DocketNumber: Appeal No. C-990155. Trial No. B-9805641B.
Filed Date: 12/8/1999
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 7/6/2016
As part of a plea bargain, defendant-appellant, Judy Lightner, pleaded guilty to and was convicted of one count of forgery pursuant to R.C.
First, she contends that the trial court did not inform her that she had a right to compulsory process and that she could subpoena witnesses on her behalf. The record shows that the trial court informed appellant that if she went to trial, she "would have the right to require witnesses to come to court to testify" for her at trial. Further, appellant signed a written guilty plea that specifically stated that, by pleading guilty, she gave up her constitutional right "to have subpoenaed witnesses in [her] favor[.]" Consequently, the trial court fully complied with the provision of Crim.R. 11(C) regarding informing appellant of her right to compulsory process. See State v. Billups (1979),
Appellant further contends that although the trial court informed her that any prison time she received could be extended if she violated the rules of the institution, it did not advise her that the court's sentence "would automatically include any such extension of time imposed by the parole board at the institution" as required by R.C.
The record shows that that trial court specifically stated to appellant, "[I]f you were to receive a prison sentence, * * * you can add to your sentence in this case based [upon] what you do in the future. If you were in prison and committed new crimes, the prison authorities could add to your sentence by up to one half for any one new crime you committed." Further, the written guilty plea also specifically stated, "I know if I commit a crime in prison, the parole board could increase my prison time up to 50% of my stated term in 15, 30, 60, or 90 day increments." Consequently, the record shows that the trial court fully complied with the requirements of R.C.
Finally, appellant contends that the trial court failed to inform her that she could receive consecutive sentences. The Ohio Supreme Court has specifically held that the trial court's failure to inform a defendant who pleads guilty to more than one offense that the court may order consecutive sentences is not a violation of Crim.R. 11(C) and does not render the plea involuntary. State v. Johnson (1988),
In sum, our review of the record demonstrates that the trial court strictly complied with the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C) regarding the constitutional rights enumerated in Boykin v.Alabama (1969),
Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Further, a certified copy of this Judgment Entry shall constitute the mandate, which shall be sent to the trial court under App.R. 27. Costs shall be taxed under App.R. 24.
Doan, P.J., Hildebrandt and Painter, JJ.