio-6573, 859 N.E.2d 923, ¶ 14. A trial court’s
summary dismissal of an action is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State ex rel. Fogle
v. Steiner, 74 Ohio St. 3d 158, 160-161, 656 N.E.2d 1288 (1995). A court abuses its
discretion by acting in a manner that is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable. State
ex rel. Askew v. Goldhart, 75 Ohio St. 3d 608, 610, 665 N.E.2d 200 (1996).
{¶ 27} We addressed a trial court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint in Tarver v.
IRS Dept., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26741, 2016-Ohio-3199:
“In general, a court may dismiss a complaint on its own motion pursuant
to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) only if the parties are given notice of the court’s intention to
dismiss and an opportunity to respond.” A trial court errs when it dismisses a
complaint “sua sponte, without first notifying all parties of its intent.” “The
notice requirement exists in order to insure that, to the extent possible, cases
are decided on the merits and that a party facing dismissal is given the
opportunity to obey the court order in question by either curing the defect,
proceeding with the matter or voluntarily dismissing the case without
prejudice.”
“A sua sponte dismissal without notice or an opportunity to respond is
fundamentally unfair to litigants.” “It places the court in the role of a proponent
rather than an independent entity.” “Sua sponte dismissals also prejudice
[plaintiffs] as they deny any opportunity to respond to the alleged
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insufficiencies.”
(Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 5-6.
{¶ 28} The trial court erred in failing to provide notice to Brookhaven that it intended
to dismiss the complaint. This error was compounded by the court’s taking of judicial notice
of facts contained in the record in Probate Case No. 2018 EST 00140. While a court may
take notice of judicial opinions and public records available through the Internet, e.g., State
v. Bevers, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 27651, 2018-Ohio-4135, ¶ 13, a review of the
Montgomery County Probate Court’s online docket reflects two probate cases for decedents
named Phyllis Seibel.
{¶ 29} The suggestion of death filed by Brookhaven’s counsel indicated that Mrs.
Seibel died on November 18, 2018, and counsel subsequently informed the trial court that
HCF Management had been appointed as the administrator of Mrs. Seibel’s estate in
Probate Case No. 2018 EST 00357. The death certificate in that case corroborated Mrs.
Seibel’s date of death and listed Paul Seibel as her spouse. In contrast, the death
certificate in Probate Case No. 2018 EST 00140 showed a date of death of December 31,
2017 (prior to the filing of Brookhaven’s complaint), and indicated that the decedent was
widowed and not remarried.
{¶ 30} When the trial court dismissed Brookhaven’s action, the death certificates had
been filed in both probate cases. A review of the probate cases established that the probate
cases involved different individuals and that the correct case for Mrs. Seibel was Probate
Case No. 2019 EST 00357. There was nothing in Probate Case No. 2018 EST 00140 to
suggest that the decedents in the two cases were the same individual or that counsel for
Brookhaven was mistaken when it cited to Probate Case No. 2018 EST 00357 in
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Brookhaven’s filings.
{¶ 31} Even if the record in the probate case were relevant to Brookhaven’s motion
for default judgment, the trial court improperly relied on facts gleaned from Probate Case
No. 2018 EST 00140 in determining that Brookhaven could not pursue its claims against Mr.
Seibel or Mrs. Seibel’s estate. Most notably, the trial court incorrectly found that Mrs. Seibel
had died prior to the filing of Brookhaven’s complaint and that Brookhaven failed to make a
timely claim against Mrs. Seibel’s estate. The trial court’s failure to provide Brookhaven
notice of the possible dismissal of its case based on the record in Probate Case No. 2018
EST 00140 denied Brookhaven the opportunity to clarify which probate case related to Mrs.
Seibel and how Brookhaven’s actions in the probate court affected, if at all, Brookhaven’s
claims.
{¶ 32} The trial court arguably attempted to consider Mrs. Seibel’s probate case
(although it ultimately looked at the case for the wrong Phyllis Seibel) as part of its review of
Brookhaven’s motion for default judgment.
{¶ 33} This court has recognized that a default judgment is not proper when the
complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. See Brown v. Christianson,
2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28188, 2019-Ohio-2937, ¶ 13, citing Buckeye Supply Co. v.
Northeast Drilling Co., 24 Ohio App. 3d 134, 135-136, 493 N.E.2d 964 (9th Dist.1985), citing
Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. Leist, 117 Ohio App. 20, 25-26, 189 N.E.2d 456 (4th
Dist.1962). Some Ohio appellate cases have held that a movant is not entitled to a default
judgment if the complaint does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted, see, e.g.,
Lane, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 18AP-197, 2018-Ohio-3140 (the trial court properly took judicial
notice of a prior case and applied res judicata in denying plaintiff’s motion for default
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judgment and dismissing an action), while others address the issue in the context of whether
relief from such a judgment should be granted. See, e.g., Brown at ¶ 13 (Civ.R. 60(B)(5)
would allow relief from judgment where a plaintiff has obtained a default judgment against a
defendant despite having no legal right to recovery); Natl. Collegiate Student Loan Tr. 2003-
1 v. Beverly, 6th Dist. Huron No. H-13-010, 2014-Ohio-4346; Student Loan Marketing Assn.
v. Karnavas, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 92-T-4718, 1993 WL 164709, *2 (May 14, 1993);
Buckeye Supply Co.
{¶ 34} Even if the trial court concluded that it required more information (i.e.,
information from Mrs. Seibel’s probate case) to determine whether Brookville stated a claim
for relief, Civ.R. 55(A) addresses situations where the factual questions make the right to a
default judgment unclear. It provides, in part:
If, in order to enable the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is
necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to
establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of
any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings or order such
references as it deems necessary and proper and shall when applicable
accord a right of trial by jury to the parties.
{¶ 35} To the extent that the trial court had factual questions about Brookhaven’s
entitlement to a default judgment, the trial court could have conducted a hearing to resolve
those matters. However, the trial court did not notify the parties that factual questions
existed, conduct any hearing, or otherwise “order such references as it deems necessary.”
Moreover, the trial court did not simply deny the motion for default judgment. Instead,
based on its factual findings and legal conclusions upon review of the (incorrect) probate
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court record, the court dismissed Brookhaven’s action.
{¶ 36} In short, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in sua sponte
dismissing Brookhaven’s action.
IV. Civ.R. 60(B) Motion
{¶ 37} Brookhaven also challenges the trial court’s denial of its motion for relief from
judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). In light of our conclusions regarding the trial court’s
dismissal of Brookhaven’s action, Brookhaven’s appeal from the September 20, 2019
judgment denying Civ.R. 60(B) relief is moot.
V. Conclusion
{¶ 38} The trial court’s August 13, 2019 judgment of dismissal is reversed, and the
matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
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HALL, J. and WELBAUM, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Robert C. Wiesenmayer
Paul Seibel
HCF Management
Hon. Richard Skelton